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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, state governments throughout
this country have engaged in a massive movement to reform
the laws of divorce custody.1 Most of these states have
adopted various forms of so-called "joint custody."2 At the
1. The literature on divorce custody laws and the reform of those laws requires
a full-scale bibliography and not a mere footnote. The best recent overview of these
reforms is Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and Mediation
on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2 INT'L J.L. &
FAM. 106 (1988). Numerous other articles are cited throughout this Article.
2. A summary in Family Law Quarterly (accurate as of August, 1988) reported
that 34 states had adopted some form of joint-custody legislation, and that two more
had approved of joint custody in their case law. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in
the Fifty States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 467 (1989). This survey does not
count Washington State among the joint-custody jurisdictions, although the state's
new Parenting Act is arguably a joint-custody-type statute. See, e.g., infra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text.
Joint custody means many things to many people and comes in many legislative
guises. The clearest categorization of the different legal options appears in Schulman &
Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and its Implica-
tions for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 539 (1982). Schulman and
FALL 1990]
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same time, numerous advocates and scholars (theorists and
empiricists alike) have pointed to the dangers, especially for
women and children, of some or all legislative varieties of joint
custody.3 During this period, reform of the "process" of
divorce has also received much attention.4 Skepticism about
the role of the adversarial system and its primary representa-
tive-the divorce lawyer-preceded "no fault" reforms and
continues unabated.5 More and more jurisdictions now permit
Pitt break joint custody into its two standard components, "joint legal" and "joint
physical" custody, and state that the former "connotes parents' equal legal rights, or
authority, to make the vital decisions affecting the child's life"; the latter refers to
"parents' alternating 'physical care and living time with the child.' " Id. at 542
(quoting Levy & Chambers, The Folly of Joint Custody, FAM. ADvoc., Spring 1981,
at 6, 9). They then categorize joint-custody legislation as belonging to one of four
types: "(1) joint custody as an option; (2) joint custody as an option only when parties
are in agreement; (3) joint custody upon the request of one party; (4) joint custody
'preference' and 'presumption.' "Id. at 546.
3. See generally Emery, Children in the Divorce Process, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOLOGY
141, 143-44 (1988) (advocating joint legal but not joint physical custody in all cases);
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727 (1988); Johnston, Kline & Tschann,
Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent
Access. 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576 (1989) (presenting research findings that
caution against encouraging or mandating joint custody or frequent access when
parents are in ongoing disputes); Schulman & Pitt, supra note 2; Scott & Derdeyn,
Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984); Steinman, Joint Custody:
What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative
Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739 (1983); Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch,
A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce: Who Reaches
Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554 (1985). But see Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in Children
of Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOLOGY
119 (1988) [hereinafter Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustments] (promoting both legal and
physical joint custody as a matter of policy); Kelly, Further Thoughts on Longer-Term
Adjustment in Children of Divorce, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1988) [hereinafter
Kelly, Further Thoughts] (same).
4. For a useful summary, see Bruch, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model
Statute & Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1969) (criticizing various aspects of the fault
system); Hawke, Divorce Procedure: A Fraud on Children, Spouses and Society, 3
FAM. L.Q. 240 (1969) (same); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (questioning the lawyer's role
and the necessity of judicial scrutiny of divorce settlements).
The literature on post-no-fault "process" reform is also too voluminous for
convenient citation in a note. Much of the literature advocating alternative dispute
resolution in divorce is implicitly, even when it is not explicitly, a critique of the
traditional adversarial system. A seminal work on mediation is 0. COOGLER,
STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978). An excellent selection of
readings on various process reforms is found in Carbonneau, A Consideration of
Alternatives to Divorce Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1120 n.2. Fineman,
supra note 3, has numerous citations to this literature. A useful recent collection of
essays, both theoretical and empirical, on divorce mediation is J. FOLBERG & A.
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a court to require parents to go through mediation before
proceeding to trial.6 Recently, however, some scholars have
criticized these alternative dispute resolution procedures,
especially mandatory mediation.7  Other scholars have
examined the actual practices of divorce attorneys in an effort
to provide better information on the reality of the law's
informal processes, processes that govern the great majority
of divorce cases.8
MILNE, DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1988). See also Hobbs,
Facilitative Ethics in Divorce Mediation: A Law and Process Approach, 22 U. RICH.
L. REV. 325 (1988); Silberman & Schepard, Court-Ordered Mediation in Family
Disputes: The New York Proposal, 14 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 741 (1986). Of
particular interest is the recent FAMILY LAW SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES: SEARCHING FOR SOLOMON (1989) [hereinafter ABA FAMILY LAW
SECTION, CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES] (transcripts from the Wingspread Conference of
conversations among lawyersjudges, and social scientists on custody issues including
"Contested Custody and the Courts").
6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1983
& Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 44.101 (1988);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601, -602 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:351-:356 (West
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 214.4, 581.4, 636, 665, 752 (1989); MINN.
STAT. § 518.619 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-1 to -6 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.015 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11 (West Supp. 1990). New legislation is
passed with regularity.
7. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3; Teitelbaum & DuPaix, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1093 (1988); Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law
Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985). Other authors have noted the negative
effect of mandatory mediation rules on victims of spousal abuse. See, e.g., Sun &
Thomas, Custody Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
562, 572-73 (1987); Note, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for
Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 437-38 (1985) (authored by Linda R.
Keenan); see also Ellis, Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separation Wife Abuse,
8 LAw & INEQUALITY 317 (1990).
8. Hubert O'Gorman was a pioneer in this field with H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS
AND MATRIMONIAL CASES (1963). More recent works include K. KRESSEL, THE
PROCESS OF DIVORCE (1985); Cavanagh & Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law
and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976); Erlanger,
Chambliss, & Melli, Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions
from the Divorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 585 (1987); Griffith, What Do Dutch
Lawyers Actually Do in Divorce Cases, 20 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 135 (1986); Kressel,
Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass & Deutsch, Professional Intervention in Divorce: A
Summary of the Views of Lawyers, Psychotherapists, and Clergy, 2 J. DIVORCE 119
(1978); Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory
Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133 (1988);
Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989) [hereinafter Sarat & Felstiner, Legal
Consciousness]; Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office,
20 LAw & SOCY REV. 93 (1986) [hereinafter Sarat & Feistiner, Law and Strategy].
For estimates of the percentages of divorce cases that are resolved by informal
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Of late, two trends have emerged. First, a number of
jurisdictions, as well as the American Bar Association's (ABA)
new Model Joint Custody Statute,9 have encouraged or
required the use of a device called a "parenting plan," where
parents elect some form of "joint custody" or "shared
parenting." °  Second, in response to growing public
awareness of the prevalence of child abuse and domestic
processes rather than formal litigation, see infra note 22.
9. The Model Joint Custody Statute is reprinted in 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1494
(Aug. 22, 1989). It was approved by the American Bar Association House of
Delegates at the ABA's 1989 Annual Meeting, but "at the urging of Peter Langrock
of Vermont, the house stopped short of urging state legislatures to adopt the model
statute." Id.
10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(3) (1987) ("In order to implement
joint custody, both parties may submit a plan or plans for the court's approval. If no
plan is submitted or if the court does not approve a submitted plan, the court, on its
own motion, shall formulate a plan which shall address and resolve, where
applicable, the parties' arrangements for ... (a) The location of both parties, the
periods of time during which each party will have physical custody of the child, and
the legal residence of the child; (b) The child's education; (c) The child's religious
training, if any; (d) The child's health care; (e) Finances to provide for the child's
needs; (f) Holidays and vacations; and (g) Any other factors affecting the physical or
emotional health and well-being of the child."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602.1
(1989) ("In such [joint-custody] cases, the court shall initially request the parents to
produce a Joint Parenting Agreement. Such Agreement shall specify each parent's
powers, rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and for major
decisions such as education, health care, and religious training. The Agreement shall
further specify a procedure by which proposed changes, disputes, and alleged
breaches may be mediated or otherwise resolved and shall provide for a periodic
review of its terms by the parents."); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 31 (1988) ("The court
shall require the parents to submit a plan in writing to the court within thirty days
of the entry of the temporary custody order setting forth the details of shared legal
custody including but not limited to procedures for resolving disputes . . . with
respect to child raising decisions and duties."); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
146A(1) (West 1982); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(4) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
223(2) (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(F) (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.04(D) (Baldwin 1989); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021 (Vernon Supp. 1990); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666 (1989).
The California Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts also
proposed the idea of a "plan" to the California State Legislature in AB 1612. See
ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY & CONCILIATION COURTS, NEWSL., Fall 1989, at 4.
The idea of a plan appears to have originated with mental health and family law
professionals affiliated with the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, who
were concerned with encouraging better cooperation between parents following
divorce. See, e.g., Shear, Developing Written Agreements And Working Effectively with
Attorneys, in CALIFORNIA CHAPTER, ASS'N OF FAMILY & CONCILIATION COURTS,
MEDIATION OF CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES: TRANSCRIPTS FROM THE
VALLAMBROSA RETREAT 58 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter VALLAMBROSA RETREAT
TRANSCRIPTS]; Ricci, The Divorce Process: Response and Reasons for Disputes, in
VALLAMBROSA RETREAT TRANSCRIPTS, supra, at 7; see also Steinman, supra note 3,
at 759 ("We have found that a very specific joint custody plan is useful psychologically
as well as legally.").
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violence, a number of jurisdictions around the country have
not been content to leave child protection to the traditional
parens patriae power 1 of the courts. 2 They have therefore
amended their statutes to include express references to
specific harmful behaviors that courts should heed in making
custody orders. 3
Although the virtues and faults of all these reforms can be
debated in the abstract ad infinitum and although empirical
studies are susceptible to methodological bias or interpretive
distortion, the insights provided by a combination of debate
and empiricism still give us the best material we have to work
with as our society continues to experiment with laws
governing-and touching-the lives of divorcing parents and
11. Parenspatriae power is the power of the state to act "to safeguard the welfare
of resident children, even at the expense of parental authority." Novinson, Post-
Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 175; see
also Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-917 (1975) (detailing the
history of the parens patriae doctrine).
12. Professor Bruch writes:
Although such concerns [spousal or child abuse] were traditionally an
accepted reason for denying custody or visitation rights, the recent emphasis
on parental access (sometimes expressed in joint custody or friendly parent
provisions) prompted many courts to turn a deaf ear to one parent's plea that
spousal or child abuse by the other parent required a traditional sole custody
order, perhaps even one with restricted visitation. Such arguments were
often viewed as mere efforts to avoid joint custody rather than as good faith
assertions of conditions justifying limited access by one parent. As a result,
some state legislatures have now enacted statutes reminding judges that a
legislative directive to encourage continued parental contact after divorce is
not a licence [sic] to ignore the court's responsibility to enter orders protecting
children and custodial parents from abuse ....
Bruch, supra note 1, at 113.
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(b) (Supp. 1990) (spouse abuse); CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4601.5, 4359 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (any history of abuse against
the child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989) (spouse abuse); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a)(6) (1989) (physical violence or threat of physical violence
against the child or another person); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3)(i) (West Supp.
1990) (safety of child, other children, or the other parent); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.02 1(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (physical or sexual abuse of spouse, parent, or child,
or a history of child neglect); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(4) (1987) (making
domestic violence a defense to an allegation of parental abandonment); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (Michie 1984) (same).
The ABA Model Joint Custody Statute, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1494, 1494 (Aug.
22, 1989), incorporates this trend in its Policy Section: "Joint custody is inappropriate
in cases in which spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping is likely to
occur."
72 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
their children. 4 This Article refines some old questions and
raises some new ones about divorce custody reform and about
the role of legal professionals in relation to that reform. To
put some flesh on the bones of theory, it uses as an
illustration an important recent statute, the Washington State
Parenting Act ("the Parenting Act" or "the Act").' 5
Legislation in other states may embody implicit compromises
between pro-joint-custody and anti-joint-custody advocates, but
this innovative statute self-consciously and explicitly
incorporates both "shared parenting" provisions and express
limitations on those provisions. 16  Although the Act requires
14. Robert Emery of the University of Virginia, a leading researcher on the effects
of divorce on children, has written:
Science is not always as objective as we idealize it to be .... My concern
is not with deliberate distortion. Rather, I am concerned thai we pay too
much attention to what we expect to find and too little attention to the
unexpected. I am equally concerned that we recognize that the methodology
employed in any given study can strongly influence its findings.'... The more
general lesson is that we cannot simply accept the conclusions of empirical
studies. We must carefully evaluate them.
Emery, supra note 3, at 141. He then adds that "[e]mpirical research on children and
divorce has grown considerably in terms of both quantity and sophistication,
however." Id.; see also Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107; Chambers,
The Abuses of Social Science: A Response to Fineman and Opie, 1987 WiS. L. REV.
159.
The debate about empirical work in the area of family law is only one piece of a
larger debate about the validity and utility of all so-called sociolegal studies. See
generally Review Symposium: Critical Empiricism and Sociolegal Studies, 14 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY (1989). It is true that empirical studies, indeed any fact, can be
misused by advocates of one or another political stance. Information has been subject
to abuse throughout human history, and some people are more prone than others to
hide their beliefs behind claims of"objectivity" and "evidence." I therefore share, and
advocate, a healthy skepticism about the use of empirical studies as the basis for
legal reform. I do not believe, however, that we should reject all searches for better
understanding through observation, particularly in an area like divorce law reform
where states continue to rewrite legislation with little or no knowledge of how those
laws operate in practice.
15. 1987 Wash. Laws 2015-42 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.002-.004,
.040-.050, .070, .110, .160, .181-.260, .280-.285, .907-.913 (1989)) (effective January
1, 1988).
16. See, e.g., WASH REV. CODE §§ 26.09.181-.191. The drafters of the Act do not
denominate or characterize their legislation as "joint custody" legislation. In place
of the term "joint custody," the drafters use the expression "shared parenting."
The absence of "joint custody" terminology does not change the fact that some
aspects of the law share some characteristics of certain types of joint-custody
statutes. See infra notes 166-67, 176-77, and accompanying text (discussing this
point). For a discussion of the way in which mental health professionals' language
(e.g. "shared parenting") has entered the realm of (and now arguably dominates)
custody reform debates, see Fineman, supra note 3, at 746-53.
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parents to file a "plan" concerning their postdivorce parental
arrangements, 17 its use of the plan is unusual and important
in two respects. First, the Act requires all parents-not only
those electing one or more aspects of shared parenting-to
complete a parenting plan at divorce.18  Second, the Act
specifies the components that must be included in a parenting
plan. 9
The Act reflects another trend as well. It lists a series of
parental behaviors that'the court must heed to protect
children and abused spouses from harm.2 ° This aspect of the
new law is significant not only because of the range of
behaviors it specifies as giving rise to limits on shared
parenting, but also because it requires limitations on each
plan component where certain behaviors are found.2 As a
result, the Act is arguably the nation's most extensive
regulation to date of the "private ordering" process.22
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (1989). As noted by the authors of one leading
family law casebook, "The (Washington Parenting] Act's structure is reminiscent of
the plans often requested or required by courts considering joint custody." I. ELLMAN,
P. KuRTZ, A. STANTON & D. KARJALA, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS,
INSTRUCTORS' SUPPLEMENT 39 (1988). The structure of the "parenting plan" is
described in Part II.C. infra. The drafters of the Act do not characterize their
legislation as "joint custody" legislation. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181(1).
19. Id. § 26.09.184; see infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
20. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191.
21. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
22. I take the phrase "private ordering" from the influential work of Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 5, who, in turn, refer to a definition of "private ordering,"
attributed to Professor Lon Fuller, as " 'law' that parties bring into existence by
agreement." Id. at 950 n.1; see also infra note 48. Since Mnookin & Kornhauser first
used this expression, another group of scholars has called into question any conno-
tation of autonomy conveyed by the phrase "private ordering." Their empirically
based work depicts a world in which private parties in an emotionally vulnerable
state are influenced strongly by attorneys' interpretations of vague or indeterminate
laws, the threat of costly litigation, or their own impatience, and arrive at necessary
and necessarily imperfect solutions to disputes. Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, supra
note 8. They conclude their paper with the observation that the prevailing image of
settlement as the negotiation of an agreement is inaccurate. Id. at 602. Their
findings are not dissimilar to the work of other noted empiricists who have examined
and criticized the lawyer-client interaction. See Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy,
supra note 8; Sarat & Felstiner, Legal Consciousness, supra note 8.
Because over 90% of divorce cases end in settlement rather than trial, this
innovative attempt to control the agreements or settlements of parents is of
particular significance. The standard figure given for the number of contested
custody cases is approximately 10% of cases. See, e.g., Levy, Comment on the
Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 525, 530 (1984)
("[S]omething like 85 to 90 percent of divorce cases are settled by the spouses and
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The Parenting Act therefore provides an opportunity to
study important recent trends in custody reform as applied to
actual human lives by actual parties and professionals. An
examination of a law in practice as opposed to that same law
in theory provides, in turn, an occasion to reevaluate the
state's role in regulating the arrangements of family members
during and following divorce.
Beginning with an overview of the "law in theory" in Part
II, this Article describes the Parenting Act's political origins
and the aspirations on which the Act was based. These
aspirations reflect common contemporary national themes and
are based on common (and often unexamined) assumptions
about the purposes of custody law and, indeed, the nature and
capacity of law itself. They are described in conjunction with
major theoretical arguments about custody reform. Part II
then sets out the specific regulations embodying the drafters'
goals. The Article next looks at this ambitious new "law in
practice" in Part III. It describes the ways in which the law
was communicated to and received by family law professionals
and the practical, ethical, and attitudinal barriers these
regulations encountered-especially from counsel and
courts-in the new law's first year of implementation. This
Part describes the significant role legal professionals play in
shaping or resisting this implementation process. It also
examines the written arrangements made by parents in a
sample of approximately three hundred cases. In addition,
this section compares this information, whenever possible, to
empirical findings from other jurisdictions. Finally, Part IV
of this Article discusses the implications of the insights
gleaned from this study.
The results of this examination provide important insights
into the behavior of parties, courts, and counsel during a new
law's initial emergence. And these observations, in turn,
highlight issues important to any jurisdiction that has or is
considering similar regulations and that is concerned, as all
jurisdictions should be, with both the actual operation of
statutes and the influence of legal professionals on the
arrangements made by divorcing parents and their children.
their lawyers prior to trial!"). In King County, Washington, one source of data for
this study, the number is even smaller: 4% or less. See infra note 144.
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II. THE LAW IN THEORY
A. A Brief History
In 1987, the Washington State Legislature passed a contro-
versial new statute, the Washington State Parenting Act.23
An odd amalgam of current cultural themes in family law, the
Act reflects the political concerns of its time and contains the
inevitable compromises struck by drafters and legislators. In
the early 1980s, Washington, like many other states around
the country, 24 was considering a number of different joint-
custody bills. 25  Following the defeat of the most recent of a
number of such statutes, a multidisciplinary committee got
together to try its hand at drafting an innovative law that
would be acceptable to a larger constituency.26 Although the
original members of this Ad Hoc Drafting Committee had
different interests and perspectives-they were family law or
mental health professionals-they all advocated a "shared
23. See supra note 15.
24. For example, Colorado and Florida passed joint-custody legislation during this
period. See 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 645 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10
(1987)); 1982 Fla. Laws 233 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1984)).
25. See S.S.B. 4027, 48th Leg. (1983); H.B. 695, 48th Leg. (1983); H.B. 403, 48th
Leg. (1983); E.S.H.B. 905, 47th Leg. (1982); S.B. 4509, 47th Leg. (1982); H.B. 473,
47th Leg. (1981); S.B. 3246, 47th Leg. (1981).
26. COMMENTARY TO 1987 PARENTING ACT, CHAPTER 460 LAWS OF WASHINGTON
1987, at 9-10 (1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. The final version of the commentary
does not have official pagination. I have called the "preface" page ii, and have begun
consecutive numbering at page 1 on the page captioned "Be it enacted . . ." The
commentary was authored by the nine-member Ad Hoc Drafting Committee along
with three additional experienced family law attorneys. The preface to the
commentary states:
This commentary to the 1987 Parenting Act has been prepared to serve
the same function as the Official Comments that were drafted to such uniform
laws as the Uniform Parentage Act or the Uniform Commercial Code or to the
Federal Court Rules....
The commentary is intended to assist attorneys, judges, court workers,
litigants, scholars and others in understanding the substance, origins and
intentions behind the 1987 Parenting Act. This commentary should not be cited
as authoritative legislative intent ....
COMMENTARY, supra, at ii. In spite of the disclaimer at the end, with respect to
authoritative legislative intent, the commentary has been described in training sessions
to numerous state judges, commissioners and attorneys as the definitive statement of
the Act's meaning and purpose. Address by Representative Marlin Appelwick at a
Continuing Legal Education Seminar sponsored by the Seattle-King County Bar
Association (Apr. 22, 1988).
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parenting" model.27 They hoped this model would facilitate
less-contentious divorces and encourage shared parental
responsibilities after divorce.2 ' Later on, the committee
brought in as co-drafters several other family law experts who
worked in the public sector. These new committee members,
who were highly experienced with a client base that included
many low-income women and their children, brought a
separate set of concerns. They wished to ensure both that a
"shared parenting" bill would not further harm the already
weak financial position of women in divorce and that
vulnerable parties-women and children who had been victims
of abuse or violence-would be protected against further
harms.2 9
27. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 10.
28. See id. at 11-13.
29. The origins and precise make-up of this group of self-appointed experts is a
story unto itself to be told at greater length elsewhere. One of the founders of the
original ("shared parenting") group described the invitation to the additional
committee members as an inevitable and necessary reaction to the political power
wielded by "women's groups" in the State of Washington. Interview with Drafter D
(Sept. 13, 1988). (Several drafters requested anonymity in these interviews; to
conceal their identities, I have concealed the identities of all of the drafters with
whom I spoke, not merely of those who so requested.) Similarly, the newer members
of the committee felt it was important to join the group and thus have a role in
drafting the new Act. They were particularly concerned with establishing a primary
caretaker rule, and with statutory protections in cases involving domestic violence.
Interview with Drafter A (Sept. 20, 1988).
The "shared parenting" advocates were not unsympathetic to the concerns about
women and children and were willing to accommodate those concerns. "But," as one
of the original drafters stated, "we considered men's issues equally valid, especially
[fathers'] feelings of disenfranchisement [following divorce]." Telephone interview
with Drafter C (Aug. 25, 1988). Whether this working alliance of very different
interest groups is perceived as mutual cooperation or a politically necessary mutual
co-optation, it is an historically significant event, standing in contrast to the passage
ofjoint-custody legislation around the country. See H. JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION 138
(1988). Jacob observes that "feminist organizations were relatively quiescent" with
respect to the initial passage of joint-custody statutes in many states around the
country. Id. He attributes the lack of political involvement to feminist "inability to
monitor continuously the activities of state legislatures" and to "the ambivalence
many feminists felt toward joint custody." Id; cf. Kay, An Appraisal of California's
No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 300 (1987) (describing the role of the
California Commission on the Status of Women in California's no-fault divorce reform
and noting that the Commission supported removal of fault as a desirable elimination
of hypocrisy, not as a reform promising gender equality at divorce.)
At the same time, it was not an alliance without tension. Many, if not all, of the
ambiguities in and possible conflicts between different sections of the Parenting Act
can be traced to the tensions and compromises between the interests of "shared
parenting" advocates and feminists. Interviews with Drafter A (Sept. 20, 1988),
Drafter B (Aug. 10, 1988), and Drafter D (Sept. 13, 1988).
Some of the original group also attempted to keep in contact with fathers' rights
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The different constituencies represented by members of the
Ad Hoc Drafting Committee each got something of what they
desired. Those concerned with "shared parenting" concepts got
a statutory statement of policy that "the relationship between
the child and each parent should be fostered unless
inconsistent with the child's best interests."30  They also
obtained substantive rules that allow the court to order
"mutual decision-making," alternative dispute resolution
methods and sharing of "residential care" in cases where the
parents did not agree to such sharing.3 1  Furthermore, the
Act requires all parents to agree to or settle on many details
of postdivorce child rearing in a mandatory "parenting plan,"
the structure of which bears a strong resemblance to the sorts
of plans sometimes required in jurisdictions with joint-custody
legislation.32
Those members concerned with the needs of women and
children won safeguards against some of the perceived dangers
of joint-custody legislation with passage of sections listing
express limitations on each aspect of shared parenting 3 and
sanctions for bad faith negotiation. 34  As the drafters'
commentary to the Act states:
The [former law] fails to protect persons who are
vulnerable. There is often a substantial power imbal-
ance between the parties because of physical, emotional,
or economic differences, or where certain types of
conduct, particularly spousal abuse and child abuse,
have occurred. In such situations, the current system
groups, and different drafts of the Act were sent to these groups as well. According
to one member of the Drafting Committee, with the exception of one group in
Spokane that expressed its opposition, the fathers' rights groups seemed to lose
interest and simply stopped responding. Interview with Drafter D (Sept. 13, 1988).
Fathers' rights groups in the state have been vociferous in their opposition to the Act
since its passage because it rejected a joint-custody presumption. See, e.g., D. Milne,
Sexism in the Washington State Law (paper submitted to Washington State Task
Force on Gender & Justice) (copy on file with Jane W. Ellis) ("The radical feminists
... struck a catastrophic blow with the Parenting Act of 1987."); Civil Rights Battle
of 1990's: Dads' Rights in Custody Cases, Olympia, Apr. 13, 1989, at 3B, col. 4.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002 (1989).
31. Id. § 26.09.184(3)-(5), reprinted in Appendix.
32. See supra note 10.
33. These are the "section 10" limitations. See infra note 96 (describing why this
section is called § 10). These restrictions on parent-child and parent-parent contact,
codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191 (1989), are reprinted in the Appendix to this
Article.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160; see infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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fails to properly:
a. limit or prohibit joint custody or other provisions
which require forced and inappropriate continuing
contact between the parties
b. sanction [sic] or prohibit the abusive use of a custody
challenge as a bargaining weapon to gain reduced or
"apportioned" support awards or other concessions;
c. identify and protect unrepresented vulnerable par-
ties.35
They also obtained language that arguably creates a statutory
"preference," though not a "presumption," for the primary
caretaker in the event of disputes over a child's "residential
schedule."36
35. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 5.
36. I borrow the word "preference" from O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds:
Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D.L. REV. 481 (1987) and
from J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 66-67 (1986) [hereinafter IN THE BEST INTERESTS] (advocating "primary
caregiver preference"). Under O'Kelly's recommended scheme, primary caretaking
is "weighed more heavily than other considerations." O'Kelly, supra, at 483. A
"preference" approach stands in contrast to a "presumption" favoring a primary
caretaker such as that adopted by Justice Neely in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,
364 (W. Va. 1981), where once a parent is identified according to explicit caretaking
criteria as primary caretaker, "the sole remaining question is whether that parent is
fit." O'Kelly, supra, at 534.
The pertinent section of the statute, reprinted in the Appendix to this Article,
directs the court to consider for purposes of determining a residential schedule, inter
alia, "(i) [t]he relative strength, nature, and stability of the child's relationship with
each parent, including whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for
performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child." WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)(i) (1989) ("factor (i)"). Parenting functions are explicit tasks
and responsibilities defined in another section of the statute, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.004(3), reprinted in Appendix. In all, there are seven statutory factors for
residential provisions, but the court is instructed that "[f]actor (i) shall be given the
greatest weight." Id. § 26.09.187(3).
A Garska-type presumption was included in a draft presented to the 1986
Legislature. See S.H.B. 1618, 48th Leg. (1986). This draft was strongly opposed by,
among others, the Washington State Family Law Bar. 5 WASH. FAM. L. REP., No. 5,
1986, at 1. The legislature subsequently rejected it. Weber, Parenting Plans, Where
Are We?, FAM. L. NEWSL., July 1986, at 7. The draft act was then revised to
eliminate the presumption. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 15. Under the final
version the court is to give greatest weight to the child's relationship with each
parent, including whether one parent has been a primary caretaker. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a) (1989), reprinted in Appendix. This version accords with the
"preference" recommended by O'Kelly. A "preference" loses in determinacy what it
gains in political viability and interpretive flexibility. The political delicacy of the
section is demonstrated by an explication offered by drafter and legislator Marlin
Appelwick:
Of the factors considered, the most important factor is "the relative strength
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The "parenting plan" and the express restrictions on the
terms of the plan thus represent the two major ideological
strands in the Act: (1) shared parenting, and (2) limitations
on shared parenting-mandatory protections for vulnerable
spouses or children and, arguably, a primary caretaker
preference where parents bring a residential care dispute to
the court. They also represent the major conceptual bases for
the Act's extensive statutory regulation of private parental
ordering upon divorce.
Before looking more closely at the drafters' concerns with
these two predominant themes, it is important to clarify who
represented the interests of children in the drafting process.
The answer is everyone, in his or her fashion, and no one at
all. There were genuine expressions of concern for children,
and the drafters relied both on the expertise of their own
mental health professional members and on work done on
"parenting functions" by an ad hoc committee of child psychia-
trists of the Washington Psychiatric Association. 7  The
statute reiterates the ubiquitous (and indeterminate) "best
interests of the child" as its basic governing principle.38
Everyone on the drafting committee seems to have agreed that
parents should be encouraged to cooperate so that, absent
nature and stability of the child's relationship with each parent." This factor
is a tremendously complex factor. One of the many components of this factor
is "whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing
parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child." This component
is listed so that the court not overlook it. Many components could have been
listed. This one was politically important to list. The previous year's
legislation did have a tie-breaker presumption in favor of a parent who
performed more parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child.
This bill abandons that presumption in favor of the six factors. We did not
want to imply by reversing that position that we did not want the court to
consider this component, so this is important as a clarification.
Letter from Marlin Appelwick to Phil Talmadge, Chairman, and to Members of
Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 25, 1987) (on file with Jane W. Ellis).
As yet, no appellate court has construed factor (i) or the fact that it is to be given
the "greatest weight." In accord with reasons elaborated in O'Kelly, supra, at 511-21
and by Goldstein and his colleagues, IN THE BEST INTERESTS, supra, at 66-67, I
believe that explicit appellate recognition of the significance of the primary caretaker
functions listed in the statute would greatly benefit children by guaranteeing to them
the greatest likelihood of a deeply reassuring continuity of care. See also Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV.
477 (1984) (favoring primary caretaker rule for children of tender years).
37. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 10, 12.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002 (1989); COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 18. The
problems with the "best interests" standard have been articulated in Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226. For a comparison of a "best interests"
regime with other more determinate rules, see Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against
the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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other harms, children can continue to have ongoing relation-
ships with both parents following divorce. 39  Everyone seems
to have agreed that children should be protected from harms
inflicted by abusive or violent parents. 40  Everyone was
concerned about the considerable evidence that ongoing
parental conflict following divorce is bad for children.4'
Everyone thought children have a right to reliable support.42
No individual drafter, however, appears to have spoken solely
from the child's point of view.43 Whether any of these
expressions of concern should be discounted because those
concerns coincided in many cases with the interests of adult
constituencies remains to be seen."
B. Aspirations
The goals of the Parenting Act include many of the basic
concerns and assumptions on which much recent custody law
reform has been based. Drafters envisioned their custody
39. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 10.
40. Id. at 10, 12, 25-27, 36-41.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 12, 13; see also New State Parenting Act is Emeritus Law Prof's 'Baby,'
U. WEEK, Jan. 7, 1988, at 1, 8 (quoting Professor Emeritus Vern Rieke) [hereinafter
New State Parenting Act].
43. See, e.g., supra note 29 (statement of Drafter C); see also COMMENTARY, supra
note 26, at 10:
The drafting committee was intentionally constituted to represent a
variety of concerns, such as the need for protection of vulnerable populations,
including low-income parents, abused spouses and children, the need to
recognize the interests of fathers in continuing to be involved with their chil-
dren, and the overriding concern that wherever possible and appropriate,
children would be permitted to have positive relationships with both parents.
The importance of evaluating policy concerning children from the point of view
of the child is one of the basic tenets of J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
Not all scholars agree that the child's perspective should be paramount. See, e.g.,
Elster, supra note 38, at 11 (arguing that making the needs of the child paramount
"is liable to yield unjust decisions by neglecting the rights and needs of the parents").
44. Professor Martha Fineman has pointed to the cynical use of reference to the
needs of children: "Characterizing children as innocent victims in need of protection
is typical of professional reformers' rhetoric in this age of no-fault divorce." Fineman,
The Politics of Custody and the Transformation of American Custody Decision
Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 829, 830 (1989).
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to untangle the web of selfish and
unselfish adult motives for a given legislative policy ostensibly benefiting children.
The history of the Parenting Act reveals much candor on the part of many of the
concerned adults about the potential benefits accruing to adult interests from the
proposed legal changes. See, e.g., supra note 29.
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regime as one that would encompass many functions in
addition to the traditional "private dispute resolution" or the
discretionary common-law "child protection" function, where
the state is basically passive unless and until an irresolvable
conflict arises between parents.4 5 These aspirations were
articulated in expansive rhetorical terms by the Ad Hoc
Drafting Committee in its commentary to the Act.46
Interviews with some of the drafters as well as
contemporaneous newspaper and magazine accounts of the
drafters' intentions47  provide further information on the
reasons and assumptions on which the changes were based.
This Article next examines the underlying aspirations in
relation to the Act's two predominant aspects, the plan and
limits on the plan.
1. The parenting plan- a. The facilitative function:
individualized private ordering-A major goal, prominent in
divorce reform literature and grounded in notions of liberty,
was to facilitate private ordering. 4 Drafters hoped the plan
45. See Mnookin, supra note 38, at 229. I have characterized the drafters' goals
here as "facilitative," "normative," "educative," "preventive," and "protective." These
labels indicate what I perceive to be the primary, though not the exclusive, function
of a given goal.
46. I refer to the commentary as "rhetorical" because it is full of pleasing
generalities and addresses none of the potential conflicts in or problems with the
legislation. This is hardly surprising given that it was written by people who had
conceived of, drafted, and presumably made politically necessary compromises
throughout a four-year task. The tendency of such people would, understandably, be
to present a cohesive piece of legislation and explain its workings, not to advertise
results about which they might be less than thrilled, although they might have
recognized privately the problems with those sections. In private conversations with
drafters, I heard many expressions of concern that are nowhere to be seen in the
commentary presented to the public.
47. See infra notes 57, 69, 85.
48. The most eloquent spokesperson for the virtues of and reasons for state
facilitation of "private ordering" is Professor Robert Mnookin. See, e.g., Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 950; Mnookin, Divorce and the Law, in VALLAMBROSA
RETREAT TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 10, at 1 [hereinafter Mnookin, Divorce and the
Law] ("My thesis, in other words, is that the primary function of divorce law today
is to give divorcing couples the power to create their own legally enforceable
commitments. This is what I call private ordering."). Mnookin has returned to the
subject and examined whether any limitations ought to be placed on private ordering
in divorce negotiations. In Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private
Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015 (1985) [hereinafter Mnookin, Divorce
Bargaining], he articulates and then examines three possible "justifications for
limitations upon divorce settlements: (1) problems of capacity . . . (2) problems in
bargaining... and (3) problems of externalities." Id. at 1036. The effect of certain
rules and procedures on children are included in the third category. Id. at 1032.
Mnookin's strong preference is for minimum regulation of private ordering. Id. at
1019. For a contrary view of the private ordering process, see supra note 22.
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device would encourage and permit individualized parenting
plans, reflective of different ways of raising children in this
pluralistic society. 49 Thus, the commentary states that "[t]he
key advantage of the parenting plan concept over former
custody concepts is its ability to accommodate widely differing
factual patterns, and allocate parental responsibility
accordingly."" This goal assumes the willingness-and
ability-of all divorcing parents to participate in such
individualized planning in place of the traditional broad-brush
"custody to x, reasonable visitation to y" language in decrees.
It also assumes that the Act's plan device will, in fact,
facilitate appropriately individualized arrangements between
parents and their children.
b. The normative function: shared parenting-A primary
goal of the drafters-like that of legislators in the many
jurisdictions who have adopted one of a variety ofjoint-custody
statutes in recent years51-was to encourage the continued
participation of both parents in the lives of their children
following divorce.52 In short, although accommodation of
"widely differing factual patterns"" is possible, patterns
involving shared parenting are preferred. The Act's drafters
thus characterize the parenting plan, an idea advocated by a
number of family law and mental health professionals,54 as
a "framework which allows for and encourages [parental]
participation" and as a vehicle to "provide for appropriate
continuing relationships.""
49. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 26-27.
50. Id. at 27. For a discussion of the extent to which the Act may pressure
parents to make one choice over another by virtue of certain substantive rules and
certain requirements for findings, see, e.g., infra note 58.
51. See generally Folberg, Joint Custody Law-The Second Wave, 23 J. FAM. L.
1, 3, 14-55 (1984).
52. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 13 (referring to "increased emphasis on
keeping both parents involved").
53. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 27.
54. See supra note 10.
55. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 11. The statutory statement of policy on
which this comment is based states that "the best interest of the child is ordinarily
served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered
only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as
required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm." WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.002 (1989). The commentary explains that "an active and involved
parent would remain involved if limitations do not exist; a long-absent or abusive
parent, having forfeited his or her rights under the Act by failing to perform his or
her duties, would not gain any new rights under this Act." COMMENTARY, supra note
26, at 11. The precise nature of these limitations, as well as the requirement of
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At a minimum, the plan requirement means that parents
must consider the possibility of some parental sharing. For
example, findings concerning a party's "reasonable" opposition
to mutual decision making must be included in an order for
sole decision making.56 This requirement may create what
one commentator described as a "weak pre-disposition" for
joint legal custody.5" Legislative history indicates that the
drafters intended this result.58
Parents are also required to work out a detailed schedule
of the time each child will spend with each parent,59 an
activity that arguably "encourages" time sharing. At the same
time, there is no statutory preference or presumption
requiring any particular amount of shared residential time
beyond the general "shared parenting" policy statement in the
Act's opening section.6" In addition, there is arguably a
"preference" for a primary caretaker in the event that parents
go to court over residential time.6' Finally, where parents
arrange for frequent, brief, and substantially equal intervals
of residence in each parent's home, a finding that the
findings, is discussed at notes 153-64 and accompanying text, infra.
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(2)(b) (1989), reprinted in Appendix; see also
Wechsler, Parenting Act Update, in 1989 FAMILY LAW SECTION MID-YEAR MEETING
& SEMINAR 6-1, 6-9 (1989).
57. Hall, The Parenting Act-What to Watch for, TRIAL NEWS, Dec. 1988, at 6; see
also Gaddis & Sooter, The New Era in Child Custody Resolution, 42 WASH. ST. BAR
NEWS 13, 14 (1988) ("The act's bias toward dual parental involvement can be defeated
only by showing, according to guidelines given within the act, that the other parent's
involvement would be harmful to the child's development.").
58. If a parent objects to mutual decision-making but the objection
is unreasonable, that parent is creating a conflict situation.
Conflict is harmful to children and is not in the best interest
of the child. Therefore, it would undercut that unreasonable
parent's probability of being awarded the sole decision-making
authority. This is intended to be a subtle way to prompt
parents to raise only reasonable objections to the use of
mutual decision-making or risk that the other parent would be
given sole decision-making authority on an issue or all issues.
Letter, supra note 36.
Professor Martha Fineman has demonstrated the ways in which ostensibly
neutral procedural devices-like mandatory mediation or, perhaps, like "plans"-often
mask the implicit substantive agenda of "shared parenting." See Fineman, supra
note 3, at 728. Here the substantive agenda was neither totally hidden nor totally
overt. One needs to read the statute, the commentary, and the legislative history
with care.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(5) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
60. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a), reprinted in Appendix; see also supra note
36 and accompanying text.
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arrangement is "in the best interests of the child" must be
included by the parties or the reviewing court.62 Legislative
history indicates, however, that these provisions were not
intended to interfere with the fact that "parents will have
equal time with children in many cases."63 Nor do they
preclude a court from ordering substantial shared time over
the objection of one parent.6
This normative preference for the continued involvement of
both parents, absent certain express behaviors, assumes that
the plan requirement, with its accompanying substantive
rules, will result in more postdivorce parental sharing than
parental arrangements made under the former custody regime.
With the exception of this Article, no published studies to date
explore the amount of shared parenting in a regime requiring
a parenting plan. 5
This goal also assumes that such legally influenced sharing
of parental decision making and of time with the child is in
the best interests of the child. 6 Common sense dictates that
it is important, assuming no harmful behavior by a parent, for
children to retain meaningful contact with both parents
following divorce. The problem for policy makers, however, is
whether, when, how, or how much the law should encourage
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(b) (1989), reprinted in Appendix; see also
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 35. As one highly experienced commentator noted:
The act rejects the premise that equal responsibility in parenting means
that all decisions must be made in concert, and that equal time must be
slavishly allocated to each parent. The act emphasizes that equal responsi-
bility in parenting means continued concurrent involvement of both parents
in their individual parenting roles.
Gaddis & Sooter, supra note 57, at 14.
63. Statement by Senator Phil Talmadge to Senator Brad Owen, WASH. ST.
SENATE J., Apr. 15, 1987, reprinted in COMMENTARY, supra note 26, app. II.
64. See infra notes 164, 176 and accompanying text (concerning the fact that in
spite of the special attention allotted to frequent changes and substantially equal
time intervals, a court can order that arrangement over the objection of a parent as
long as it makes the appropriate findings); see also infra note 68 and accompanying
text (concerning studies on the effect of frequent transitions between parental homes
when parents are at war).
65. For data from the few studies done in jurisdictions where joint custody has
been allowed (or encouraged) following divorce, see infra notes 213, 217, and
accompanying text. Some authors have suggested that what occurs in practice is a
fair amount of joint legal custody with considerably less joint physical custody. See
e.g., R. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT 130 (1988); Bruch,
supra note 1, at 110.
66. Gaddis and Sooter write: "The act assumes a child's needs are best met by
continuing a close relationship with each parent, unless compelling reasons to the
contrary exist...." Gaddis & Sooter, supra note 57, at 14.
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or require such arrangements. To date, there is little
empirical evidence on the effect of legally induced shared
decision making, and the evidence on the effect of various
amounts of shared residential time is, at best, inconclusive.6 7
A considerable-and growing-body of evidence, however, now
documents the harm to children who are in frequent contact
with two venomous and warring parents." Finally, in
67. Even one of the strongest (and most respected) proponents of shared
residential time, researcher and clinician Joan Kelly, does not claim that empirical
studies per se support her position: "I would agree with Emery that the research
differences in favor of joint physical custody are still limited and that this body of re-
search remains confounded by sampling, definitional, and methodological problems."
Kelly, Further Thoughts, supra note 3, at 160.
Leading experts on the effect of divorce on children are divided themselves about
whether any type of state-coerced "physical joint custody" regime is good for children.
Dr. Kelly has written, with candor:
What underlies my general advocacy for acceptance of the concept of joint
physical custody or, more accurately, an expansion of more traditionally limit-
ed visiting patterns that includes at one end of the spectrum more equal time-
sharing, is the integration of existing joint custody research with 9 years of
mediation, consultation, clinical experience, and research in a jurisdiction
whose statutes have encouraged shared parenting. In California, far more
couples are opting for a variety of shared parenting patterns that go beyond
every-other-weekend visitation, and far more parents seem capable of manag-
ing the logistics and their child-related differences than any of us ever
envisioned in 1980 ....
As the joint custody option has become more normative in California,
there are proportionately fewer saints and more just plain average parents
who have agreed to share parenting in some manner. Neither particularly
friendly nor models of maturity, they have heard or seem to understand that
despite their marital failure, some postdivorce efforts directed toward
'normalizing" their child's postdivorce experience by having both parents
remain involved serves their child's interests as well as their own. For these
parents, the shared custody option (whether 30% or 50%) seems not to be as
demanding as Emery and others believe. Levels of satisfaction are quite high,
and although some researchers have denigrated the importance of parental
and child satisfaction, I am of the opinion that contentment with one's
postdivorce arrangement is an important long-term variable, one not usually
considered a measure of adjustment.
Id. at 160-61. Kelly's summary of the research to date is found in Kelly, Longer-Term
Adjustment, supra note 3, at 130-31.
Kelly's views should be contrasted with those of another leading and well-
respected researcher, Robert Emery, who claims that "[m]y objections are not with
the goal of promoting joint custody. I agree that this is an important policy objective,
but I disagree that this objective is strongly supported by existing research findings."
Emery, supra note 3, at 143; see also Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra
note 3, at 556 (citing Derdeyn & Scott, Joint Custody: A Critical Analysis and
Appraisal, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 199 (1984); Clingempell & Reppucci, Joint
Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 102 (1982)). Emery favors joint legal custody, but is unwilling to concur with
that t ............... . . . u wuy. See Emery,
supra note 3, at 143.
68. See, e.g., R. EMERY, supra note 65, at 95 ("[T]he evidence is sufficiently strong
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connection with the assumptions underlying shared parenting,
some drafters expressed the frequently held and controversial
belief that a law encouraging fathers to stay involved with
their children would benefit children not only by increasing
contact with a father, but by increasing compliance with child-
support orders. 9
to permit a consideration of how, not whether, interparental conflict is tied to the
development of negative outcomes among children from divorced families."); Kelly,
Further Thoughts, supra note 3, at 161 ("There is ample clinical evidence regarding
the negative effects of venomous divorce and postdivorce situations on children, and
there are not yet sufficient data to advocate either sole or joint physical custody for
these families."); see also Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 3; Nelson, Parental
Hostility, Conflict and Communication in Joint and Sole Custody Families, 13 J.
DIVORCE 145 (1989); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 3, at 490-92.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, in BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 43, at
37-38, recommended that the state grant no legally enforceable visitation rights to
the noncustodial parent where parents were in sufficient conflict that they could not
agree on who should have custody of the child. Id. This suggestion, which they
based in part on concern with the effects of parental conflict, has been criticized
roundly and misunderstood, and has not been accepted in any jurisdiction to date, see
Bruch, supra note 1, at 109, but it may be time to insist on a reconsideration of the
authors' insights with respect to high-conflict parents.
69. See, e.g., New State Parenting Act, supra note 42, at 8 (quoting Professor
Emeritus Vern Rieke):
"The state of Washington pays many millions of dollars a year to support
children whose fathers don't pay .... It's a terrible problem, and I think it's
come about because we've awarded exclusive custody of the children to the
mothers in 90 to 95 percent of the cases. Fathers feel cut off, so they refuse
to pay.... If both parents can stay involved in their children's lives, it should
cut down on the need for support enforcement, and more important, it gives
the children the advantage of continuing to have two parents .... "
Some commentators have expressed heated views about relying on this
assumption and about the validity of empirical work attempting to test the
assumption. See, e.g., Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-
Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 251, 292-95 (1989) (quoting Hugh
McIsaac, Director of Family Court Services for the Los Angeles Conciliation Court,
accusing Lenore Weitzman of misrepresenting an empirical study on the interrelation
of custody form and child-support compliance in her treatment of the question in L.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985)).
A recent empirical study by the researchers whose preliminary results Weitzman
cited, concludes the following:
This series of regression analyses showed that although custody
arrangement and amount of visitation were relevant variables, they were not
compelling predictors of child support payment behavior. The more relevant
variables dealt with the financial status and resources of the obligor and
parental cooperation. Taken together, variables pertaining to these
characteristics of obligors and their ex-spouses explained 20 percent of the
variance in payment.
These statistical patterns fully jibed with the accounts of mothers in all
custody categories and nonpaying fathers who were interviewed about their
payment behavior. The two most common explanations for nonpayment
offered by mothers were that the obligor was unemployed much or all of the
preceding year or that he was angry with his ex-wife and withheld support
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c. The educative function: focusing parents on postdivorce
responsibilities-The drafters also sought to provide
"guidance" or "education" to parents concerning their parental
responsibilities.7" A number of writers from different
disciplines have urged that the state provide some form of
education for divorcing parents about the needs of their
children during and after divorce." This educative function
stems from two very different rationales. First, divorcing
as a means of getting even with her. The third item mentioned with some
frequency was that the ex-spouse did a poor job of managing his finances.
... [W]hile visitation and paternal participation played only a modest role
in explaining support payments, these variables played a more central role
in explaining contributions outside of regular support payments. It is also
relevant to note that custody type per se was neither a powerful predictor of
payment of ordered child support nor of supplementary child care
expenditures. The more critical variables dealt with the amount of time the
noncustodian spent with the child and his involvement with the daily life of
the child.
Pearson & Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The Influence of Custody
on Support Levels and Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319, 331, 335 (1988). Their
conclusions were based on a longitudinal study (three years from initial to follow-up
interviews as well as inspection of court files for objective data) of 426 families. Id.
at 322. They are careful to point out that the sample "consisted of those who opted
for joint residential custody; we had no reading on the child support.. . experiences
of those who were ordered into this arrangement over the objections of one or both
parents." Id. at 336. Thus, these researchers' findings "do not support the routine
imposition of joint custody arrangements on divorcing couples," although the data
"revealed the importance of access and paternal participation for the financial welfare
of children" for predicting "financial and in-kind payments outside of support by
absent parents." Id. at 336-37.
If policies encouraging increased access are implemented in hopes of increasing
a child's financial well-being, then policy makers must stay alert to the fact that
those policies may work simultaneously, and sadly, to the detriment of the child's
psychological well-being, at least in situations where there is evidence of damaging
ongoing parental conflict. See supra notes 67-68.
Unfortunately, it will be extremely difficult to test the relationship between a
parenting plan requirement and better compliance with child support or extra
economic benefits to the child in the Parenting Act's own jurisdiction. Six months
after the Act went into effect, use of mandatory child-support schedules was
instituted statewide. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.100, 26.19.010-.020, .040 (1989);
WASHINGTON STATE CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE COMM'N, WASHINGTON STATE CHILD
SUPPORT SCHEDULE 1-4 (1988). These schedules require courts to order more
.adequate" amounts of child support than previously. WASHINGTON STATE CHILD
SUPPORT COMM'N, supra, at 1. Thus, the influence of the Act per se on compliance
with support orders is confounded with the effect of the new schedule.
70. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 11-12.
71. See, e.g., Elkin, Educational Preparation for Divorce-Another Missing Link
in the Divorce Process, 21 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. at v (1983); Mnookin &
responsibility to inform parents concerning the child's needs during and after
divorce").
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parents need to be informed about their children's needs.72
Second, because of the emotional turmoil of divorce, parents
need to have their attention focused on those needs.73
The drafters of the Act had their own notions about and
solutions to these concerns. To accomplish the first form of
"education," some of the drafters developed a list of "parenting
functions," both to instruct parents on what parental
responsibilities might be considered and to provide standards
for cases in which parents were having trouble agreeing.
74
This list, however, does not describe the needs of children of
divorce per se. Rather, it describes a number of basic needs of
all children-food, clothing, education, and the like-whether
their parents are divorcing or not.7 s
The drafters hoped that the second "educative"
goal-refocusing parental consciousness on the needs of their
children 76-would be achieved by requiring parents to use a
plan with specific components in all cases. Thus, the
72. See, e.g., Mnookin, Divorce and the Law, supra note 48, at 3. Mnookin
believes in "encouraging parents to understand" their postdivorce responsibilities, but
does not set forth a specific mechanism for achieving this goal. Mnookin, Divorce
Bargaining, supra note 48, at 1035.
73. The traditional justification for state scrutiny of parental agreements
concerning children at divorce has been the belief that divorcing parents are unable
to put aside their own interests and to make agreements that reflect the child's needs
as well as their own. Justice Black expressed this common conviction in the days
preceding no-fault divorce, claiming that "[e]xperience has shown that the question
of custody . . . frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is
particularly true where, as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds
parental judgment with emotion and prejudice." Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193
(1962).
74. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 20:
[Tihe concept of parenting functions.., has no equivalent in former law. It
serves two purposes in this statutory scheme: (1) the concept of parenting
function should guide the parties as they consider their responsibilities under
their proposed parenting plans, and (2) should the court be required to
formulate the parenting plan, the parties['] performance of these functions is
used as a criterion for determining that permanent parenting plan.
The drafters' belief that a law can simultaneously serve as a (presumably helpful)
"guide" to creating plans and as a rule declaring which parent will be favored in the
event of a dispute is questionable. The former function implies neutrality; the latter
is by definition nonneutral. A parent who inquires about his rights in the event of
a dispute and is told that he fails to meet the statutory criteria may not feel inclined
to use those same "criteria" to work out plan details.
75. The idea of parenting functions, devised by an ad hoc committee of the
Washington State Council on Child Psychiatry, see COMMENTARY supra note 26, at
20, is codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.004(3) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
76. "With the definition of parenting came the key shift of the new act, a focus on
parents performing the parenting functions and meeting their responsibilities to their
children." COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 12.
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commentary states that "[t]he components of the plan are set
out to insure that parents think through carefully their
parenting plan and arrive at arrangements that are realistic
and are for the best interests of their children."77 Similarly,
the drafters used a shift in language for the plan from the
traditional "custody and visitation" terminology to the more
neutral-sounding "residential care" or "decision-making"
terminology to help parents shift their focus from concern with
"control of' to "responsibility for" their children.7"
Here the Act assumes that law, and specifically a legal
device (a plan), has the capacity to make parents focus on
their shared responsibilities. Furthermore, it assumes the
plan device will be successful when implemented by
professionals who may or may not be sympathetic to its
intended effect. The Act was based, in the words of one
drafter, " 'on a profile of marriage dissolution cases in which
the parenting arrangements seemed to be successful.' ""7 But
the participants in those cases had chosen without state
coercion to create a parenting plan or agreement8 0 The
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id. at 2, 26. This shift from the emotionally laden "custody" and "visitation"
language has been made in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 752(2)(A) (Supp. 1990) (referring to "[aillocated parental rights and
responsibilities"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 664 (1985) (referring to "[1]egal
responsibility," "[p]hysical responsibility," and "[p]arent child contact").
An important additional reason for this particular change unquestionably was to
avoid the negative political repercussions of the phrase "joint custody." COMMENTARY,
supra note 26, at 10. Professor Martha Fineman has described such language
changes as an "attempt to accommodate fathers' interests in a symbolically pleasing
manner [that] . . . has worked to reallocate power between parents . . . [and]
disadvantages functioning custodial mothers." Fineman, supra note 3, at 733.
I discuss the extent to which I believe the Act is and is not, in fact, a "joint
custody" statute at notes 166-77 and accompanying text, infra.
79. New State Parenting Act, supra note 42, at 8 (quoting Professor Emeritus
Vern Rieke).
80. If the drafters considered the fact that their case profile was based on
agreements created without the explicit mandatory directives of the new law and that
the ability to define both the parameters and detail of the agreement might itself
have contributed to the success of the arrangement, they did not discuss this fact in
their commentary or in their later depictions of the Act. Drafter Rieke, for example,
referred to a study of his that showed that " 'couples who agreed upon terms before
coming to court were much less likely to come back to court later to ask for changes
or to complain that one party wasn't carrying out his or her responsibilities.'" Id. at
1. Although this result could be attributed to the "terms," it could be attributed
equally well to the fact of agreement per se. In short, an equally valid hypothesis is
that Darents who Ppt Plnna wall a,nnh tn 4-c =c" !...1:y tc =t .
so, while parents who are not able to agree to terms are likely to continue to disagree.
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effect of requiring such a plan might be quite different.81 A
nonhostile parent might see an "opportunity" to think about
different planning issues on behalf of the child. A hostile one
might discover a rich source of ammunition. Thus, the stuff
of one parent's helpful articulation may be the fodder for
another parent's war.
d. The preventive functions: decreasing parental con-
flict-A closely related goal, reflecting another nationwide
concern, was to decrease destructive parental conflict, both at
the time of divorce and over the long term.82 In the words of
one commentator involved in some stages of the Act's drafting,
"the statute was drawn to minimize two frequent occurrences
inherent in the dissolution process: 1) continued conflict
between the parents, which creates long-term harmful effects
on the children, and 2) continuing use of children as pawns in
one parent's struggle to control, annoy, or harass the other." 3
The drafters believed, and there is now much empirical
evidence for the proposition, that exposure to ongoing parental
conflict is harmful to children. 4 The drafters also believed
that requiring a parenting plan would help resolve conflicts:
"By bringing potential areas of conflict into focus during the
dissolution process, the purpose of the law is to identify and
resolve sources of conflict, or at least to provide a process for
reasonable conflict resolution, to avoid future long-term or
ongoing disputes." 5 Thus, the drafters hoped that the need
to decide the details of a plan would enable parents to articu-
late specific concerns that they may not have thought to
express in the former two-dimensional custody-visitation
framework, thus preempting problems.8 6
81. This very requirement stands in contrast to (or at least strongly qualifies) the
expressed goal of autonomous private ordering which, taken to its logical extreme,
would permit, but not order, a plan to be filed by all parents.
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
83. Gaddis & Sooter, supra note 57, at 13. Lenore Weitzman has pointed out that
one of the basic rationales for joint legal custody "is that it will eventually reduce the
conflict between divorced spouses." L. WEITZMAN, supra note 69, at 255.
84. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 13; see also supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
85. Gaddis & Sooter, supra note 57, at 13; see also Goodnow, New Law Tosses Out
Old Concept of Child Custody, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 31, 1987, at Cl, col. 2
("Joint planning is likely to reduce hostility in many cases, supporters say, because
it will force parents to switch their focus from their own immediate battle to the long-
term issues surrounding their child's welfare.").
86. One drafter tells the story of a client who continued battling over custody
almost to the point of trial until her attorney finally discovered that she wanted to
have the power to decide on the child's school. When they discovered that this
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The drafters also believed that the specific terms of the
plan would help eliminate, or at least more quickly resolve,
future conflict by "prevent[ing] confusion for parents and
child.""7 Where parents disputed the meaning of a specific
term, the plan would provide for a dispute resolution method
(other than court if no prohibitions existed) that would permit
a more efficient and less stressful solution to the problem and
thereby better address the problem of ongoing parental
conflict.8 The drafters thus assumed that the plan would
serve as a contract, one term of which would require a form of
alternative dispute resolution in the event of disagreements.
They also hoped, however, that the plan would "encourage
flexibility to meet the changing requirements of . . . the
child."89 It is unclear how the drafters expected the plan
both to help resolve or prevent disputes in the future (and
hence minimize conflict) by virtue of its specificity, and to
permit sufficient "flexibility" for numerous unanticipated
changes. Although the parties to a normal business contract
often can modify it at their discretion and at any time,9" the
parenting plan would remain, like all custody decrees, subject
to the jurisdiction of the court during the child's minority.91
decision-making function was the sole sticking point, the parties were able to settle
immediately. The drafter therefore believes that the different aspects of the plan will
help parents get issues on the table sooner and so resolve them. Interview with
Drafter D (Sept. 13, 1988). In a later conversation, this same drafter stated that he
had originally seen the plan as a voluntary mechanism to assist this process, not as
a mandatory one. Conversation with Drafter D (July 25, 1989).
87. Excerpts from the Governor's Executive Task Force on Support Enforcement
Final Report, reprinted in FAM. L. NEWSL., Apr. 1987 at 1, 5.
88. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 27. In addition to the plan components
per se as a means of decreasing conflict, there is evidence that the Act was designed
to harness the adversarial tactics of attorneys. See, e.g., id. at 42. One drafter
described the legislation in an interview as the "Domestic Law Restraint Act of 1987."
Interview with Drafter B (Aug. 10, 1988). The two main devices for achieving this
end were a list of substantive criteria for temporary orders where parties were
disputing some aspect of the plan at the outset, see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.194
(1989), and-for purposes of controlling destructive tactics-sanctions for "bad faith
negotiation," see infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
89. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 20.
90. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (allowing parties to contracts for sale of goods to modify
contracts without additional consideration).
91. "Moreover, even if the parties' initial agreement is accepted by the court, it
lacks finality. A court may at any time during the child's minority reopen and modify
the initial decree in light of any subsequent change in circumstances." Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 955. In Washington State, the substantive standard for
modification is somewhat stricter. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (1989)
(requiring the court to find a substantial change in circumstances and to find that a
modification is necessary to serve child's best interests). In addition, the court must
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2. Limitations on the parenting plan: the protective
functions-Courts traditionally have relied on their parens
patriae power to protect children in divorce actions as the
courts see fit.92 Most statutory schemes, however, describe
this broad discretionary power only in generalized language
directing the court to consider the child's well-being.
93
Statutory language describing specific conduct that may cause
harm is a recent and still relatively limited phenomenon, and
chiefly has addressed the problem of domestic violence and
child abuse.94 Even in these new statutes, however, the court
retains broad discretion as to whether it will limit an
offending parent's contact with a child.
The Parenting Act assumes that courts need more specific
direction concerning the nature of certain harms to children
and "vulnerable" spouses.95  The primary, though not the
only, statutory mechanism for limiting shared parenting is
section 10, which lists behaviors considered harmful enough
to require protection for a child or abused spouse.9" The
drafters intended that section 10 "Ib]etter identify and
conduct a threshold hearing to determine, on the basis of affidavits and not mere
allegations, whether there is "adequate cause for hearing the motion." Id. § 26.09.270;
see Roorda v. Roorda, 25 Wash. App. 849, 852, 611 P.2d 794, 796 (1980) (" 'Adequate
cause'... requires something more than prima facie allegations .... ."). Nevertheless,
the possibility of modification continues to defeat the "finality" of the agreement.
92. See, e.g., 2 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 477 (2d ed. 1988).
93. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1990) ("[Tlhe court shall order
reasonable visitation rights to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would
be detrimental to the best interests of the child."); cf. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(4)(b)
(West Supp. 1990) ("A child is entitled to periods of physical placement with both
parents unless, after a hearing, the court finds that physical placement with a parent
would endanger the child's physical, mental or emotional health.").
94. See supra note 13.
95. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 5; see also supra note 11. Some courts
are beginning to show greater sensitivity to the harms of domestic violence. See, e.g.,
Desmond v. Desmond, 134 Misc. 2d 62, 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. 1986); cf. Hall v.
Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); id. (Popovich, C.J., dissenting); id.
(Nierengarten, J., dissenting); id. (Crippen, J., dissenting).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191 (1989), reprinted in Appendix. I refer to this
section of the law as "§ 10" because that name was commonly applied during the
initial period of the Act's implementation and is commonly found throughout training
materials and assorted commentary on the Act. See, e.g., Prochnau, A Roadmap of
the 1987 Parenting Act, in THE 1987 PARENTING ACT: WASHINGTON'S INNOVATIVE AP-
PROACH TO FAMILY LAw 38 (Oct. 15, 1987) (materials from a CLE Seminar sponsored
by the Northwest Women's Law Center) [hereinafter WASHINGTON'S INNOVATIVE
APPROACH]; Wechsler, Overview of the 1987 Parenting Act, in WASHINGTON'S
INNOVATIVE APPROACH, supra, at 43. "Section 10" is the section number of the
"limitations" list in the original bill presented to the legislature. 1987 Wash. Laws
2023 (ch. 460, § 10).
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affirmatively protect the best interests of the child as well as
at-risk parties by establishing specific criteria for limitations
to be imposed on a party's continued involvement and/or
access to the child, where circumstances or conduct make this
necessary."sv According to the commentary to the Act:
[W]hile the rest of the statutory scheme attempts to
define the parameters of the parties' involvement with
the care of the child, Section 10 operates to limit such
involvement, in either the temporary or post-dissolution
phases, depending on a parent's conduct or history of
interaction with the other parent or the child. 98
The drafters of the Act, however, did not stop with a mere
list of harmful behaviors. Because of evidence that "[the legal]
system fails to protect persons who are vulnerable" and to
"identify and protect unrepresented vulnerable parties,"99
they decided that parties, attorneys, and courts must all give
serious attention to these behaviors. The result was a list of
"mandatory" limitations that are to be applied in any case
where neglect ("[w]illful abandonment . . . or substantial
refusal to perform parenting functions"), abuse ("physical,
sexual, or a pattern of emotional abuse"), or domestic violence
is found. 100 The drafters also listed behaviors that may, but
need not, be the basis of limitations on plan components.1 '
Section 10 prohibits courts from requiring mutual decision
making or alternative dispute resolution in cases where there
are stipulated or litigated findings of any behaviors on the
"mandatory limitation" list.10 2  This prohibition applies
regardless of whether the court is approving a settlement or
entering an order following a hearing or trial. It also requires
limitations on the child's residential time with the offending
97. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 12 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 5; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
100. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(l)-(2), reprinted in Appendix. Domestic
violence is defined in accord with the state's domestic violence statute. See infra note
153.
101. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(3), reprinted in Appendix; see also text
accompanying note 156.
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in Appendix. Under the literal
language of the statute, parents would still be free to list mutual decision making or
an alternative dispute resolution process as their first choice in their plan in § 10
cases. It could not be the only choice, however, because then it would be "required"
by the plan, not merely an option.
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parent where there are such findings, although it does not
specify the nature of those limits. 103 Furthermore, the only
exceptions to these "mandatory limitations" apply to
residential time, but not to decision-making or dispute
resolution choices. The residential schedule need not be
limited if the court expressly finds that:
[C]ontact between the parent and the child will not
cause physical, sexual, or emotional abuse or harm...
and that the probability that the parent's harmful or
abusive conduct will recur is so remote that it would not
be in the child's best interests to apply the limitations.
... or .... the parent's conduct did not have an impact
on the child ....
Section 10 reflects recent heightened awareness, found
nationwide, of the existence and dangers of various forms of
child abuse and domestic violence. 105 The Act thus expresses
the drafters' belief that a parent who has abused or neglected
a child endangers that child and should not be accorded auto-
matically the right to share in decisions about or to spend
unlimited time with that child. 10 6  Similarly, the Act
incorporates the belief of many domestic violence experts that
forcing a parent who has been a victim of violence to interact
with the other parent, for purposes of shared decision making
or mediation, harms both the previously victimized parent and
the children of that relationship.0 7 This latter belief is not
103. Id. § 26.09.191(2)(c), reprinted in Appendix. In 1989, the Washington Legisla-
ture added language designed to clarify these "limitations." 1989 Wash. Laws 1603-
04. That language, codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191, reprinted in Appendix,
is not (and perhaps cannot be) very specific.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(2), reprinted in Appendix. In its original form,
§ 10 allowed the court to refuse to "limit" residential time on the basis of findings of
domestic violence only. 1987 Wash. Laws 2024. The amendment expanded this
.escape clause" to all of the behaviors that would otherwise require mandatory
limitations on residential time. 1989 Wash. Laws 1604.
105. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 1, 5; see also Myers, Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse in Custody Visitation Litigation: Recommendations for Improved Fact
Finding and Child Protection, 28 J. FAM. L. 1 (1989); Romer, Child Sexual Abuse in
Custody and Visitation Disputes: Problems, Progress and Prospects, 20 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 647 (1990); supra notes 11, 13, and accompanying text.
106. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 25-26, 36. But cf. Levy, Using "Scientific"
Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383, 390 (1989) (describing
danger of "systematic bias in fact finding" in divorce cases where sexual abuse has
been alleged).
107. The commentary states:
Section 10(1)(c) reflects the drafters' view that mutual decision making
and non-judicial dispute resolution should not be required in cases involving
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without its challengers,' nor does it lack its own tensions
in Washington State, where courts are free to order unwilling
spouses into mandatory mediation at the predecree temporary
order stage, 109 even though the Act does not permit a
parenting plan to require postdissolution" ° mediation where
there is evidence that one of the section 10 mandatory
limitations is required."'
a physically abusive parent. The harmful implications of continued contact
with a batterer for a battered spouse are obvious, but children are also
emotionally traumatized, and sometimes physically injured, by exposure to
battering. They also may learn inappropriate behaviors from observing such
parental interaction. Thus, limitations on contact with the abusive parent are
needed in this and any other circumstances where harm to the victim-parent
or the child could result.
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 38.
Scholarly works specifically addressed to the need for legal recognition of the
existence of and harm caused by domestic violence in custody cases include Sun &
Thomas, supra note 7; Note, supra note 7 (recommending a statutory presumption
of detriment to a child where evidence of spouse abuse is found). Both articles warn
of the dangers of mandatory mediation and joint decision making where there is a
history of domestic violence. See also supra note 7.
108. A number of experienced divorce mediators take issue with the conviction that
mediation is contraindicated in families with a history of domestic violence. See, e.g.,
Wahrhaftig, Spouse Abuse and Mediation Practice: The Concerns Revisited, 8
MEDIATION NEWS, Fall 1989, at 3 (summarizing different views). Some of the most
useful work in bridging these disparate perspectives and setting out guidelines for
when mediation is appropriate has been done by Dr. Linda K. Girdner, a feminist
anthropologist and mediator. See L. Girdner, Dealing with Spouse Abuse:
Recommendations for Divorce Mediators (unpublished handout prepared for the July
1987 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Family Mediators) (copy on file with Jane
W. Ellis). Girdner, who explicitly credits the groundbreaking work of Lisa Lerman
for some of her recommendations, has recently edited Special Issue: Mediation and
Spouse Abuse, 7 MEDIATION Q. 291-388 (1990), in which Girdner, Mediation Triage:
Screening for Spouse Abuse in Divorce Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365 (1990),
appears.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.015 states: "In any proceeding under this chapter
[on dissolution], the matter may be set for mediation of the contested issues before
or concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing . . . ." King County has a
local rule mandating mediation for all custody or visitation disputes unless waived
by the court "for good cause." KING COUNTY, WASH., LocAL R. 94.04(c)(2). Family
law practitioners in this county have informed me that the courts continued, in 1988
and 1989, to order mediation on occasion where there was a history of domestic
violence, in spite of the clear policy underlying the new Act, and I have heard, in
assorted interviews with practitioners in 1988 and 1989, both very positive and very
negative reports concerning the experience of victims of domestic violence in Family
Court Services mediation. One practitioner informed me in a recent (1991)
conversation that of late such orders for mediation are rare and King County
mediators are now well-versed in the dangers of mediation in these cases.
110. Washington State uses the term "dissolution" instead of "divorce." WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 26.09.002-.914 (1989). I prefer the simpler "divorce" and use the two
synonymous terms interchangeably throughout this Article.
111. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in Appendix.
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Section 10, like other parts of the Act, rests on a number of
assumptions. Its very existence demonstrates a conviction
that divorce is a proper occasion for the state to intervene-by
limiting the terms of parenting plans in certain circumstances
and by court scrutiny of those plans-to protect children and
vulnerable former spouses from harm. Several leading
scholars have argued that the traditional insistence that the
state oversee the arrangements made by divorcing parents for
their children is questionable at best.
112
112. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have argued that "[d]ivorce or separation of
married parents [shiould no longer be a sufficient ground" for state intervention in
response to the question "What should constitute probable cause for inquiry by agents
of the state into individual parent-child relationships and what should they be
required to find before being authorized to seek modification or termination of a
specific parent-child relationship?" J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19, 33 (1979) [hereinafter BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS]. Thus, the state would not be involved with parent-child arrangements
at divorce unless "one or both separating parents, whether married or unmarried,
bring to the court their disagreement about the custody of their children." Id. at 31.
Divorce, in short, would not be an occasion for state inquiry concerning harms absent
a request from a parent for protection. This position accords with their earlier
argument that there should be no enforceable right of visitation. In their view, the
relationship of each parent with the child is a matter for the parents alone. If they
disagree, the state decides only the custody issue, and the custodial parent decides
on the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent from that time on. BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 43, at 38. Their position is based in part on their
conviction that "the law does not have the capacity to supervise the fragile, complex
interpersonal bonds between child and parent." BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra,
at 11-12; see also, Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of
Children: A Review of Before The Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. REV. 645,
651 n.21 (1980) ("Although some parents may reach what seems like an 'undesirable'
solution, and one parent may be 'coerced' into accepting an agreement.., forcing
parents to accept an arrangement neither wants often will do more harm than
good.").
In the same year that Before the Best Interests of the Child was published,
Mnookin and Kornhauser examined the traditional belief that "there are good reasons
not to trust parents with child-rearing decisions following divorce" and asked if "this
attitude really [is] appropriate today." Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 995.
Unlike Goldstein and his coauthors, they would create enforceable rights of visitation
for the noncustodial parent, id. at 981-82, but questioned court scrutiny of divorce
custody settlements on the ground that the procedure creates an illusion that the
state has the capacity to supervise the upbringing of children of divorced parents
when it does not, id. at 996.
Mnookin subsequently returned to the question of the state's role with respect to
the "child protection" function of divorce:
When a divorce affects minor children, the state obviously has interests
broader than simply dispute settlement. The state also has responsibility for
child protection. To acknowledge this responsibility, however, is not to define
its limits. Indeed, the critical questions concern the proper scope of the child-
protection function at the time of divorce and the mechanisms that best
perform this function.
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The Parenting Act retains the traditional court scrutiny of
divorce settlements and establishes a statutory list of plan
restrictions. The statute is ambiguous on its face, however, as
to the precise operation of section 10. On the one hand, the
language implies that court or counsel have an affirmative
duty to ensure that they do not allow certain arrangements if
they find-presumably by inquiring directly of parties-any of
the behaviors listed in section 10's "mandatory limitation"
subsection. On the other hand, the statute can be read not to
require such inquiry, leaving parents, rather than the legal
system itself, to invoke the protective function.
The statute states, as an example of this ambiguity, that
with respect to parental agreements concerning decision
making, "[t]he court shall approve agreements of the parties
allocating decision-making authority ... when it finds that:
(i) The agreement is consistent with any limitations . . .
mandated by [section 10.]"113 Section 10, in its turn,
provides: "The permanent parenting plan shall not require
mutual decision-making ... if it is found that a parent has
engaged in any of the following conduct ....
These provisions can be read in two ways. Under one
reading, if a plan makes no mention of section 10, the court
can find that the plan is consistent with any "mandated"
limitations only if it inquires into parental conduct to
determine whether any limitations are, in fact "mandated." If
the answer to the inquiry is "no," mutual decision making can
be ordered. If the answer is "yes," the plan cannot "require"
mutual decision making and will have to be changed before
the court can approve it.
• . . Notions of child protection hardly justify general judicial suspicion
of parental agreements; the state's interest in the child's well-being in fact
implies a concomitant interest in facilitating parental agreement.
• . . Moreover, because parents, not state officials, are primarily
responsible for the day-to-day child-rearing decisions before and after divorce,
parents, not judges, should have primary authority to agree on custodial
arrangements. This means that courts should not second-guess parental
agreements unless the narrow child-protection standard implicit in neglect
laws demands judicial intervention.
Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining, supra note 48, at 1034-35 (footnote omitted).
Unfortunately, Mnookin does not explain how even his carefully limited protective
function will be triggered at divorce when parents have agreed.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(2)(a) (1989), reprinted in Appendix; see also id.
§§ 26.09. 184 (4)-(5), -.187(3)(a), reprinted in Appendix.
114. Id. § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in Appendix.
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The court's duty to inquire could be obviated if counsel has
anticipated the question by including in the plan her findings
that no limitations are mandated. But counsel cannot include
any such findings without a basis for believing that the
findings are true.'15 Thus, counsel who wishes to include
such findings arguably has an affirmative duty to inquire
about the existence of any conduct that would "mandate" the
section 10 limitations.
This inquiry, however, would encounter immediate
obstacles. An attorney may ask about section 10 conduct, and
may "render candid advice" to the client concerning the legal
effects of the conduct and the concern with protection that
underlies those legal effects." 6  But an attorney may not
reveal the client's confidence if the client objects to mentioning
the conduct in the divorce, unless it falls within the narrow
"future crime" exception to the rule of confidentiality. 1 7 The
onus of inquiring, therefore, seemingly returns to the court.
115. Rule 11 of the Washington Rules for Superior Court places a duty upon the
attorney to review every pleading, motion, and legal memorandum to ensure that "to
the best of [his] knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law." WASH. R. SUPER. CT.
11; see also WASH. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3, reprinted in note 116.
116. The relevant rule of professional conduct in Washington, 'Candor Toward the
Tribunal," states:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client
unless such disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6;
(f) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all
relevant facts known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to permit
the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse.
WASH. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3.
117. The relevant rule in Washington states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal confidences or secrets relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in section[] (b) ....
(b) A lawyer may reveal such confidences or secrets to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a crime; or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client, or pursuant to court order.
WASH. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6.
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It is, however, a basic tenet of our adversarial system that
with rare exceptions (e.g., judicial notice) facts are "found"
only when the parties and their counsel choose to bring those
facts to the court's attention as evidence or stipulated
findings.' Thus, under another reading, in the absence of
an express statutory requirement that the court itself inquire
as to the existence of any section 10 conduct, arguably no
"affirmative duty" to do so should be implied. Rather, a
reviewing court faced with an agreement for mutual decision
making need only look at the plan to see if it includes any
findings of section 10 conduct. If it does, the court must then
ensure that the plan complies with section 10's terms; if it
does not, the court may "find" that the plan is consistent with
the statute because there is no evidence of any need for
"limitations." The phrase "shall not require," which implies
that at least one parent opposes such an order, bolsters this
interpretation. This reading also accords with fundamental
notions of client and family autonomy.
The statute may well be intentionally ambiguous, reflecting
unresolved philosophical differences about the proper
protective role of the state at divorce. Under the first
interpretation, divorce per se is an occasion for inquiring into
the possible existence of harms to children or spouses. Under
the second interpretation, divorce per se is not enough; the
state will set limits if and only if a divorcing parent brings
evidence of harm to its attention.
Section 10 may also represent an unsatisfactory statutory
effort to achieve another goal: limiting the behavior of, and
educating, legal professionals-attorneys and reviewing
courts-with respect to the need to give more serious attention
to the dangers of certain arrangements for children and
"vulnerable" spouses. The statute might have been written in
such a way that attorneys would feel that they had to ask
about and confront conduct that they might prefer to ignore,
and the court would no longer have discretion to ignore the
need for certain protections. The implications of the actual
statutory scheme for client autonomy or the rule of confidenti-
ality may have been ignored or even unanticipated. In any
event, the ubiquitous tension between facilitating private
ordering, on the one hand, and ensuring protection to
vulnerable parties, on the other, was brought to the fore by
118. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 1-2, 919-20 (3d ed. 1984).
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section 10. Not surprisingly, the question of precisely how
section 10 was to work quickly became a subject of much
controversy among legal professionals.'19
Second, section 10 assumes that the particular list of
limiting behaviors is appropriate. 120  Thus, the list of
behaviors requiring "mandatory" limitations is arguably
overinclusive or underinclusive, as is the list of behaviors
allowing "discretionary" limitations.'
12
Third, there are the closely linked, omnipresent questions
of interpretation and application, especially in the
nonreviewable negotiation and settlement process. Thus, the
Act assumes, for example, that parties and attorneys can
comprehend the words and then recognize the acts or omis-
sions constituting "a pattern of emotional abuse."2 2
119. See infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text.
120. Mnookin would, for example, limit the state's protective role at divorce to
addressing the harms described in a state's child protection laws on abuse and
neglect. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 1034; see also supra note 112.
State laws on abuse and neglect have been criticized for their imprecision, and the
appropriate grounds for state intervention in intact families have been debated
extensively. See, e.g., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 112; Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination
of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625 (1976).
121. An argument could be made, for example, that if the drafters were truly
concerned with the problem of parental conflict and its effect on children, they could
have included language on conflict or harassment in the mandatory-limitation
behaviors. The counterargument is that it is too hard to tell who is at fault in such
a case and that the wrong parent may too easily be blamed. Indeed, that is a major
reason for fearing the ostensibly helpful "friendly parent" provisions, see Schulman
& Pitt, supra note 2, at 554-56, found in many custody laws. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1)-(2) (1989). This phrase is particularly
troublesome on its face. Moreover, whether some type of "emotional abuse" should
be a ground for state intervention in the family has been debated vigorously by
leading scholars. Cf., e.g., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 112, at 75-77
(arguing against "emotional neglect" and "serious emotional damage" as grounds for
intervention because we cannot be certain that parents caused the symptoms and
because of lack of consensus about treatment, but recommending state-supported
voluntary services to help parents deal with their children's emotional needs); Wald,
supra note 120, at 701 (including as a proposed statutory ground for intervention "(c)
A child is suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety,
depression or withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward others, and her
parents are unwilling to provide, when financially able to do so, or to permit,
necessary treatment for her."); see also C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 476-77 (3d ed. 1985); Kincanon, The Child Abuse That
Doesn't Count: General and Emotional Neglect, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (1989).
The statute, as passed, referred only to 'emotional abuse." 1987 Wash. Laws
2023-24. The words "a pattern of" were added by amendment in 1989. 1989 Wash.
Laws 1603 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(2)(a)(ii) (1989), reprinted in
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Recognition of this or other listed conduct, like domestic
violence, may well be influenced by experience and by personal
values.'23 The Act also assumes that where parties include
section 10 limitations in their negotiated plans, they will know
what limits on the child's time will protect the child.
Similarly, the law assumes that negotiating attorneys and
courts are or will become educated sufficiently to judge the
appropriateness of particular residential time restrictions.
Finally, section 10 assumes that the parents have the
economic and emotional resources to litigate these issues. For
parties, a dispute over section 10 has costs in attorneys' fees
and in additional stress. Lawyers' enthusiasm for informing
clients of section 10 and advising compliance might be
dampened by the inability of many family law clients to pay
for extended negotiation or litigation services. Court
implementation of section 10 requires additional resources for
scrutinizing agreed plans and, possibly, for extra hearings or
trials. The legislature, however, allotted no funds to help
ensure compliance with this section of the Act.
Other sections of the Act, which reflect concerns about
possible inequalities between spouses that may affect the
bargaining process and concerns about the knowing and
voluntary nature of any settlement,'24 also limit plan
components. The Act forbids a court to order an alternative
dispute resolution process, for example, if one spouse is unable
to pay for it or would be "at risk emotionally or physical-
ly." 25  Similarly, the Act requires the court to determine
whether the parents both knowingly and voluntarily agreed
about the nature of decision making.12  Lastly, the Act
requires the court to give special scrutiny to agreements in
which children are to go frequently and for substantially equal
periods of time between parental residences.
27
Appendix. Although the change helps eliminate the possibility that a single episode
of"emotional abuse" will require a plan limitation, it tells parties, counsel, and court
nothing further about the nature of the "emotional abuse" from which the statute
protects children. The commentary is peculiarly silent on this point.
123. See, e.g., infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text (reprinting a debate
between two family law practitioners about "domestic violence").
124. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 30; cf. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The
Limits on Private Ordering, supra note 48, at 1024-31 (expressing skepticism about
the law's ability to address and solve some of these "problems in bargaining," in part
because of the difficulty in recognizing unequal bargaining power).
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(1) (1989), reprinted in Appendix; see also
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 30.
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(2)(a)(ii), reprinted in Appendix; see also COMME-
NTARY, supra note 26, at 31.
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.109.187(3)(b), reprinted in Appendix. Although this
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The Act attempts to set important limits on the planning
process, as well as on the substantive components of the plan.
In response to the reported use by parties and attorneys of
custody-suit threats as a way of extracting concessions on
support or property matters, the Act permits sanctions against
parties for bad-faith negotiations128 and requires parties who
file proposed plans to include a verified statement that the
plan is submitted in good faith.'29 The commentary states:
[T]he drafters sought to discourage practice of parties
and counsel who conditioning [sic] their agreement on
one aspect of the parenting plan upon concessions in
another aspect of the plan by the other parent. For
example, a parent threatens a battle over child's
residence unless the other parent agrees to a reduction
in child support, or a parent attempts to condition
residential time upon the timely receipt of child support
130
This aspect of the Act accords with the views both of critics
of classic adversarial tactics in the divorce context 13' and of
commentators concerned with the problem of coercive custody-
suit threats. 32 It reflects a hope that the required plan will
influence the attitudes and strategies not only of the parties,
but also of counsel. 33  This latter concern assumes that
lawyers initiate at least some destructive negotiation tactics,
including abusive custody-suit threats. Despite a substantial
body of anecdotal evidence of such tactics and threats, we are
section seems designed to protect children from too much upheaval in their living
situation or from too-frequent contact with both parents if those parents are
extremely hostile, its genesis appears to have been quite different. According to one
drafter, this section was written at the request of a legislator to assure that children
who spent summers with their fathers would not easily be ordered to return home to
their mothers often during that vacation period. Interview with Drafter A (Sept. 20,
1988); see also COMMENTARY, supra note 26, app. II.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160.
129. Id. § 26.09.181(3).
130. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 42 (emphasis added). A description in the
beginning pages of the commentary is more specific. Under the heading "The Threat
of Joint Custody as a Bad Faith Bargaining Tool," the commentary says that "the
current system fails to properly . . . sanction [sic] or prohibit the abusive use of a
custody challenge as a bargaining weapon." Id. at 5.
131. See sources cited supra note 5.
132. See, e.g., Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the
Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984).
133. See COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 42; see also supra note 88.
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only beginning to understand what role, if any, the
attorney-as opposed to the client-plays in bad-faith
negotiation at divorce.
The Act's solution to these problems also assumes, of
course, that the threat of sanctions will affect (at least some)
parties and attorneys, and that a statement of good faith will
influence (at least some) people who otherwise might not act
in good faith. I am not aware of any data about whether this
is an effective approach to this problem in divorce bargaining.
In sum, drafters and commentators believed the regulatory
scheme would serve a variety of important functions. They
included the plan mechanism to facilitate individualized
private ordering while still promoting increased shared
parenting; to educate parents about their responsibilities; and
to help decrease parental hostility at divorce and in the future.
They also designed limitations and sanctions to protect
vulnerable spouses or children from the other spouse or parent
and from the potentially destructive bargaining tactics of
attorneys.
134. See, e.g., Neely, supra note 132, at 177. In the State of Washington, a survey
of judges and lawyers showed that:
In response to survey questions on property division, both lawyers and judges
reported that they were aware of cases in which women gave up community
property to avoid custody battles. Almost half (47 percent) of the lawyers
responding to the survey have represented at least "occasionally" female
clients who conceded property in order to avoid a child custody dispute. Nine
percent (9 percent) of the lawyers report their female clients usually or
always compromised on property division in exchange for their husband's
agreement not to seek custody.
A significant number of judges (48 percent) also responded that at least
occasionally" they were aware of situations in which mothers conceded more
than 50 percent of the community assets in exchange for the father's
agreement not to seek custody....
Sixty-one percent of the lawyers said they had occasionally represented
mothers who accepted less child support than the father's income would call
for in exchange for the father's agreement not to contest custody. More than
two-thirds of the judges (71 percent) believe that situations exist where
mothers agree to accept less child support in exchange for fathers' agreement
not to seek custody. This bartering of support in exchange for custody may
have serious negative economic consequences for both the mothers and the
children post dissolution.
FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN
THE COURTS 56, 70 (1989) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter WASHINGTON STATE TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT]. The report does not indicate whether lawyers exploit these
observations. See also K. KRESSEL, supra note 8, at 172-77 (reporting that lawyers
may exercise less impact on the settlement process than is typically imagined, but
that we still know very little about the actual role of attorneys in the negotiation
process).
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These goals are based on major assumptions about human
behavior and-even more significantly-about the capacity of
law (or legal devices such as plans) to shape that
behavior. 3 ' Custody reform has been plagued by a some-
times overt and sometimes unarticulated schism in belief
concerning the law's capacity. In discussing whether the law
should impose joint physical custody on unwilling parents, for
example, two leading empiricists may have arrived at very
different conclusions not simply because of their substantive
preferences, but because they have very different notions of
what the law can do to affect attitudes about postdivorce
parenting.'36 The same dichotomy holds true with legal
scholars. Some scholars have advocated custody reforms
based on a belief in the capacity of law to change societal
norms.'17  Others have refused to advocate certain reforms
because they are uncertain about the law's capacity to effect
such educative goals.138
135. The Parenting Act is based on three assumptions about the capacity of a law
to effect change. It aspires to refocus parental attention to decrease hostility at
divorce and assumes that the law can affect the immediate emotions and attitudes
of parties. It tries to decrease hostility in the long-term and assumes that the use
of details in a plan to anticipate or resolve disputes, as well as the availability of an
alternative dispute resolution process, will succeed in averting or lessening conflict
over time. It also tries to encourage continued participation by both parents in the
child's life after divorce, and assumes that a statute with certain substantive
emphases can "instruct" the public effectively so that the "new" becomes the "norm"
over time.
136. See, e.g., supra note 67.
137. See e.g., Bartlett & Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency
Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 28, 30 (1986):
Feminist critics of joint custody have focused on the concrete and
immediate effects of joint custody laws. These critics have ignored another
critical feature of the law: its expressive or symbolic power to alter social
expectations and norms....
We do not mean to overemphasize the yield from legal reform. Changes
in the law, alone, are not likely to produce gender-based equality. However,
an end to the law's complicity in inequalitarian norms may be a precondition
of reform and even a catalyst for it.
138. See, e.g. Elster, supra note 38, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted):
An even more tenuous argument derives from the educative and socialization
effects of the law. These effects have been used to justify a statutory
presumption for joint custody and to argue against the maternal presumption.
... On the one hand, these assertions sound plausible and may well be true.
On the other hand, there is in general very little knowledge about the alleged
educative effects of the law. This criterion, therefore, cannot be assigned
great weight.
See also Fineman, supra note 3, at note 26.
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The different views may be attributable to a different focus.
Thus, some reformers may be looking at the immediate short-
term effect of a law; others may be unconcerned or less
concerned with the short term, because they are looking
forward to a long-term change in society. Different reformers
or scholars may also be focusing on the law's effect on parties
at different points in the divorce process. The parent who is
just filing for divorce, for example, does not necessarily require
the same type of legal guidance as one who is already em-
broiled in a contested case. Or the different groups may be
focusing on a different type of client. The optimists may be
concentrating on the easy case-the basically cooperative
couple who works to create a plan that then helps avert or
avoid disputes. The pessimists may see only the hard case
where warring parents perpetuate conflict before, during, and
after a divorce. We don't know enough about either extreme,
but more importantly, we don't know much of anything about
the great middle ground-the tense, unhappy, but not or not-
yet intractably alienated, parents.
In fact, we are still embarrassingly ignorant about whether
custody law can successfully perform any function other than
resolving disputes.'39 Although this ignorance may require
us to hesitate before creating new policies without evidence
that the proposed law can effect such change-and it is my
personal belief that we have an obligation to hesitate, at a
minimum, in that case-once a new law has been passed, we
have a responsibility to examine its assumptions in action, not
to dismiss it out of hand because we do not believe it can work
or to praise the law lavishly because we are convinced, as an
act of faith, that it will. To the extent that we act only on
what we imagine to be possible, we are all responsible for the
way in which our vision of the law's capacity colors our
shaping of policy, our study of how that policy works in the
world, and the professional services we render to our clients.
139. This point is made about law in general by Melton and Saks, who then go on
to argue for "a psychology of jurisprudence that would increase our understanding of
(a) the forces that shape the law and legal reasoning ... (b) the psychological mean-
ing of law; (c) how that meaning is acquired; and (d) the ways the law shapes the be-
havior of individuals, groups, and communities." Melton & Saks, The Law as an
Instrument of Socialization and Social Structure, in THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL
INSTRUMENT 235, 258, 268 (G. Melton ed. 1986).
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C. The Regulatory Scheme
Drafters' goals are subject, as are all such legislative
aspirations, to being cast in and communicated by the
language of law. Before considering the initial fate of the
Act's ambitious goals, it is useful to examine the actual
written regulatory scheme devised by the Act's drafters and to
situate that scheme in the larger context of recent divorce
custody reform.
The regulatory scheme governs the private-ordering process
of all divorcing parents even where no formal dispute has
occurred between those parents. Everyone must file a plan
covering certain arrangements, and everyone is subject to
certain limitations on private ordering, given certain factual
findings. 4 ' The law also establishes rules for formal
disputes. The regulations controlling agreements require that
those agreements be "consistent with" the section of the Act
that governs formal disputes."' Furthermore, the outcomes
predicted by the formal dispute rules may influence the
settlement process itself.'42
Yet, for several reasons, it is useful to treat separately the
perspectives underlying these regulations. First, the Act is
unique in the ways in which and the extent to which it
attempts to control the private-ordering process as opposed to
the formal dispute. Second, we do not know how the formal
dispute rules that the court is directed to apply affect--or do
not affect-the agreement or settlement process.'43  A
description of the express role of the state-theoretical though
it may be-with respect to arrangements made without a
formal dispute, at least at the decree stage,'44 articulates a
140. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.181, .184, .187, .191 (1989).
141. Id. § 26.09.184(3)-(5), reprinted in Appendix.
142. This is the "bargaining in the shadow of the law" theory, propounded by
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 5.
143. See, e.g., Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, supra note 8, at 1147:
The foregoing description of the actual divorce process raises the question
of who is in fact casting the shadow of the law-the judge (as is typically
presumed) or the litigants themselves. . . . It seems that, rather than a
system of bargaining in the shadow of the law, divorce may well be one of
adjudication in the shadow of bargaining.
The authors based this conclusion on their empirical study of court scrutiny of child-
support provisions in 349 cases in Dane County (Madison), Wisconsin. Id. at 1138-39.
144. Some aspect of a plan may be disputed formally before the court enters the
decree. Usually this occurs at the temporary plan stage. The case will end up on the
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baseline against which the actual practice of over ninety
percent of divorce cases can be measured. Discussing the
formal dispute rules helps situate the substantive content of
the Act with respect to other custody regimes across the
nation. This section of the Article will therefore examine the
regulations from each of these two perspectives: the
regulation of private ordering and of formal disputes.
1. Private ordering-The legislative scheme governing
private parental ordering can be divided into two basic parts:
affirmative ("the plan") regulations and prohibitory ("the
limitations") regulations. These parts correspond to the two
predominant themes of the Act: shared parenting and limits
on shared parenting.
a. The parenting plan-In accord with relatively recent
statutory revisions in a number of other states, 145 the Act
requires detailed "parenting plans."'46 Thus, parents can no
longer state simply that one parent has "custody" and the
other "reasonable" or "liberal" "rights of visitation." Nor can
they agree, as they could previously," 7 to nothing more
specific than "joint legal" or "joint physical custody." Instead,
parents must specify terms with respect to three discrete plan
components: a dispute resolution process; 14 allocation of
motion calendar, and in counties with Family Court Services, will likely be referred
to that service for mediation, evaluation, or investigation. In King County, approxi-
mately 10% of the dissolution cases require a hearing at the temporary order stage
and are referred to Family Court Services. Of that number, approximately 60% work
out both a temporary and a permanent parenting plan in mediation.
The remaining 40% (4% of total dissolutions) are left to their own devices, and
may take a long time to complete, but virtually all of these cases settle without a full-
blown trial. Interview with Marjorie Hellman, Director, King County Family Court
Services (Aug. 1, 1989).
In a study of 700 randomly selected dissolution files from 11 Washington State
counties, for example, a "maximum of five out of the 700 cases were contested custody
cases." WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 67.
145. See supra note 10.
146. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (1989). Washington is the first state to
require all divorcing parents, regardless of their "custody" arrangement, to file a
parenting plan. As the examples in note 10 demonstrate, the different state statutes
vary immensely in the type and nature of detail suggested or required for those
parents who must file a plan. See supra note 10.
147. The pre-Act statute required only "provision for child custody and visitation."
See 1987 Wash. Laws 2018 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.050); see also
Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-Making Alternative, 32
WASH. ST. B. NEWS 10, 11 (1978) ("Joint custody has been with us for many years in
the State of Washington. It has been recognized in earlier court decisions such as
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 159, 37 Wn. 2d [sic] 222 P. 2d 400 (1950) .... ").
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(3) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
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decision-making authority;'49 and residential provisions for
"given days of the year, including provision for holidays, birth-
days . . . vacations, and other special occasions. " "' Every
plan must contain each of these elements.' 5 '
b. Limitations on the plan-The Act subjects each of the
plan components to different limiting factors. The court must
review the components of all plans for compliance with any
such limits before it places its imprimatur on an arrangement
created by the parents themselves or through negotiation,
mediation, or settlement conference.' 52
(1) Section 10-A constant limitation on all components of
the parental agreement is the "section 10" list of mandatory
restrictions. 153  Under that section, a finding of "[w]illful
abandonment" or "substantial refusal to perform parenting
functions"; of "physical, sexual, or a pattern of emotional
abuse"; or of "a history of acts of domestic violence[" 4] . . . or
an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily
harm or the fear of such harm" requires, with exceptions
applied only to residential time, various restrictions on each
component of the parenting plan. 55
In addition, section 10 lists certain other behaviors or
conditions for which the court "may" limit any plan
component. Thus, an agreed plan can, but need not, restrict
decision making, dispute resolution, and residential time
where the court has found, for example, substance abuse that
interferes with parenting functions or abusive use of conflict
149. Id. § 26.09.184(4), reprinted in Appendix.
150. Id. § 26.09.184(5), reprinted in Appendix.
151. In its original version, the Act required that provisions for child support be
included in the plan as well. That requirement was deleted by the Washington State
Legislature in its 1989 session. 1989 Wash. Laws 1964 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.184 (1989)).
152. See supra note 144.
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1)-(2) (1989), reprinted in Appendix. WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.50.010(1) defines "domestic violence" as "(a) Physical harm, bodily
injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or
assault, between family or household members; or (b) sexual assault of one family or
household member by another."
154. "Domestic violence" is defined by WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.010(1); see supra
note 153.
155. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191, reprinted in Appendix. These findings can
be incorporated into a plan arrived at through negotiation and settlement and then
signed by the court. See Wechsler, supra note 56, at 6-9 (advising practitioners to
"[a]dd specific findings in all cases where no dispute resolution process is ordered, in
all cases where the parties have agreed to a dispute resolution process, and in all
cases where sole decision making is ordered").
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by the parents that endangers the child's emotional well-
being. 156
(2) Limitations on specific plan components-Dispute
resolution processes, decision-making processes, and
residential schedules, as outlined in a parental plan, are each
subject to judicial scrutiny under section 10 and under several
additional statutory sections.
(a) Limitations on agreements concerning decision
making-The Act refers expressly to the ability of parents to
make their own agreements with respect to the decision-
making component. It states that the "court shall approve"
such agreements, requiring only that the agreements be
consistent with section 10 and be "knowing and volun-
tary."'57 Section 10 states that the plan "shall not require
mutual decision-making" where any of the mandatory
limitation behaviors are found.'58
(b) Limitations on agreements concerning a dispute
resolution process-The Act does not defer similarly to
parental agreement on dispute resolution. Instead, it states
that "[a] process for resolving disputes, other than court
action, shall be provided unless precluded or limited by RCW
26.09.187 or 26.09.191 [section 10]." 9 Section 187 states,
in turn, that "[t]he court shall not order a dispute resolution
process, except court action, when it finds that any limiting
factor under [section 10] applies, or when it finds that either
parent is unable to afford the cost of the proposed dispute
resolution process." 6 ° In addition, the court must consider
a number of factors, of which parental agreement is only one.
Among these factors is, for example, "[d]ifferences between the
parents that would substantially inhibit their effective
participation in any designated process."
(c) Limitations on agreements concerning residential
provisions-Agreements concerning residential time are also
subject to limitations. When an agreed plan contains findings
of any of the mandatory-limitation behaviors, the court must
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(3), reprinted in Appendix.
157. Id. § 26.09.187(2)(a), reprinted in Appendix (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in Appendix (emphasis added).
159. Id. § 26.09.184(3) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
160. Id. § 26.09.187(1), reprinted in Appendix (emphasis added). Section 10 states
that the "plan shall not require . . . a dispute resolution process other than court
action if it is found that a parent has engaged in any [of the mandatory-limitation
behaviors]." Id. § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in Appendix.
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appropriately and effectively limit the child's time with the
endangering parent, absent additional express findings that
the child was not or will not be harmed."6 ' Furthermore, the
section governing provisions for residential time gives formal
precedence to one factor that refers to primary caregiving
functions, over private parental agreement.1 12 In addition,
any agreement must be "knowing and voluntary."6 3 Finally,
the Act requires the court to make certain findings before
approving agreements in which a child may "frequently
alternate his or her residence between the households of the
parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of
time." 6 4
Thus, private ordering of residential time is subject to
scrutiny for section 10 restrictions, to scrutiny for compliance
with the "greatest weight" assigned to factor (i), which
emphasizes the primary caregiver, and to scrutiny for frequent
changes for substantially equal periods of residential time.
The role of the reviewing court therefore looms large here too.
2. Rules governing formal disputes-How is a court to
decide on the terms of a parenting plan when the parents have
been unable to agree? The short answer is that-barring a
finding of one of the section 10 "mandatory limitation" behav-
iors-this statute does permit, although it does not require, a
court to order both "mutual decision making" and an alterna-
tive form of dispute resolution where the parents have not
been able to agree on either of those two aspects of the plan.
Additionally, the statute requires that the court make certain
findings before it can order "sole decision-making" over the
161. Id. § 26.09.191(2), reprinted in Appendix; see supra note 104. In its original
form, section 10 provided no guidance concerning what the phrase, "residential time
with the child shall be limited," id. § 26.09.191(2)(a) (emphasis added) should mean
in practice. A 1989 amendment explained that a limitation on time with an
endangering parent "shall be reasonably calculated to protect the child from physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse or harm that could result if the child has contact with the
parent requesting residential time." 1989 Wash. Laws 1603; see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.191(2)(b), reprinted in Appendix. The amendment also mandated that
if limiting the amount of time with the endangering parent will not adequately
protect the child, the court "shall restrain the parent requesting residential time from
all contact with the child." Id.
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a), reprinted in Appendix. The "parenting
functions" referred to in § 187(3)(a)(i)-so-called "factor (i)-are defined in WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.004(3) (1989), reprinted in Appendix. Subsection (f) was added by
the Washington State Legislature and not by the Ad Hoc Committee. See
COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 22-23.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)(ii) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
164. Id. § 26.09.187(3)(b), reprinted in Appendix.
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objection of one parent.165 Thus, although the drafters do
not use the phrase "joint legal custody" and, in fact, claim that
they have rejected "joint custody" as a "legislative con-
cept,"166 the Act properly belongs to that class of statutes
across the country that permits "joint [legal] custody upon the
request of one party."67 The criteria for deciding between
sole and mutual decision making are set out in section 187 of
the Act. 6 ' The commentary explains the convoluted lan-
guage by stating:
If the parties have not agreed, then the Court is to
consider any limitations under Section 10, whether the
parents have historically participated mutually in
decision making, whether they have a demonstrated
ability to cooperate, whether they want to cooperate and
whether or not their geographic proximity would be any
barrier to participation. Subject to these factors, the
Court has the discretion to order mutual decision
making or to vest decision making solely in one parent
or the other.'69
The statutory criteria for the court to order a dispute
resolution process where the parents have not reached
agreement are identical to the criteria the court must use to
evaluate an agreement. 70  The court must consider any
section 10 behavior and the ability of each parent to pay, as
well as the vague "Id]ifferences between the parents that
would substantially inhibit their effective participation in any
designated process. "1 7' The Act therefore belongs to the
nationwide movement encouraging alternative dispute
resolution in divorce cases, 72 but also recognizes that the
court may be the only appropriate forum in certain cases. 173
165. See id. § 26.09.187(2)(b), reprinted in Appendix.
166. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 10.
167. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 2, at 546. In fact, by requiring certain findings
before the court can reject mutual decision making the Act arguably creates a "mild
presumption" for joint legal custody. History and professional reactions to the Act
confirm this interpretation. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(2) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
169. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 31.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(3) (1989), referring to WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.09.187, .191. All three sections are reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
171. Id. § 26.09.187(1)(a), reprinted in Appendix.
172. See, e.g., ADR 3 Rep. 423 (1989) (summarizing results of a survey by Peter R.
Maida of legislation in 27 states that mandate or suggest divorce mediation).
173. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The commentary explains the
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The Act's formal dispute resolution rules for deciding on
residential time, born of political compromise, are not
straightforward. On the one hand, the Act assigns a
preference to a factor that refers to primary caretaking
functions, by virtue of requiring expressly that the court give
"greatest weight" to that factor among a number of
factors. 7 4 Because Washington State case law has held, in
construing its former divorce custody statute, that a court is
not required to set out its findings with respect to each
statutory factor, the actual effect of this "weight" requirement
is unclear at best.' On the other hand, the Act does not
preclude substantial sharing of residential time where parents
do not agree, unless (unspecified) restrictions are to be placed
on one parent's time because of the mandatory section 10
limitations. Even frequent transitions between parental
homes for substantially equal periods of time may be ordered
over one parent's objection, although such an order requires
the court to make certain findings, including findings on
whether the parents have a history of cooperation and this
arrangement therefore arguably is discouraged by the Act.'76
This section, more than any other, evidences the compromises
and political tensions between the pro- and anti-joint custody
advocates.'77
Finally, the role of section 10 in a contested case should be
noted. If a parent contests an allegation of "mandatory
limitation" conduct, the other parent bears the burden of
showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the behavior
occurred. 7 ' But once that showing is made, a limitation
amorphous language on "differences" by stating that "[a] parent may not be forced to
work with another parent if it would put that parent at risk emotionally or physically
and a parent would not be forced to use a nonjudicial mechanism they [sic] could not
afford." COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 30. See also supra note 48.
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a) (1989), reprinted in Appendix ("The
relative strength, nature, and stability of the child's relationship with each parent,
including whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parenting
functions relating to the daily needs of the child . . . shall be given the greatest
weight."); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
175. In re Marriage of Croley, 91 Wash. 2d 288, 290-92, 588 P.2d 738, 740-41
(1978). This statement assumes, of course, that the Croley rule will also apply to the
new Act. Arguably, it should not because there will be no way to review actual
application of the "greatest weight" requirement if a court does not have to spell out
exactly what weight it has given to each of the seven factors.
176. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. But see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(5) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
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must be imposed unless the offending parent rebuts the
presumption of harm by proving, again by a preponderance of
evidence,179 either that contact will not harm the child and
"the probability that the parent's harmful or abusive conduct
will recur is so remote that it would not be in the child's best
interest to apply the limitations [or that] the parent's conduct
did not have an impact on the child."8 ° Thus the parent
attempting to protect the child (or herself or himself) is not
put in the position of having to carry the burden of proving
both the existence of certain conduct and the need for
protection against that conduct.
III. THE LAW IN PRACTICE
Drafters' commentaries can instruct parties and profession-
als on the contours and goals of a regulatory scheme and, to
a degree, on the actual application of a new law. But they are
also understandably self-serving documents, putting forward
the best face of their creation and avoiding discussion of
troublesome assumptions about or underlying conflicts among
those goals.'8 ' Only when the word of law is transformed
into the fact of practice can it assume its real shape and reveal
the inevitable problems that result from any untested
legislative aspiration. What happened with this new law,
then, when it entered the world?
A sound evaluation of the Parenting Act and its many
aspects requires observation over a period of time. It is
therefore not possible yet to say whether the Parenting Act is
working with respect to its desired goals for parents and
children. It is possible, however, to describe how the law is
working in some respects. The behavior of courts, counsel,
and parties, gleaned from a study of completed parenting
plans and from observations of and interviews with family law
professionals, provides useful information, both for assessing
initially the law's "successes" and "failures" and for
articulating key questions concerning this and other recent
attempts at custody reform. The ways in which this new law
179. Id.
180. Id. § 26.09.191(2)(c), reprinted in Appendix.
181. See supra note 46.
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was presented to and received by the professionals who would
usher it into the world tell us something about the nature and
even the possibility of reform itself. This Article therefore
turns next to examine how the law has operated in its first
year or so of implementation.
A. Methodology
My students and I gathered data from four main sourc-
es. 182  First, I obtained materials used throughout the state
to teach attorneys and superior court judges about the new
law. In addition, I attended numerous training sessions
("CLEs" 83) for attorneys, held just before and just after the
effective date of the Act. At these sessions, I observed both
the way in which the law was presented to practitioners and
the reactions of attending attorneys.
8 4
182. These sources do not include my interviews of drafters and other family law
professionals, referred to in notes throughout this Article.
Much of the information for this section of the Article was collected by student
participants working on their own research projects for a law school seminar that I
taught at the University of Washington School of Law. The students were required
to write a paper for this course and were told that they could choose an empirical
project if they so desired. I suggested a series of possible topics as the course
progressed. Most, though not all, of the students chose a paper related to one of
those empirical topics. The shaping of the research was a collaborative effort;
students worked in pairs or groups, and I reviewed questionnaires and made
suggestions to facilitate the students' chosen inquiries and interests and, where
possible, to permit data gathering for closely related questions in which I was
interested. The names of each of these students will be mentioned in passing and
their papers cited whenever the text (as opposed to the raw data) is directly quoted.
I remain immensely appreciative of the excellent caliber of their work and of their
willingness to share and coordinate their research efforts with my own. Their papers
are available to the public in the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library, University
of Washington School of Law.
In addition, I was fortunate to have an excellent research assistant, Peter Fabish,
who reviewed over 300 King County case files for additional information and updates.
I was also fortunate to be assisted by the valuable skills and insights of a trained
social scientist, Julie Hunt, Ph.D. Candidate in Psychology at University of Washing-
ton, who spent untold hours patiently analyzing the massive amount of data gathered
from the King County files.
183. 'CLE" is the term used throughout Washington State for Continuing Legal
Education courses.
184. These 'CLEs" were given by a variety of organizations including a public
interest group (Northwest Women's Law Center), state bar organizations, educational
institutions (including University of Washington School of Law) and the Washington
State Office of the Administration of the Courts. The 'trainers" at these sessions
were often the same people: drafters of the Act, family law attorneys who had advised
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Second, we examined more than 300 King County cases for
which a decree of dissolution was issued during 1988 and in
which there was a permanent parenting plan.8 5  We
examined the content of permanent parenting plans filed
during the first year of the Parenting Act to ascertain a
number of variables, including types of arrangements made by
parents within the confines of the new law and compliance in
the private-ordering process with the express terms of the law
by parties, attorneys, and the courts.8 6  The following
the drafters, and experienced family law judges. In addition, a number of
experienced family law attorneys who had not participated in the creation of the
legislation would, on occasion, appear at these sessions. One drafter told me quite
candidly in an interview that the drafters had attempted to ensure that they would
be well represented in training sessions around the state. This drafter referred to the
need for "seizing the agenda." Interview with Drafter A (Sept. 20, 1988).
185. K. Haynes & S. Somers, An Empirical Study of Final Parenting Plans
Developed in 1988, The First Year Since Passage of the Parenting Act (May 1989)
(unpublished paper on file in Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library, University of
Washington School of Law). Karen Haynes and Sue Somers did all of the actual data
collection. This study was originally to cover all permanent parenting plans for
which decrees were issued in King County in 1988. Halfway through the study, it
became evident that the computer-generated list of files supplied by the County
Clerk's Office was woefully incomplete. (It appears that some attorneys had filed
parenting plans as separate documents and some had not. The computer had no way
of locating those files in which the plans were incorporated in the decree rather than
separately docketed.) The complete list of case files from 1988 was prohibitively
large and it was too late to start the project anew with a statistically random
sampling of files from 1988. As a result, it is impossible to claim that these files are
representative of all King County dissolution files for that year. At the same time,
however, with one exception, nothing about this sample (or its arbitrary selection
process) indicates that it is not representative. The one exception is that the files
selected were all initiated and completed within 1988 to ensure that they were
governed by the Parenting Act that went into effect January 1, 1988. As a result,
there are likely somewhat fewer of the more contentious (and therefore more time-
consuming) cases than would be found in a random sample.
Haynes and Somers' original sample of 317 cases was reduced to 306 for the
statistical analyses described throughout this Article. The difference is attributable
to several phenomena. First, to study completely the § 10 allegations in files, we had
to return to all files. Where file data collected by Haynes and Somers could not be
checked and amplified because the file number did not correspond to an actual file
or the actual file was checked out of the filing room, that file was eliminated. Second,
a review of the original data sheets completed by Haynes and Somers produced
several cases that did not fit into any category with respect to important issues.
Those cases were also set aside. Finally, there were two data sheets with separate
file numbers that turned out to be duplicates of two other files. Those cases were
eliminated as well.
In addition to eliminating 11 cases from the original pool as described, raw data
was entered anew for a number of variables because of the need for additional
information or to convert various "ranges" to raw numbers. On occasion, the text
relies on Haynes and Somers' original paper. If so, it always so states.
186. Although some of these cases involved disputes at the temporary-order stage,
all but one resulted in an agreed or settled permanent parenting plan.
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summer we completed a review of these same case files. We
examined those cases in which section 10 allegations preceded
the filing of the permanent parenting plan and traced those
allegations throughout the file. In addition, we noted, inter
alia, any formal legal action since the decree and whether any
of the cases had been referred to King County Family Court
Services (FCS) before the decree was granted.
Third, students conducted loosely structured interviews
with thirty attorneys from two counties (King and Clark).1 7
They selected King County attorneys from the King County
case files, word of mouth, and the King County Yellow Pages
telephone directory listings for family law practitioners.' 8
The researching student selected the Clark County counsel
after observing them in appearances before the county's
Family Law Commissioner. The students asked attorneys to
fill out background information sheets and then interviewed
them in person for an average of one and one-half hours.
Each interviewer worked from the same basic list of forty-
three questions, but because of time constraints not all
attorneys were asked all of these questions. One student tape-
recorded the interviews; the other three took extensive
handwritten notes. These interviews covered two basic
themes: the attorneys' use of and opinions of the plan require-
ment and their use of and opinions of the section 10
limitations.
Fourth, three students observed ex parte proceedings
approving agreed parenting plans and followed up with
187. There were 24 attorneys from King County and 6 from Clark County. This
work was completed by four different students and presented in three papers: J.
Sutter, The Effect of the Parenting Act on the Practice of Family Law in King County
(May 1989) (unpublished paper); J. McKeever & D. Noda, A Survey of King County
Family Law Practitioners: Responses to the Mandatory and Discretionary Limitations
of the 1987 Washington Parenting Act (May 1989) (unpublished paper); C. Hart, "My
Clients Are Just Simple Folk"-Is the Parenting Act Working in Clark County?
(Spring 1989) (unpublished paper). All three papers are on file at the Marian Gould
Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School of Law.
In addition, one student, using a similar questionnaire, interviewed 12 family law
mediators, some of whom were and some of whom were not licensed attorneys. R.
Cordero, A Survey of Family Mediators: Mediating Under the 1987 Parenting Act
(Spring 1989) (unpublished paper) (on file at the Marian Gould Gallagher Law
Library, University of Washington School of Law). Because her questions were not
consistently the same as those used by the other researchers, I refer to this paper
only on occasion.
188. Attorneys whose names appeared more than two times were listed by the
students examining the files. The interviewing students then selected names from
that list as well as the two other mentioned sources.
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interviews of the observed regular ex parte and pro tern
commissioners in four counties. 8 9 They spent a minimum
of one-half day observing each of the nine commissioners.
These commissioners, who handle a number of different types
of cases, were not told beforehand what, specifically,
interested the observers. Following all the observations, the
students or I interviewed each observed commissioner. 90
Those interviews concentrated on the commissioners' views of
their scrutiny of agreed parenting plans, including their
scrutiny of section 10 limitations on different aspects of the
plan and other statutory limitations on private parental
ordering. The students then compared the information from
observations with the information from interviews and,
wherever possible, examined the parenting plans subject to ex
parte proceedings on the day of the observation.
B. Findings
1. The parenting plan- a. The facilitative function:
individualized private ordering-Family law professionals lost
no time in pointing out that the plan's "ability to accommodate
widely differing factual patterns" 9' had its costs, including,
ironically, a possible loss of parental autonomy. They were
concerned particularly about the Act's requirement that the
plan set out a detailed residential schedule covering "given
days of the year." Some practitioners questioned the appro-
priateness of a detailed plan for couples who were already
cooperative or had much older children and so preferred the
flexibility granted them under the old "custody to x,
reasonable visitation to y" formula. Others worried about the
requirement of a very detailed residential schedule for couples
whose lives were not sufficiently organized or predictable for
such careful "planning" even in the immediate future or whose
189. See P. Eakes & P. Brown, Judicial Scrutiny of Agreed Parenting Plans: A
Study of King, Snohomish and Pierce Counties (May 1989) (unpublished paper) (on
file at the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School of
Law); C. Hart, supra note 187. The counties were King, Snohomish, Pierce, and
Clark.
190. Eakes and Brown were unable to interview one of the observed ex parte
commissioners because of scheduling problems. I subsequently conducted that
interview.
191. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 27.
FALL 1990]
118 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
cultures or personal proclivities were not conducive to the type
or extent of planning required by the Act. 9 2  Similarly, the
practical problem for all families of predicting and providing
concrete detail to cover the inevitable changes that would
occur with time was not lost on members of the legal com-
munity.
193
192. Cordero reports:
Three of the mediators in this study commented on how groups outside
of the white middle class might be affected by the Parenting Act in general
and by mediating a parenting plan in particular. Their comments imply that
many of the values the Parenting Act reflects are primarily middle class
values. They refer especially to the quality and style of parenting skills and
communication skills that the Act seems to assume will be available in most
families; their opinion is that those skills have mostly been learned by
persons having access to a greater amount of education than that available
to the lower socio-economic classes.
One mediator sees the Parenting Act as being potentially helpful to lower
socio-economic families who frequently are forced to deal with a high degree
of chaos because of the struggle just to make ends meet. If they have the
chance to mediate a parenting plan, her experience is that this serves to
organize their thoughts and gain some "middle-class" communication and
parenting skills, skills which are often sorely lacking. In contrast, going
through the court system would insulate them from knowing what decisions
need to be made and how to make them.
Another mediator working for a public interest group sees many very
young parents of infants and toddlers; many of these parents have very poor
parenting skills and so do not really have enough information to act in their
children's best interests. She refers them to parenting classes or other com-
munity services since she thinks the mediation context insufficient to educate
them to the degree they need.
The third mediator in this group points out that for cultural minorities
the definitions of parenting functions and of family can differ greatly from the
norms of the majority culture. For example, in many minority cultures, the
extended family is the basic social unit rather than the nuclear family. In
those cultures, parenting functions are the responsibility of more individuals
than just the parents of a child. How would a parenting plan under the Act
provide for the "existing pattern of interaction" between the child and all of
her/his parents and parent-surrogates?...
But mediating a parenting plan could still be a positive option for those
minorities for whom it would be excruciatingly shameful to have to go to court
since any involvement with a public legal forum would be regarded as a loss
of face.
R. Cordero, supra note 187, at 40-42. In a similar vein, the intricacy of the plan
disturbed those attorneys who were experienced with pro se parties. See, e.g.,
Goodnow, The Dissolution Dilemma, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 4, 1989, at C2,
col. 2 (statement of Tony Vivenzio, Director of the Family Law Clinic of the Seattle-
King County Bar Association). Many attorneys expressed concern about the
increased expense of a dissolution for all clients, and especially those with little
income. See e.g., id. (statements of Tony Vivenzio, Wendy Gelbart, and Yakima
County Superior Court Judge Stephen Brown). For further discussion of increased
costs, see infra note 237.
193. A participant at a training session for state judges raised this problem. The
response, by one of the trainers ("Speaker"), demonstrates the extent of the confusion
Divorce Custody Reform
According to training materials, however, the use of less
specificity because two parents preferred to work things out
over time or needed more open-ended language because of
uncertain work schedules or future plans or events would not
be acceptable. At training sessions, attorneys were
consistently instructed that "reasonable" or "liberal visitation"
would no longer suffice.'94 One training attorney, not a
over the statute's requirement:
Questioner: Can I ask you one question .. that we all wrestle with? ... The
thing of it in a day-by-day courtroom is that the future is so uncertain, you
talk about vacations, you know if everybody had a regular job and a regular
vacation and so forth, the way I see most of this, that's not the case. I mean
people move, they change their jobs, they remarry and their wife or their
husband and they got other children, got a million things that, sit down when
you're trying to get these people to divorce, on their separate ways, say about
3 years from now, what are we going to do about Easter vacation. That seems
to me totally unproductive except the more dispute and more cost. [sic] Is it
really contemplated that you really want these people to try and think
through Spring vacation three years from now?
Speaker: Or a process that alternates holidays that allows them to make the
decision on their own without being back in front of you or some way else in
the courtroom to try to resolve that issue perspectively. You don't need to
assign those dates, but, certainly, to raise the issue that the holidays will
alternate and to have a resolution to what happens on an annual basis.
Questioner: But this seems not to say that. This seems to say, you know,
that you, the Plan shall include residential schedule which designates which
parent each dependent child shall reside on given days of the year including
provisions for holidays. I mean that language seems real mandatory to me, that
you designate what day of the year little Johnny's gonna be at mom's....
Speaker: Good, and I hope most people take it that way but literally you can
accommodate that language by specifying an alternation of holidays over a
multi-year cycle. There's nothing wrong with that level of detail.
Questioner: . . . dad'll have three weeks in the summer or momll have three
weeks in the summer...
Speaker: Absolutely nothing wrong.
Another Questioner: . . . in fact in the appropriate case and surely a non-
contested case, could not the residential plan be: "the children shall reside
primarily with (fill in the blank) and the other parent shall have the children
alternate weekends and for one month during summer?"
Speaker: In the appropriate case, yes...
Questioner: I think that's important, say, 'cause it doesn't come through in the
language.
Transcript of Washington Superior Court Judge's Seminar, Judicial Guide to the 1987
Parenting Act, Tape B, at 31-32 [hereinafter Transcript] (copy on file with Jane W.
Ellis). This seminar was delivered on January 23, 1988 and March 26, 1988. The tape,
recorded for the Washington State Office of the Administration of the Courts, does not
indicate on which of these two dates it was recorded. I transcribed the tapes, and the
emphasis and page designations are mine.
194. Appelwick & Wechsler, Family Law Practice Under the New Parenting Act,
in FAMILY LAW INSTITUTE, supra, at 5, 10 (stating that the plan "must include a
schedule which designates in which parent's home each dependent child shall reside
on each day of the year") (emphasis added); Sawyer, Family Law Practice Under The
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drafter, did make a useful suggestion (though not a less
expensive one) of retaining flexibility by granting "reasonable
residential time" as long as parents agree and, in the event
they later disagree, a specific schedule.' 95 The lay public,
however, was told only: "Along with school. days and
weekends, this schedule considers occasions such as holidays,
birthdays of family members and vacations. The schedule
must be specific about these days and may not simply state
'reasonable visitation.' "196
The public and their attorneys voted with their pens in
deciding whether to comply with the requirement for
residential schedules. Only 6%, 19 of the 306 King County
cases, said only that visitation would be "as agreed" or
"reasonable visitation" or "as child wishes," and so failed to
comply with the statutory requirement that parents provide
for "given days of the year."197 This compliance rate seems
New Parenting Act, in THE SECOND ANNUAL FAMILY LAW INSTITUTE 94, 117 (1988)
(materials from a CLE Seminar, sponsored by the Univ. of Wash. School of Law)
[hereinafter FAMILY LAW INSTITUTE).
In fact, one drafter and trainer of attorneys and judges suggested that a "vague
or general schedule" in a proposed plan would be a basis for a default judgment
against the responsible party. Prochnau, supra note 96, at 60.
These materials also indicate, ironically, the ambiguity in the statute with respect
to the required detail, and the possibility that the threshold issue of "how much
detail" could itself become an issue in litigation:
What if the parent is unwilling to propose a specific schedule because of,
for example, a variable work schedule? The parent who desires a more
specific schedule would cite to first the plain meaning of § 8(5)-which
appears to require such a designation. That parent could also argue that a
specific schedule is needed to meet two of the objectives of the permanent
plan: to maintain the child's emotional stability . . . and to minimize the
child's exposure to harmful parental conflict.
On the other hand, about the most that can be argued in favor of a more
vague schedule is that another of the objectives of the plan is to "provide for
the child's changing needs as the child grows and matures . . . " § 8(1)(c).
Finally, if an argument could be constructed that it would benefit the child
to have a vaguer schedule than [sic] counsel could cite to § 2 of the Act which
continues to make "best interest of the child" a paramount consideration.
Id. at 61.
195. Hibbard, Drafting Plans and Other Pleadings, in PARENTING ACT: HOW TO
GET TO THE FINAL PLAN 11, 11-22 to 11-23 (1988) (materials from a CLE Seminar
sponsored by the Seattle-King County Bar Association) [hereinafter HOW TO GET TO
THE FINAL PLAN].
196. WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE
PARENTING ACT 4 (1988) (emphasis added) (pamphlet on file with Jane W. Ellis).
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(5) (1989). It should be noted that 63% of the
plans that failed to comply (12 of 19 cases) were plans for children in the 15- to 18-
year-old range. This approach to planning for an older child may be more
sensible-and realistic-than the considerably less flexible requirement of specifying
the adolescent's location on "given days of the year."
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very good, especially given the fact that attorneys and parties
were coping with a detailed statute for the first time.'98
There was no statistically significant difference in compliance
on this score between cases where one or both parties had a
lawyer and those where no lawyer was involved at all.'99
To what extent did the parenting plans realize the goal of
individualized ordering of parent-child relationships following
divorce? Not surprisingly, pragmatic concerns affected the
extent to which the idealized, individually crafted plan materi-
alized. In interviews, more than half the attorneys stated that
they relied on some sort of form to be filled out by (or with the
assistance of) the client.2 °° Other preprinted plan forms
were prepared by an ad hoc committee of family law
practitioners or by the county court systems for use by
nonrepresented parties.2"' Almost all of these forms consist
198. Compliance rates for the other major plan components-"decision making"
and "dispute resolution process"-were also good. Ten percent of the cases omitted
a "dispute resolution process" component. Four percent, 5%, and 8% of the cases
omitted provisions for decision making concerning the child's education, healthcare,
and religious upbringing, respectively. (It is conceivable that the higher rate of
noncompliance regarding decision making for religion reflects some cases in which
neither parent is religious.).
199. Nor was there a statistically significant difference, in relation to compliance
with the other required components, between cases where attorneys were involved
and those in which no attorney participated. The numbers are as follows:
Cases in which one or both parties were represented by counsel had slightly
better compliance with respect to inclusion of a dispute resolution provision. Nine
percent of cases (24/264) that had some legal representation failed to include such a
provision. Seventeen percent of the cases (7/42) that did not include legal represen-
tation omitted that plan component.
The level of compliance was lower, however, with respect to the designation of a
specific provider of dispute resolution services. Only 28% (74/264) of cases in which
attorneys represented one or both parties named a specific provider. Thirty-eight
percent (16/42) of cases in which both parties were unrepresented managed to include
this detail.
Results were mixed with respect to compliance for the required decision-making
categories. Only 5% of cases (2/42) with no attorney on either side failed to include
provisions for decision making on education and health care, and only 2% percent
(1/42) failed to provide for decision making on religious upbringing. The percentage
of noncompliance for cases with one or two attorneys were 3% (9/264), 5% (12/264),
and 8% (22/264) for education, health care, and religious upbringing, respectively.
Thus, parties with attorneys generally fared no better or worse than parties
without counsel in terms of following the dictates of the somewhat complicated new
law.
Attorney compliance rates do not indicate that courts can reliably depend on the
presence of counsel (one or two) as compared to no counsel to ensure a complete
parenting plan is being filed.
200. Some of these forms were prepared for and distributed at training sessions
to attorneys. See, e.g., Halverson, A Parenting Plan, in WASHINGTON'S INNOVATIVE
APPROACH, supra note 96, at 67.
201. See, e.g., EVERGREEN LEGAL SERVICES, GETrING YOUR OwN DIVORCE IN
FALL 1990]
122 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
of a limited list of alternatives for each plan component. °2
Additionally, interviews revealed that:
The Act has not seemed to have generated much differ-
ence in the way attorneys suggest that residential time
be divided when the client has not arrived at his/her own
schedule. Most attorneys seem to be suggesting the
traditional custody arrangement: the non-residential
parent has the children on alternate weekends, one
evening midweek, and on alternating holidays.2 °3
Our case-file study provided more information about the
customizing of each of the required plan components.
(1) Dispute resolution provisions-Although there were
numerous variations in alternative dispute resolution provi-
sions, a closer examination revealed that an extremely large
number of plans followed a very limited number of patterns.
Fifty-eight percent of plans named "mediation" (as opposed to
"arbitration," "counseling," "court," or "other") as the dispute
resolution method of choice.20 4 "Mediation" and "court" (or
WASHINGTON (1988) (Form 3a: Parenting Plan).
202. See, e.g., J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 16-17 & app. F. Different attorneys use
their forms in different ways, some giving more and some giving less time to working
with clients to create their individualized plan. Needless to say, an attorney's time
is money, and the optimal amount of individualized planning may be beyond the
economic reach of many parties.
203. Id. at 25-26. The King County case study confirmed the predominance of this
arrangement. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
204. The breakdown of choices for dispute resolution was as follows:
Method of Dispute Resolution Cases Percent (%)
Mediation 177 57.8
Court 50 16.4
No Provision 31 10.1
Counseling 22 7.2
Other 20 6.5
Arbitration 6 2.0
This preference for mediation may well reflect an expectation that disputes in
King County are very likely to be referred for mediation at the court-affiliated King
County Family Court Services ("FCS") even if they begin on the normal motion
calendar. It may also reflect the perceived availability of free mediation services
through King County Family Court Services rather than a cultural current favoring
mediation per se. (I say "perceived availability" because the legislature failed to
provide extra funds for Family Court Services when it passed the Parenting Act, and
that availability may well diminish with the increased demand for postdissolution
mediation.) Haynes and Somers noted that "King County Family Court Services was
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"no provision," which is the functional equivalent of a
designation of "court") taken together accounted for 84% of the
plans. Thus, only 16% of cases adopted an unusual option for
dispute resolution.
At the same time, however, a number of cases indicated
that parties had taken advantage of the opportunity for a
"customized" dispute resolution process to work out future
disagreements by naming a unique dispute resolution pro-
vider. Scattered among the providers in the 29% of cases that
did name a specific person or organization were people
affiliated with the parties' religions, relatives, professional
private mediators, and, in one case, a tribal court.
, (2) Decision-making provisions-We considered two
possible indicators of individualized planning for decision
making. First, we examined the plans to see how many
contained provisions for a decision-making area other than
education, health care and religious upbringing. Fifty-two
percent of plans included provisions for decision making on
day care; 51% of plans included one or more provisions for
nonrequired areas of decision making other than day care, an
indication of individual party or attorney initiative.2 °5
Second, we determined the amount of variation within
individual plans by looking for plans that were neither all
mutual nor all sole decision making for the three required
areas. Thus, plans that gave sole decision making to one
parent in one area and to the other parent in another area, or
plans that gave mutual decision making in one or more areas
while also designating some area or areas for sole decision
making, were designated "mixed decision making" and were
tabulated. Nineteen percent of the sample fit that description.
We cannot know from this data, of course, the extent to
which these variations represent careful individualized
planning and the extent to which they represent more refined
forms of trade-offs in the plan negotiation process. In short,
the most commonly listed provider of mediation." K. Haynes & S. Somers, supra note
185, at 46. Even if parents did not list FCS as the mediator in their plans, they may
have expected to use the service.
The choice of "mediation" may also reflect an unthinking response by parties
or their counsel. In a number of divorces, for example, one party defaulted and yet
the plan listed mediation-a method that assumes a modicum of cooperation between
parents-as the chosen dispute resolution method. Id. at 63.
205. Haynes and Somers noted, for example, one file that specified joint decision
making for a two-year-old child's haircuts. Id. at 40. The temptation to speculate on
the origin and virtue of this provision is great, and I will avoid it.
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we cannot tell whether the child is being cared for or whether
the child's life is merely being divided up into smaller and
smaller pieces that may or may not reflect the real needs and
desires of individual parents and their children. Further
study on the creation of plans is necessary to make this
determination.
(3) Residential schedules-Residential schedules are
conductive to highly individualized planning, and we found
many variations. Closer examination again revealed, however,
that a limited number of patterns for weekly residential time
with each parent predominated. After we subtracted those
cases in which the parties did not comply with the terms of
the Act or gave no time whatsoever to one of the parents
(through failure to comply or through legitimate limitation),
68% of the remaining cases fit into one of two standard
residential time patterns.2 °6
(4) Representation-The representation of one or both
parties did not increase or decrease the amount of individual
variation for weekly residential patterns. Such representation
did make a difference, however, with respect to the number of
cases in which parties selected a dispute resolution method
other than the predominant "mediation" or "court." Where
neither party was represented by an attorney, the parties were
significantly more likely to pick either "court" or an alterna-
tive like "arbitration" or "counseling" than in cases with one
or two attorneys (X2 = 7.82; p < .0201; d.f. = 2). In addition,
where neither party was represented by an attorney, the
parties were significantly more likely to choose to add some
sort of decision-making provision for an area other than the
three required areas or the nonrequired but frequently named
area of day care (X 2 = 7.22; p < .007; d.f. = 1). Thus, to the
extent that these variables are valid indicators of
"individualized" planning, they were less likely, not more
likely, to appear when either one or two attorneys were
involved in the case.
206. Forty-one percent of those cases (94/228) opted for alternate weekends. An
additional 26% (60/228) opted for alternate weekends plus one daytime visit per week
or per alternate week.
Treatment of holidays and vacation periods also fell into a limited number of
patterns. After we subtracted plans that did not specify holidays as required, 90%
of the remaining cases (261) opted for one of two holiday patterns, either alternating
holidays between parents (162/261 cases or 62%), or allocating all holidays to one
parent (73/261 cases or 28%). Summer vacation patterns showed only slightly more
variation.
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These patterns became even more pronounced when we
compared one-attorney, two-attorney, and no-attorney cases.
As Table A indicates, two-attorney cases showed considerably
less use of dispute resolution processes, other than mediation
or court, compared to one-attorney and no-attorney cases.
Similarly, the percentage of two-attorney cases that included
extra decision-making provisions was much smaller than the
percentage for one-attorney or no-attorney cases.
TABLE A
REPRESENTATION AND INDIVIDUALIZED PLANNING
BY PERCENTAGE OF CASES
Number of Attorneys
Type of Plan None One Two
Dispute Resolution Provision
Other than "Court" or "Mediation" 24% 16% 9%
Nonrequired
Decision-making Provisions
(Including Daycare) 71% 53% 35%
b. The normative function: shared parenting- How much
and what type of "shared parenting" did we find in parenting
plans? The bare-bones requirement for parenting agreements
under the former law-that parents state no more than
"custody to x, reasonable visitation to y"-makes direct
comparison of parent-child arrangements under the old and
new laws impossible. Nevertheless, the King County case-file
study provides valuable information concerning the amount of
shared parenting agreed to under the new law, and several
other sources of information from the state provide rough
before-and-after comparisons. The data show greatly
increased shared-parenting provisions following the effective
date of the Act.
FALL 1990]
126 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
(1) Dispute resolution provisions-As mentioned earlier,2 °7
58% of parents selected "mediation," the dispute resolution
process requiring the most cooperation and thus arguably the
most "sharing" between parents, in their plans.
(2) Decision-making provisions-Over half the cases
specified mutual decision making, the functional equivalent of
joint legal custody, for the three required areas. Fifty-six
percent of cases designated decisions concerning "education"
as mutual, 55% percent designated "health care" as mutual,
and 57% percent designated decisions on "religious
upbringing" as mutual. 2° Not surprisingly, the next most
prominent category was sole decision making by mother
(education-35%, health care-36%, and religious
upbringing-32%). Fathers had sole decision-making in only
small numbers of cases (education-5%, health care-5%, and
religious upbringing--4%). 20 9
Although no direct before-and-after comparisons can be
made for King County, a random sampling of dissolution files
finalized in 1987 from eleven Washington State counties
including King county is available. 210 Those files, involving
a total of 597 children, showed that mothers received so-called
"legal custody" of 61% of the children, fathers received legal
custody of 13% of these children, and the decree assigned
"joint" custody for the remaining 27%.
To compare the pre-Act findings with this post-Act study,
we calculated the number of children in the latter and
assigned the designation "joint" decision making to any case
207. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
208. Haynes and Somers found that "[p]lans that allocated joint decision-making
were proportionately more likely to use mediation for dispute resolution and less
likely to use court action, even where the plans contained Section 10 violations." K.
Haynes & S. Somers, supra note 185, at 85. We confirmed this statistically signifi-
cant finding for the sample of 306 cases. (X2 = 38.04; p < .00005; d.f. = 1).
Additionally, Haynes and Somers found that "[p]lans that allocated joint decision-
making were less likely to fail to provide for any method of dispute resolution than
plans that allocated decision-making authority to one parent." Id. Again, we
confirmed the finding and its statistical significance for 306 cases. (X 2 = 13.20;
p < .0003; d.f. = 1).
209. The percentages may not add up to 100% for a given category, either because
we eliminated those cases having no provision at all for that category of decision
making or because we rounded off percentages. Plans omitted decision-making
provisions for education in 4% of cases, for health care in 5% of cases, and for
religious upbringing in 8% of cases.
210. WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, app. F-343.
The 11 counties were selected in a manner that would provide a good demographic
and geographical cross-section of the State. I was a member of this task force.
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in which neither the mother or the father had sole decision
making authority across the board.211 Thus, "joint" decision
making could consist of all-mutual decision making, of some
mutual and some sole decision making in the different
categories, or of sole decision making in one category to one
parent while the other parent received sole decision making in
some other category. In addition, we removed from the sample
the eight cases in which there were no decision-making
provisions. On those assumptions, the post-Act results were:
the mother received legal custody of 27% of these children, the
father received legal custody of 4% of the children, and
parents received "joint" custody of 69% of the children. The
"pure joint legal custody" cases, with mutual decision making
for all required categories, covered 49% of children.
TABLE B
PRE-ACT AND POST-ACT "DECISION MAKING"
BY PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN
Decision Making Method Pre-Act Post-Act
Sole Decision Making
by the Mother 61% 27%
Sole Decision Making
by the Father 12% 4%
Joint
Decision Making 27% 69%
Assuming at least rough comparability in the samples from
the pre-Act 1987 study and this post-Act study and even
accounting for the possibility that the post-Act sample may
211. The decision-making provisions were identical for all children within a given
case in our post-Act study. As a result, the percentage of cases assigning a particular
type of decision making is the same as the percentage of children.
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have fewer of the extremely contentious cases,212 the number
of formal joint legal custody or "mutual decision-making"
agreements definitely has increased.213  Although these
relationships do not establish that the new Act, with its plan
requirement, caused this increase in shared decision-making
provisions, there is at least a strong implication that this is
the case.21 4
(3) Residential schedules-We could not quantify with preci-
sion, even with the Act's more demanding requirements, the
amount of shared parenting with respect to residential time
(the equivalent of physical custody). Some cases failed to
specify a residential schedule, using only the old generalized
language on custody and visitation.215  Furthermore, we had
to make certain assumptions to compute the number of
overnight visits scheduled with each parent in a given case on
weekends, holidays and vacations.21 6
212. See supra note 185.
213. Moreover, the percentages for joint legal custody are also considerably higher
than those found in a Massachusetts study of 500 divorce agreements in which
parents ultimately received joint legal custody in just over 20% of the cases. See
Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements:
Joint Versus Sole Legal Custody, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 419,425 (1983). Mnookin,
Maccoby, and their colleagues found that a total of 79% of their cases had decrees
designating joint legal custody. See Mnookin, Maccoby, Albiston & Depren, Private
Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements are Parents Negotiating?, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 58-59 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
214. This inference is particularly strong because only one year separated the pre-
Act and post-Act cases.
215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. For example, in a number of
default cases, the parent who failed to appear was assigned seemingly boilerplate
'reasonable visitation." After examining the data from these 19 cases, we decided
to include them as "no time" rather than exclude them as "unknown time." Later,
we tested this decision by calculating the number of overnight visits in Table F,
infra p. 133, without these cases. There was no statistical difference between those
results and the results when the 19 cases were included.
216. Haynes and Somers allotted 2 "overnights" for every "weekend" and 7
'overnights" for "alternating holidays." They allotted 90 nights for summer, 7 nights
for spring break and 14 "overnights" for winter break. See K. Haynes & S. Somers,
supra note 185, at 31.
In 10 cases out of 306, the children within one family were not treated identically
in terms of overnight residential schedules. (Only 1 case out of 306 varied the
number of daytime visits for two children in one family, and that was only by three
days.) One case gave slightly different amounts of overnight visits to the same
nonprimary parent for each of two children. Two other cases would have been
labelled "joint physical custody" for both the children, although the actual number of
nights varied from child to child. (For our definition of "joint physical custody" or
"joint residence," as opposed to "sole physical custody" or "sole residence," see infra
note 217.) Seven of the 10 cases were "split custody" cases-cases in which each
parent has primary residential custody of one (or half) of the children. Because we
based our calculations on a given case, rather than on individual children, we had to
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Using these assumptions, the case study shows that
approximately 20% of cases involved children who were sched-
uled to spend at least 30% of their nights with one parent, and
the remaining nights with the other.217  Measured by
overnight visits, mothers received the bulk of the residential
time in the great majority of cases. In 70% of cases, the
children were scheduled to spend 71% or more of their nights
each year with their mothers. In only 10% of cases did they
have that number of nights scheduled with their fathers.21
decide whether to exclude these cases, and, if not, how to treat the variations within
a single case. We decided to retain the cases and to create an average "child time"
per parent for each case. We added the total overnight visits for all children with the
mother and then divided that number by the total number of children. The result
was overnight child time with the mother for that case. Child time for the father in
each case was the difference between 365 and the mother's child time. So, for
example, if the mother had 81 nights with one child and 284 nights with a second
child, while father had the reverse, the mother's child time would be 81 + 284 = 365
divided by 2 = 182.5 nights. The father's time would be 365 - 182.5 = 182.5. Our
rationale was that there was a significant amount of parental sharing, albeit in a
different form, in these cases, and that this approach would best reflect that essential
fact. These cases had a variety of representational modes, and none of them
contained § 10 findings in the final plan.
217. These are "joint residence" or "joint physical custody" cases. I selected this
range of time because it corresponds most closely to the range used by other
empirical studies. See Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment, supra note 3, at 130-31
("Research on joint custody has most often defined joint physical custody as a time-
sharing arrangement in which the child is spending at least 30% of the time with one
of the parents, and the remaining time with the other."). Maccoby, Depner, and
Mnookin, for example, define "dual residence" as those cases in which children
"divided their overnights 7-7, 8-6, 9-5, or 10-4 between the two households" per two-
week period. Maccoby, Depner & Mnookin, Coparenting in the Second Year after
Divorce, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM., 141, 144 (1990). "Sole residence" cases are those
in which a child was scheduled to spend 71% or more nights per year with one
parent.
Mnookin and Maccoby's major study found that 20% of families had decrees for
joint physical custody. See Mnookin, Maccoby, Albiston & Depner, supra note 213;
see also Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustments, supra note 3, at 130-31 (reporting that
three California studies, including that of Maccoby and Mnookin, have found that
20% to 30% of families have the children spend at least 30% of the time with one of
the parents and the remaining time with the other). During the period of the
Mnookin study, California encouraged joint legal and joint physical custody in its
statements of statutory policy but did not require a plan. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4600.5(a) (West 1983). Mnookin and his colleagues had data on the time that
children actually spent with parents, not merely on the time scheduled on paper. For
a description of these findings, see infra note 220.
The study of approximately 500 Massachusetts divorce files in the years 1978
through 1981 indicated that approximately 22% of cases resulted in joint legal
custody decrees but only 2% of cases resulted in joint physical custody. See Phear,
Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, supra note 213, at 425. The statute at the time of
the studied divorces said only that the court "may make such judgment as it
considers expedient relative to the care, custody, and maintenance of the minor
children of the parties.'" Id. at 421 (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 28).
218. Again, these figures are strikingly similar to those of Mnookin and his
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The eleven-county random sampling of pre-Act 1987 cases
indicated that for 79% of cases, the mother received "[sole]
physical custody," for 18% the father had "[sole] physical
custody," and for only 3% was "physical custody" denominated
as "joint."219
Again assuming at least a rough equivalency in the sample
and in the meaning of "joint custody" with the time periods we
have assigned for the post-Act study-and there is no
definition of amounts of residential time for pre-Act "joint
custody" cases-the data indicate a decrease in both the
number of mothers getting "sole physical custody" and the
number of fathers getting "sole physical custody." The number
of "joint physical custody" cases increased by a substantial
amount, rising from 3% to 20% of the cases.
TABLE C
PRE-ACT AND POST-ACT RESIDENTIAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHILDREN
BY PERCENTAGE OF CASES
Percentage of Cases
Residential Arrangement Pre-Act Post-Act
Sole Residence
with the Mother 79% 70%
Sole Residence
with the Father 18% 10%
Joint
Residence 3% 20%
Thus, here too the relationship between the Act and a
considerable increase in joint physical custody provisions is
apparent, although actual causation cannot be proved.
colleagues, who found that in 68% of cases the decrees assigned physical custody to
mothers and in 8% to fathers. See Mnookin, Maccoby, Albiston & Depner, supra note
213, at 60.
219. WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, apps. F-352,
F-353 & F-354.
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No data are available as yet on the actual practice of these
parties and their children as opposed to the terms of their
agreements. It is therefore not possible to say at this time
whether any aspect of shared parenting has increased in fact,
as opposed to on paper.22 °
(4) Representation and appearance-Haynes and Somers
found that "[m]ediation was chosen more often as the method
for dispute resolution where both parties were represented by
attorneys, than with any other representational status."22 '
Table D shows the statistically significant breakdown for the
306 cases by mode of representation or appearance.222
TABLE D
REPRESENTATION AND APPEARANCE BY
PERCENTAGE OF CASES ELECTING MEDIATION
Percentage
Representation Number Electing
and Appearance of Cases Mediation
Two Attorneys 74 80%
Nondefault
One Attorney 137 61%
No Attorney 34 46%
Default
One Attorney 46 30%
No Attorney 7 0%
X 2 = 41.51; p< .00005; d.f. = 4
220. Mnookin and his colleagues found that less than half of the 20% of cases with
decrees designating joint physical custody actually maintained a dual residence
pattern. However, some number of sole physical custody cases were de facto dual
residence. The overall result was that 16% of their total sample "did in fact have
dual residence." Mnookin, Maccoby, Albiston & Depner, supra note 213, at 67.
221. K. Haynes & S. Somers, supra note 185, at 62.
222. When we compared the two-attorney cases to all other cases for percentage
selecting mediation, the numbers were again significant. The significance held true
whether all other cases included defaults (X2 = 18.82; p < .000; d.f. = 1) or did not
include defaults (X2 = 10.34; p < .0013; d.f. = 1). Interestingly, all of the default cases
in which the nondefaulting party selected "mediation" involved parties represented
by counsel. None of the unrepresented parties in default cases chose "mediation."
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Similarly, when both parties were represented by
attorneys, they were significantly more likely across the
three required categories to choose some form of shared
decision making than to choose sole decision making.223
Table E sets out the percentages of cases involving some
shared decision making.224
TABLE E
REPRESENTATION AND APPEARANCE BY
PERCENTAGE OF CASES ELECTING
SHARED DECISION MAKING
Percentage
Representation Number Electing Shared
and Appearance of Cases Decision Making
Two Attorneys 74 91%
Nondefault
One Attorney 137 70%
No Attorney 34 77%
Default
One Attorney 46 33%
No Attorney 7 0%
X 2 = 60.46; p< .00005; d.f. 4
The relationships between representational or party-
appearance status and residential time schedules were also
statistically significant. Table F sets out the mean number of
overnight visits and daytime visits scheduled per year with
the nonprimary residential parent.225
223. For this analysis, "some form of shared decision making" means either all-
mutual decision making or some "mixed" decision making. See supra text
accompanying note 208.
224. Table E is based on the sample of 298 cases (306 cases minus 8 cases that had
no provisions for decision making). Once again, when we compared two-attorney
cases to all other cases the relationships were also significant. Two-attorney cases
compared to all others including defaults were significant (X2 = 20.90; p < .0005; d.f. = 1)
as were they when compared to all nondefault cases (X' = 9.73; p < .0018; d.f. = 1). Only
the default cases in which the one appearing party was represented by counsel
selected some form of shared decision making. None of the default cases where the
appearing party was unrepresented made such a choice.
225. A daytime visit is a visit during the day when there is no overnight visit. Thus,
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If each overnight and each daytime visit is assigned one
"residential unit," solely for purposes of comparison, the total
mean "residential units" by representation and appearance
a weekend visit was counted as two nights, but no days. A holiday visit for the day
with no overnight visit was counted as one daytime visit.
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also are set out in table F.226
The greater amount of shared parenting in two-attorney
cases does not appear to be an aberration. Mnookin, Maccoby,
and their colleagues studied the role of counsel in their major
California study.227 They examined a subgroup of "150 cases
in which the mother requested legal custody and the father
made no request."228 They found that "[j]oint legal custody
was almost always awarded if both parents had an
attorney."229  Similarly, they examined almost their entire
sample of 900 families and discovered that "U]oint physical
custody [in decrees] was highest in those cases when both
parents had legal counsel."23 °
Divorcing parents might have two attorneys for a variety of
reasons, only one of which is the desire for more time with or
decision making about a child. Is there something about the
sort of parents who choose to (and can afford) retain two
attorneys that leads to more parental sharing? We might
hypothesize, for example, that wealthier parents have more
ability, and therefore possibly more inclination, to agree to
226. Again, the relationship between two-attorney cases and residential time was
significant compared to cases with one attorney or no attorneys. Two-attorney cases
compared for overnight visits against all other cases including defaults were
significant (t = 3.70; p < .0005; d.f. = 304) as were they when compared to all other
cases not including defaults (t = -2.49; p < .014; d.f. = 251). Cases involving two
attorneys again showed significant patterns for daytime visits when compared to the
other cases. When compared to all cases including defaults, two-attorney cases were
significant (t = -3.39; p < .001; d.f. = 304). The same was true for the two-attorney
cases compared to all nondefault cases (t = 2.37; p < .018; d.f. = 251).
227. Mnookin, Maccoby, Albiston & Depner, supra note 213, at 37.
228. Id. at 62.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 41, 64; see also ABA FAMILY LAW SECTION, CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES,
supra note 5, at 107-08 (emphasis added), in which an unnamed participant from an
unnamed jurisdiction stated during an ABA conference on child custody disputes:
We have a very interesting study coming out directed at examining joint
custody. To me what was very interesting was the difference between the
type of custody arrangements when two attorneys were involved versus the
type of custody arrangements when no attorneys were involved. They were
very, very different. The highest rate ofjoint physical custody was when both
parties were represented by counsel. The lowest rate ofjoint legal and physi-
cal custody was when neither party was represented. One of the points that
the study made that I agree, is what has to do with the use, the bargaining
chip, and the use of compromise rather than really reflecting the custody
arrangements that the parties both agreed to, both want, and in fact had
been doing during the ongoing marriage.
The speaker is not connected in any way to the Mnookin and Maccoby study. Letter
from Robert H. Mnookin to Jane W. Ellis (Oct. 23, 1990). I have been unable to
identify the speaker or the study.
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provide two-household arrangements after divorce.23' Or is
there something about the two-attorney negotiation process
that generates different results in plans? Is there, for
example, more shared parenting in two-attorney cases than in
one-attorney or no-attorney cases because of the structural
nature of negotiation by two representatives who function by
making trade-offs and who may use decision making or child
time as chits in their settlement repertoire?
Evidence from other sources suggests ways in which the
dynamics of divorce-attorney negotiation may influence these
outcomes. An essay for practitioners on custody negotiation,
on the one hand, warns that "[o]ften people agree to joint
custody just to get the case over with. It's probably cheaper
for your client and better for the child to meet serious custody
problems now rather than later if joint custody is clearly
inappropriate."232  On the other hand, this same essay
concludes with a series of "leverage factors" that can be used
to "gain advantage" over the other side. Among those factors
are "[p]ressure to arrive at a joint parenting arrangement.
You can induce settlement out of a litigious party by a cleverly
crafted joint parenting agreement that the party can't refuse
because it meets his or her priorities. The court may well join
you in your efforts."233
These tactics may be used in part because of a prevalent
belief that it is essential not to litigate. Empiricists who have
examined the role of the divorce attorney have found evidence
of such a strong belief.234 The desire to avoid litigation is
231. We do know that the mean income of fathers, but not mothers, in these two-
attorney cases was significantly higher than the mean income of parents in other
modes of representation or appearance. Further analysis showed that both higher
income and the presence of two attorneys are predictors of more overnight visits for
the nonprimary parent and that income does not make as much difference as legal
representation for both parents.
232. Friedman, Negotiating Child Custody Cases, in NEGOTIATING TO SETTLEMENT
IN DIVORCE 133, 138 (S. Katz ed. 1987).
233. Id. at 141-42.
234. See Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy, supra note 8, at 109 ("Although not
all lawyers are equally dedicated to reaching negotiated agreements, most of those
we observed advised their clients to try to settle the full range of issues in the case.");
see also Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, supra note 8, at 593:
The lawyers in particular describe a widespread professional belief that
divorce litigation is traumatic and that good lawyers keep their clients out
of court, especially in cases involving children. Most of the lawyers we
interviewed say they feel responsible for encouraging informal settlement
and will pressure parties to accept settlements that they, as attorneys find
reasonable ....
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understandable and commendable, assuming there is no
seriously harmful conduct by one parent, but whether the two-
attorney negotiation process is the best means for arriving at
parenting arrangements is another question. It may not be
the best means if the presence of the two attorneys shifts
attention from the important task of helping parents to focus
on the needs of their children to negotiation tactics that do not
give sufficient regard to these needs.
The two-attorney results become even more pronounced in
relation to the limitations section of the Act, and those results
will be discussed below.235
c. Educative and preventive functions: focusing parents'
attention and decreasing parental conflict- (1) At divorce-
Are the statutory devices for helping parents to reduce
hostility and focus more on their parental responsibilities at
divorce being used and received in the intended way?
With respect to any decrease in hostility at the time of the
divorce, the anecdotal evidence is mixed. One state senator
who had attempted to add a sunset provision 23 6 to the Act,
with repeal scheduled for 1992 absent evidence of the Act's
effectiveness, reported that his action was based on numerous
reports from attorneys that the Act was not decreasing client
hostility, but was increasing costs.
237
Actual interviews with attorneys revealed a decisive split
in opinions concerning the Act's effect on immediate hostility
and parental focusing on children.238 Sutter conducted a
number of interviews and then analyzed those results in
relation to the results gathered by two other interviewers.
Her conclusions merit quoting at some length. One group of
attorneys viewed the Act's effect quite skeptically:
All [twenty-four King County] attorneys interviewed
emphasized that a hostile and unpleasant atmosphere
frequently pervades the dissolution process. There were,
235. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
236. E.H.B. 2155, 51st Leg. (1989) (as amended by Senate Committee of Law and
Justice, Apr. 13, 1989).
237. Conversation with State Senator Phil Talmadge (July 25, 1989). We confirmed
the senator's information concerning cost in interviews with attorneys and court
personnel. All but two attorneys stated the cost of a parenting plan had significantly
raised the cost of a dissolution. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 32. Some of the
increased expense, however, may be attributable to the inevitable start-up costs of
creating forms and mastering a new law.
238. In King County, 10 attorneys reported no change; 14 reported some positive
effects on clients. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 13-14. In Clark County only 1 of the
6 attorneys thought the Act helped people calm down and think more about their
children. C. Hart, supra note 187, at 21.
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however, markedly different responses as to how the
Parenting Act was or wasn't affecting this atmosphere.
Ten of those interviewed felt that the Act was not
helping... parents who were hostile or angry [to] focus
on the best interest[s] of their children. In so many
words, they said that it is unrealistic to try and change
human nature by asking the parties to formulate a plan
which requires rational thought at a time when they are
very irrational. The most dubious said that parents
generally are thinking about their own best interest at
divorce. In their view, issues surrounding children only
become an issue when they can be used to goad the
other side.
The attorneys who felt most strongly that the emo-
tions of divorcing parents would not be changed by the
Act's requirements analogized the Act to no-fault
divorce. They felt that the latter was an attempt to
remove the process of blame from the dissolution
process. Unfortunately, said this group of attorneys,
this did not happen. Likewise, they felt that the
Parenting Act tr[ie]s to deprive angry, hurt and re-
vengeful humans of the needed opportunity to 'battle it
out' ....
Indeed, some attorneys see the requirement that par-
ents prepare a parenting plan as itself inflammatory.
Parents are forced to consider specific details of post-
dissolution child raising early in the dissolution process.
This must be done at a time when they are basically
blind to any point of view but their own. To expect
them to cooperate with each other, particularly if one
has been deeply hurt, may be unrealistic. Instead, they
use each other's request to harass one another over
endless details.239
Sutter found, in contrast to the first group, that:
On the other side of the issue are fourteen attorneys
who see some of the positive effects on clients which I
had hoped to find. Although they too recognize the pain
and hurt of the parties, they feel the preparation of a
239. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 13-14; see also Horenstein, Parenting Plans-Two
Years Later (or I Told You They Wouldn't Work) FAM. L. NEWSL., Dec. 1989, at 3-4.
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parenting plan helps the client, and in some cases, the
attorney, to focus on the children earlier than before the
Act and possibly prevent the devastating consequences
of a trial. Benefits [of the Act] mentioned included less
polarization developing between the parents,
communication staying open, parents recognizing that
they must work out the details, and the availability of
a structure within which to do this. These attorneys ex-
pressed more frequently the sentiment that the great
majority of parents do put their children[']s well-being
first, even in divorce, and that working on a parenting
plan helps them focus on what parenting is really
about.24 °
Sutter admitted that she was "impressed" with this group of
practitioners and described how they effectively used the
parenting plan:
[These lawyers] reported that they use the parenting
plan to focus their clients on the many details of raising
children in cooperation with an ex-spouse. They spoke
of the challenges in dividing up parenting tasks because
of working mothers. They discussed teenagers who
don't want to visit Dad, little children who can't survive
too much switching back and forth. They were giving
the plan great importance by being closely involved in
its preparation, by questioning clients about each
choice.241
The interviewed attorneys thus revealed two distinct sets
of attitudes concerning the capacity of the plan device, and for
some attorneys the capacity of any law, to change the
emotions or behavior of divorcing parents. These attitudes
were closely linked to their views of the Act's ability to help
parents to calm down and better focus on their children's
240. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 14-15. Only one of the Clark County attorneys
thought the plan device helped parents to think more about their children. C. Hart,
supra note 187, at 21. But cf. R. Cordero, supra note 187, at 39 (reporting the very
favorable views of mediators). One attorney-mediator reported that the plan was
valuable because it forced attorneys to focus more on the parent-child relationship.
Id. at 40.
241. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 16.
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needs.
This evidence tells us something about attorneys' opinions,
of course, rather than about the actual experience of clients.
Furthermore, although attorneys do tend to speak in
generalizations about the Generic Divorce Client, this evidence
does not tell us whether different attorneys would react
differently or similarly to the same clients. To the extent that
referral to Family Court Services for mediation or evaluation
in connection with a contested temporary or permanent plan
is a valid indicator of parental conflict at divorce, the
percentage of such referrals was the same percentage as under
the former law.242 This sample, however, may be slightly
biased in favor of less-contentious cases because all of its cases
were both filed and completed within 1988. If that is so, then
the number so referred may be slightly greater than under the
former law, rather than the same as under the former law.
Finally, a defect in the law, which has been cured
subsequently by amendment, may have caused more conflict
or, at the very least, prevented the positive effects of the Act
from taking place. In its original form, the Act required all
parties to file a proposed permanent plan with their petition
or response or risk a default judgment against them.243 Not
only did this pressure attorneys to demand decisions from
clients that the clients might not have been prepared
emotionally to make, 244 but clients were later loathe to give
up their opposing "plans" in the Family Court Services
mediation process because they had become emotionally
attached to them because of their significant investment of
time and money.245  In the 1989 legislative session, an
242. Approximately 10% of King County cases are referred to Family Court Services
for mediation, evaluation, or investigation following a formal legal conflict during the
divorce. Interview with Marjorie Hellman (July 21, 1988). Of the 306 King County
cases, 30 (or almost exactly 10%) were so referred.
243. 1987 Wash. Laws 2019 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181(l)(a),
(d) (1989)).
244. Sutter noted that "[a] common sentiment [is that this early filing requirement]
interferes with the positive effects which creating a parenting plan might have on the
divorcing couple." J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 20-21.
245. Interview with Marjorie Hellman (Aug. 1, 1989). Almost no one disagrees that
the new Act makes divorces more expensive for many parents in time or attorneys'
fees. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. There is, not surprisingly, disagree-
ment about the value of that extra expense. Attorneys' estimates of the actual cost
of creating a permanent plan ranged from $200 to $1500. Some of the variation is
doubtless because of the amount of disagreement between the parties. Some may
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amendment changed this procedure and a "cooling period" was
built into the Act's planning process.24 s
Another "focusing" device is the change in language and
"legislative concept" from "custody" and "visitation" to the os-
tensibly neutral functional terminology of the Act.247
Although some commentators have claimed that "the entire
concept of custody and visitation has been abrogated under
Washington law, at least as it applies to parents,"248 this is
a subject of strident debate among the state's family law
professionals. After putting the new language into practice,
some interviewed attorneys insisted that eliminating the term
"custody" with its connotation of property and possession has
helped promote a focus on the importance of shared parenting
following divorce. Other professionals insist that such a
change has made and will make no difference whatsoever.249
turn on the experience of the attorney. Again, longitudinal studies are necessary to
assist policy makers in deciding if the added burden of creating a parenting plan
results in comparable benefits in the future, whether those benefits are measured in
decreased conflict after divorce, subjective satisfaction of parents and their children,
or other variables related to the Act's goals.
246. That portion of the act as amended now reads in pertinent part:
(1) SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED PLANS. (a) In any proceeding under this
chapter, except a modification, each party shall file and serve a proposed
permanent parenting plan on or before the earliest date of:
(i) Thirty days after filing and service by either party of a notice for trial;
or
(ii) One hundred eighty days after commencement of the action which one
hundred eighty day period may be extended by stipulation of the parties.
(c) No proposed permanent parenting plan shall be required after
filing of an agreed permanent parenting plan, after entry of a final decree,
or after dismissal of the cause of action.
(d) A party who files a proposed parenting plan in compliance with
this section may move the court for an order of default adopting that
party's parenting plan if the other party has failed to file a proposed plan
as required in this section.
1989 Wash. Laws 1962-63 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (1987)).
247. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 2, 10, 12.
248. Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 463.
249. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 9-10, reports:
Twelve of the twenty[-]three [King County] attorneys who answered this
question.., saw no change in client attitudes as a result of the changed ter-
minology. This number includes many who were following the Act's
guidelines by discussing "parenting rights and responsibilities" and "decision
making" instead of "custody" and "visitation".
A frequent reaction to the new words is that they merely codify the
arrangements present in joint custody which existed prior to the Act.
C. Hart, supra note 187, at 19, also found in his interviews that some Clark County
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It is probably impossible to gauge the precise effect, if any,
of such a change of terminology on the attitudes and actions
of affected professionals or their clients (who may or may not
have been through divorce before). Nevertheless, there is a
visible and intense ideological schism between those legal
professionals who believe a change in legal language can affect
the behavior of professionals and clients alike and those who
insist that a rose by any other name smells as sweet.2 50
Thus, once again, there are two distinct and disparate groups
of attorney attitudes concerning the effect of a legal change.
In summarizing the data from the King County attorney
interviews, Sutter noted, interestingly, that "only those
attorneys willing to use the new language noticed any change
at all in the behavior of divorcing clients."25' Not
surprisingly, the King County cases revealed numerous
divorce actions during the first year of the Act in which
parents, represented and not represented by attorneys,
continued to use the old terminology in papers filed with the
court.25 2
(2) Postdecree-It is too early to tell what effect the require-
ment of a plan is having, if any, on postdissolution conflict
between parents. Any definitive evaluation of this regulatory
device's value in relation to its major goal of decreasing
conflict over time requires a long-term before-and-after study.
Some observations can be made now, however, concerning the
content of plans and anecdotal evidence on conflict.
Two aspects of parenting plans bear directly on whether
postdissolution conflict might be reduced: the provisions for
dispute resolution and the provisions, if any, for future
attorneys felt that the language change made no difference or merely increased the
paperwork.
250. I observed a number of attorneys at one CLE seminar who hooted with
laughter when a speaker suggested that the change in language might make a
difference; those who were laughing were, in turn, booed by attorneys of the opposite
viewpoint. The Washington State Bar Association and the Superior Court Judges
Association sponsored the CLE seminar, entitled Family Law Bench and Bar on
Effective Practice, on November 19, 1988.
251. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 12. She states further that "even this change,
after only a fifteen month experience with the Act, is minimal." Id.; see also
Fineman, supra note 3, at 746-53.
252. See K. Haynes & S. Somers, supra note 185, at 19-20. This is not too
surprising given that the revised King County Local Rules also continued to use the
old language. See KING COUNTY, WASH., LOCAL R. 94.04.
The presence of one or two attorneys did not improve compliance with the new
statutory terminology. For example, 11 cases used the phrase "reasonable visitation."
All 11 cases involved either one or two attorneys.
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changes to the plan. Ten percent of the examined files
(31/306) had no provision for a dispute-resolution method.253
Some plans complied, yet revealed fertile ground for future
disagreements. Most noticeably, 71% of plans both named a
method without naming a specific provider and did not include
a fall-back provision in the event the parents disagreed as to
the provider. Only 9% of plans provided for payment of the
expenses of the required dispute resolution process. Thus, the
dispute-resolution provisions may help avoid formal litigation,
but may also provide fodder for arguments over provider and
cost.
Did plans indicate that parties and counsel had anticipated
the need for future changes in a way that was likely to
minimize emotional and financial costs for parents who needed
such changes? The statute does not encourage this. Although
requiring great detail in residential schedules, it does not
address the extent to which parents would be free to alter
those details without returning to court for a formal
modification.254
253. In addition, many plans did not include statutorily required language
concerning use of the method and sanctions for misuse. The Act originally stated:
In setting forth a dispute resolution process, the permanent parenting plan
shall state that:
(a) Preference shall be given to carrying out the parenting plan;
(b) The parents shall use the designated process to resolve disputes relating
to implementation of the plan, except those related to financial support,
unless an emergency exists;
(c) If the court finds that a parent has used or frustrated the dispute
resolution process without good reason, the court shall award attorneys' fees
and financial sanctions to the prevailing parent; and
(d) The parties have the right of review from the dispute resolution process
to the superior court.
1987 Wash. Laws 2020-21 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(3)
(1989)).
254. During attorney training sessions during the first months of the Act, one
drafter admitted that the Act needed clarification in that respect. His materials
included a list of proposed amendments, one of which was titled "Adjustment vs.
Modification." It read:
(2) A court may order adjustments to the permanent parenting plan without
requiring a threshold hearing or a showing of substantial change in cir-
cumstances if a proposed modification is a change only in:
(a) The dispute resolution process; or
(b) The residential schedule of not more than 24 full days in a calendar
year and not more than five full days in a calendar month.
COMMENT: This change was proposed to allow changes in the residential
schedule without requiring a full-fledged modification of the plan, including a
threhhold [sic] hearing. That is, this will allow relatively minor changes in the
residential plan to be made between the parties without a modification action.
Presumably, this will allow changes through the dispute resolution process or
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To contend with this problem, different authorities and
trainers offered different solutions to practitioners. Two
commentators recommended including "provisions that would
provide for changed circumstances .... The inclusion of such
provisions can avoid the necessity of later modification
actions."25  They failed to explain, however, how one could
predict such changes with sufficient specificity to meet the
requirements of the plan. Another commentator attempted to
solve this problem by offering up a formulaic solution,
according to which parents would link a child's age to
residential schedule changes over time.256
In interviews, attorneys indicated continuing concern over
the problem of future changes and different ways of dealing
with it. Some reported that they tried to avoid the need for
future modifications by spending extra time trying to cover
every detail. Others, in the words of one interviewer,
"anticipated modifications and set in the body of the plan a
mechanism for such at certain ages in the child's life."257
In spite of this concern, however, only 23% of the King
County case files (69/306) contained provisions of any sort
addressed to future changes. Of that small number, very few
files provided for specific arrangements for the future; most
referred to future changes in general terms. Haynes and
Somers found frequently the following provision:
"Both parents acknowledge that as the children grow
and change, revisions may be required in the Plan and,
though unable to predict such revisions, agree to
remain flexible with respect to access, parental
responsibility, etc. Both parents agree that adjust-
upon motion to the family law calendar.
Kelly, Proposed Amendments to the Parent [sic] Act, in HOW TO GET TO THE FINAL
PLAN, supra note 195, at 4-2.
Thus, even in these proposed amendments, Kelly relegated flexibility in the
future to the limited realm of"relatively minor changes," and might allow even those
agreed changes to be subject, "upon motion," to court scrutiny.
255. Applewick & Wechsler, supra note 194, at 29.
256. See Sawyer, supra note 194, at 117-18:
Please keep in mind that if you are dealing with preschool children, their
developmental needs will change as they become of school age and go into
adolescence. Therefore, I suggest that you make some appropriate provisions
for those changes in your initial parenting plan. One area that comes to
mind is gradually increasing the length of time that the child or children
have with the non-school year residential parent each summer.
257. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 18.
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ments shall be made without showing substantial
change in circumstances."25
They also found that:
provisions for future changes fell into three general cate-
gories: those that provided for modifications at certain
ages of the child; those that provided for modification at
certain time intervals; and those that provided for
modification at the occurrence of a specific event
unrelated to either the age of the child or time inter-
vals.2 59
Some of the failure to include provisions concerning the
future may be attributable to the practical difficulty of naming
specific plans in advance;260 some may be attributable to
confusion concerning when any change would require a
modification proceeding or formal approval by the court. The
legislature, although aware of the problem, has to date passed
no amendments resolving the question of parental freedom to
agree to changes in a plan without court approval or a full-
blown modification procedure." 1 If written plans are not
updated to reflect changes that parents have made as children
grow and change-because parents believe they would have to
return to court and do not wish to incur the costs of doing
so--their efficacy in helping parents to resolve disputes in a
meaningful way is diminished severely. Thus, an important
preventive function of the plan may be undone.
Finally, some evidence, albeit anecdotal, is available con-
cerning the amount of postdissolution conflict to date. King
County Family Court Services appears to have some increase
in requests for postdissolution mediation concerning disputes
over details of plans compared to the number of such requests
under the prior law.262 Without a careful study of this group
258. K. Haynes & S. Somers, supra note 185, at 32 (quoting language from the
files).
259. Id. at 33.
260. See supra notes 193, 255-57, and accompanying text.
261. Bills have been introduced in legislative sessions on at least two occasions. See
H.B. 2887, 51st Leg. (1990); H.B. 1536, 50th Leg. (1988). The most recent such effort,
the 1990 Substitute House Bill 2887, did not make it out of committee, probably from
lack of attention as much as from any organized opposition. Conversation with
Michele Lamb (Apr. 4, 1990); see 12 LEGISLATIVE DIGEST AND HISTORY OF BILLS 789
(1989-90).
262. Interview with Majorie Hellman (Aug. 1, 1989) (20 months after the effective
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of returning parents, the reported increase in use of the court-
affiliated and free mediation service is difficult to interpret.
Some or all of these people might have gone to court without
an agreement to mediate; indeed, some may have gone to court
and been referred to mandatory mediation. It also may be
that including a dispute resolution provision brings people to
mediation who would otherwise have done nothing or relied on
some sort of self-help rather than return to court. Or plan
details may lock parents into positions that could be shifted
more easily were they not carved in stone. The finding is
worrisome, however, in light of findings by Phear and
associates, who found in their dissolution-file study that:
[T]he parents who chose to try to continue to maintain
their joint legal responsibility for their children tended
to draw up agreements that covered a greater number
of their children's needs. However, this group also
returned to court more frequently, reflecting an
additional and possibly continuing source of stress to the
children involved.263
2. The limitations: section 10 protections-This study
examined the implementation of the key limitation of the Act,
section 10.264 The experiences are likely to be similar in all
jurisdictions concerned with both parental autonomy and the
protection of vulnerable children or spouses at divorce.
a. Professional reaction-The limitations section of the Act
immediately concerned practitioners and judges. They
discussed repeatedly in training sessions the possibility of an
implied "affirmative duty" to ascertain the existence of any
section 10 conduct. One drafter who gave many of the
date of the Act). According to Ms. Hellman, these requests were not coming from
parents who had previously been through mediation or evaluation at Family Court
Services. Rather, they were parents whose disputes were showing up for the first
time after issuance of their decree. In response to the increased requests, Family
Court Services referred some of these mediations to another mediation organization
in King County, the King County Dispute Resolution Center, an organization that
provides voluntary mediators to families in distress.
Ms. Hellman also reported that she nevertheless still hoped, at least as of August
1989, that the plans would help resolve rather than generate disputes over parenting
arrangements.
263. Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, supra note 213, at 440.
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191 (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
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seminars around the state wrote:
[T]he Section 10 limitations affect so pervasively the
operation of the Parenting Act that counsel should
consider first whether Section 10 limitations are
applicable. In fact, even if the parties agree or a default
is taken, findings with regard to Section 10 limitations
will probably be required by the court.265
More than one drafter believed that courts should reject
some parental agreements, no matter how mutually
satisfactory. Another speaker, an experienced family-law
attorney, at an early and heavily attended CLE seminar,
passed out materials to the many hundreds of attorneys in the
audience, stating that:
It is generally preferred and encouraged that the parties
come to agreements concerning the components of
parenting plans. A thorough reading of Sections 9 and
10, however, indicates that the best interest of the child
standard and the Section 10 limitations take precedence
over agreements of the parents....
It is advisable, therefore, that the following findings
be included in all agreed parenting plans which provide
for residential time with both parents, mutual decision-
making or alternate dispute resolution mechanisms:
(1) No Section 10 limitations are present which would
affect operation of agreements .... 266
This advice implies that attorneys must ask clients about, not
simply inform them of, section 10.
Attorneys also expressed concern over the effect of section
10 on the negotiation and settlement process. Two
practitioners asked, for example:
Did the Legislature intend that the allegations be
included even if the parties agree to not impose restric-
tions? What if one party alleges, the other party denies,
but the parties can agree to a residential schedule and
265. Prochnau, supra note 96, at 62 (emphasis added).
266. Wechsler, supra note 96, at 53-54.
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joint decision making? We surmise that if one party
vehemently denies the allegation, but it is necessary to
include it anyway, we will find an increase in litigation
to "clear my name."267
Such comments evidence the tension between the statute's ap-
proach to protection and the professional belief in the
importance of avoiding litigation.
Other practitioners voiced concern about perceived prob-
lems in applying certain of the limitations. They wondered
what should be done with a client who reported behavior that
was, in the opinion of counsel, only arguably the behavior
described in the statute. I overheard numerous comments by
attorneys at training sessions concerning their distress that
they would have to worry more about "domestic violence"
allegations in divorce. A spirited exchange between two
experienced attorneys who appear to be talking right past each
other demonstrated the problem attorneys were having with
even the idea of such allegations. In the March 1988 newslet-
ter of the Washington State Bar Family Law Section, an
editorial appeared entitled The New Parenting Law-Yuppie
Custody? With respect to section 10's inclusion of domestic
violence, it said:
Even more troubling is the restriction on parental
contact for those who have been guilty of domestic
violence. It is hard to reconcile this restriction with the
intent of the law to minimize the changes in the rela-
tionship between parent and child. It may, in some
cases, even be contrary to the best interests of the child.
Consider the hypothetical case of a good father whose
one flaw has been to allow himself to be provoked into
267. Hall & George, Reactions to the Parenting Act, TRIAL NEWS, July 1988, at 1.
One instructor at a CLE seminar offered no less than four optional clauses to address
§ 10 allegations: (1) No limiting factors; (2) parental agreement not to impose
limitations (for use when the factors are "resolved or are de minimus [sic]"); (3)
parties don't agree as to the existence of the limiting factor but agree, or don't agree,
to certain provisions (for use when "one party will not admit to the validity of the
limiting factor, but will agree to very real limits... a way to proceed without the
problem of having someone hang up on a label"); and (4) provisions for use "when
there is a real limiting factor." Hibbard, supra note 195, at 11-14 to 11-15. Presum-
ably, by "real," the writer meant "real and acknowledged by both parents."
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committing domestic violence. Let us further suppose
that the mother is a disaster as a parent - indifferent,
unavailable, perhaps even a drug abuser. The act
leaves the court no discretion....
• . . The legislature, in enacting the Parenting Act,
may be responding to some yuppie ideal of rational
people who rationally deal with each other about their
children despite the end of their relationship. These
people are undoubtedly too well-mannered to abuse
their children or threaten their spouses. However, not
everyone lives up to this ideal. The real world has
many less articulate people who, in the stress of a
failing relationship, may resort to ways that are not
socially acceptable to express their anger at their
spouses. They may still love their children. The
question is should the law punish them for their miscon-
duct through their children.... Whether we have done
the children any service in imposing [this punishment]
seems doubtful.26
A former chairperson of the King County Bar Association
Family Law Section responded as follows:
It was with great dismay that I read the editorial....
With the passage of the Parenting Act, attorneys who
have represented victims of domestic violence were able
to see that the ramifications of domestic violence, as
they impact parenting, were finally being recognized.
The issues of control, power and manipulation of the
legal system against the victim were finally going to be
dealt with. The victims at last could believe that they
would no longer be disenfranchised by the legal system.
The writer of the editorial demonstrates the classic
view of domestic violence in his statement: "A good
father whose one flaw has been to allow himself to be
provoked into committing domestic violence." This is
not "Yuppie Custody," this is a total failure to recognize
that good parents don't subject their spouses to domestic
268. Editorial, The New Parenting Law-Yuppie Custody?, FAM. L. NEWSL., Mar.
1988, at 2.
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violence....
We, as attorneys, need to educate ourselves, examine
what we are fostering, and not continue to speak blindly
about rights that the parent long ago put into jeopardy
by his own actions. The Parenting Act forces parents to
deal with their own actions, confront the denial, and
promotes a way to good parenting. Only through that
recognition and confrontation of the domestic violence of
the relationship can the children then benefit from good
parenting from both parents. Then, the decisions of
those parents will become "in the best interests of the
children."269
The editor replied that "[t]he response by [the letter writer]
assumes that spousal abuse and child abuse are irretrievably
bound together, perhaps two sides of the same coin. This is
undoubtedly true in many cases; it is also undoubtedly not
true in many cases."27°
Finally, numerous attorneys-and even two drafters--ex-
pressed concern that section 10 would lead to an increase in
conflict at divorce, and, specifically, in allegations of child
abuse, domestic violence and the other named behaviors.271
Some practitioners were also concerned that the first printed
parenting-plan forms created for the public began by asking
whether there were any such limitations.272
269. Letter, FAM. L. NEWSL., June 1988, at 3.
270. Id. at 4.
271. Interview with Drafter D (Sept. 13, 1988); Goodnow, New Law Tosses Out Old
Concept of Child Custody, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 31, 1987, at C1, col. 3.
("These exclusions, designed as safeguards, could lead to trumped-up charges of
abuse by parents intent on cutting off their spouse from the other child, Dunne said.")
(quoting statement by drafter John Dunne). I also overheard comments to this effect
at numerous CLE sessions in 1987 and 1988.
It is probably not incorrect to say that some family law practitioners viewed § 10
as nothing other than a weapon to be thrown at an innocent spouse by a vindictive
one. See, e.g., Fields, Dilemmas for the Domestic Lawyer: Preventing A Simple
Divorce From Turning Into a Felony Prosecution, Considerations Under the New
Parenting Act, in VULNERABLE ACCUSERS, VULNERABLE ACCUSED 2-05 (1988)
(materials from a CLE seminar sponsored by the Washington Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers).
272. Again, I overheard comments about this is at numerous CLE sessions in 1987
and 1988. See also, e.g., Parenting Act Form of Evergreen Legal Services, supra note
201.
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Judges were very concerned about whether the new law
required them to inquire about section 10 conduct when they
scrutinized negotiated plans. They feared a conflict with the
law's important goal of fostering parental cooperation.273
Participants at a judicial education session wondered how the
state would cope if the Act increased demand for mental
health evaluations in section 10 cases, and how individual
parties would pay if the state couldn't cope with the
demand.274
273. The following exchange took place at a judicial training session:
Speaker One: [Tihere is going to be a different role taken by the courts...
• The statute requires that the court shall apply section 9 and section 10
criteria to the plan that is worked out in the settlement conference.... So,
if the parties have an agreement and they say, we're going to use so-and-so
to mediate, or arbitrate or to conciliate our disputes, but section 10 says "you
shall not do it" then you can't do it ....
Speaker Two: One question if I may interrupt.... It seems to me the whole
thrust is to get parents to agree and cooperate. Here we're saying they've
agreed, and then we're going to argue with them about the terms of their
agreement. I find that a little difficult to [unintelligible].
Speaker One: Well, I'm just the Siskel and this is the Ebert .... This is one
way I view it, now it may be that the parties can put their own findings and
their pleadings and the court will not scrutinize and it's up to you to
determine whether or not-how far you have to go with this. I think you do
have to take a look at and ascertain whether there are any section 10
limitations. My feeling is the statute is directed towards the viewpoint...
the court is the only one left to look at the section 10 limitations on behalf
of the child.
Speaker Two: Wouldn't that require that the court basically interrogate
whichever party is presenting the decree ... as to whether any limitations
exist? It's not uncommon for a parent who is coming in to repress the fact
that there has been abuse or does not [sic] protect the child.
Speaker One: That's what I perceive is to be the case. That there will be
those kind of questions ... when it's an agreed order.
Transcript, supra note 193, Tape B at 20-21. Other inquiries included whether "the
court then is obligated to appoint an attorney . . . [flor the child." Id. at 21. The
inevitable question concerning payment for such an appointment arose as well. Id.
at 23.
274. Thus, a speaker noted:
Some of the outcomes that I see are that it's possible that only those who can
afford expert evaluations will be able to substantiate or refute section 10
guidelines .... You're going to have to ask if you have people within your
Court system, those people to evaluate or you're going to have to make a
finding without having an evaluation or you're going to have to use your
external resources. In those cases, those resources are generally not free..
• . As was mentioned, also, this morning, if indeed the agreed orders are
scrutinized and they're scrutinized with any degree of consistency, we then
have that whole other population that we never saw before coming back for
evaluations. I don't know how many that will be .... We've always dealt
with the contested cases, but if we start dealing with the uncontested cases,
I think we're all in the, could get into a mire that none of us necessarily
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One member of the Ad Hoc Drafting Committee, a
proponent of the goals of the section 10 limitations, candidly
admitted the extent to which the statute had failed to resolve
the court's role in reviewing negotiated plans:
There's been a lot of questions about the problem for
judges with agreements and I've had a couple thoughts
about this .... First of all, I think there was a real
tension between the legislature's desires . . to protect
the children from serious abuse and to get, and require
us to all become more involved in protecting children.
The[re was] tension between that and the practicalities
of judicial and county economy .... There was also, I
think, an intention to protect children . . . where one
parent is simply ignorant of their [sic] rights to be able
to protect that child, that you be able to inform them of
that, or that you be able to override that agreement
where that problem is obvious. I think you've got a
continuum of possibilities just as you had under the old
Act. Under the case law, you certainly had the option
not to approve agreements that you felt were not in the
best interests of the child and some would argue, under
the case law, you had that duty. But you have the
continuum of... how much you are required to discover
or interrogate the parties to find out if there's a limita-
tion. In some counties where you don't even have live
testimony, you may decide that the fact that the
limitations box hasn't been checked on the parenting
plan form may be enough in and of itself, that that has
put the parent on notice that they [sic] should check
that box if it's there, if they don't check it, you can
assume safely that limitation is not available. In other
cases where you do have live testimony, you may feel
that a cursory questioning of the parent is enough.
Other judges may feel that you have to go further.
What are the possibilities once that parent discloses to
you, or it comes to your attention, that there is such a
limitation? One possibility is the most extreme, is ap-
predicted would happen to us.
Id. at 23.
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pointing an attorney for the child, obviously. Another
extreme is just refusing to sign it and saying, you go
figure it out, I suppose. Another possibility is, if you
have this new requirement to report child abuse, is to
say, I'm not going to sign this agreement until you come
back with a report from [Child Protective Services], as
[to] what they think is appropriate. That is an agency
that is supposed to investigate and make recom-
mendations as to child abuse and that would be another
option.
[A]nd I understand, I understand these are not
perfect options and my experience with [Child Protective
Services] is that they're very slow to report and we have
difficulty in getting the reports available to the Court.
Maybe one of the things would be to put in your court
order that [Child Protective Services] is ordered to
produce a report within a certain time. . . . I'm not
suggesting that these are perfect solutions. These are
things I'm floating right now and I agree that there's
some real problems in this area.275
In spite of these concerns, however, it appeared that at
least some of the drafters and commentators expected courts
to inquire actively into the existence of the mandatory
limitation behaviors in all cases, settled or not, and to apply
the limitations where necessary. A draft of the new
Washington State Family Law Deskbook Chapter on the
Parenting Act, used in training materials, stated that "the
court has an affirmative duty to inquire and to be sure that
the agreement of the parties is consistent with the limitations
imposed by the act."276
b. The attorney's screening role-Attorney interviews on the
Parenting Act revealed how the inevitable use of attorney
discretion plays a central role in the making of threshold
decisions-whether to include a section 10 allegation in papers
or whether even to mention the existence of section 10 to
275. Id., Tape F at 26-27.
276. Appelwick & Wechsler, supra note 194, at 32 (emphasis added). This language
also appeared in the final version, Wechsler & Appelwick, The Parenting Act of 1987,
in WASHINGTON FAMILY LAW DESKBOOK 45-18 (1989).
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clients-concerning implementation of the Act's express
limitations on plans. The attorney's ethical obligation to
maintain the client's confidence also influences these
decisions. Interviews revealed the very different views of legal
professionals on how to handle the mandatory limitations.
Almost one third of the interviewed attorneys stated that
they do not necessarily bring up section 10 with clients.277
Two of the King County attorneys expressly stated that they
never bring up section 10 unless section-10-type behavior is
mentioned by the client.7 One of these attorneys described
section 10 as a potential "minefield" for clients who were
susceptible, because of the strain of divorce, to "power of
suggestion."279 The rest determine case by case whether to
inquire explicitly into or even mention the possibility of
section 10 claims.280
Once those attorneys who believe in inquiring do so, they
use a second discretionary filtering process, deciding what to
put in the plan and deciding whether to refer to section 10 at
all when they do not include limitations. Over half of the
King County attorneys reported that, where the facts
permitted, they would include a statement in the plan that
there were no limitations.28 '
Where attorneys discover section 10 conduct or clients bring
up claims on their own initiative, attorneys must decide
whether to include a section 10 allegation in formal papers.
Here again, attorneys differed as to how they should proceed.
Some expressed the sentiment that "some inappropriate
behavior" is pretty typical of people going through a divorce
and should not be elevated to an official ground for
limitation.2 2  In some cases, often involving domestic
277. Five out of 24 of the King County attorneys and 4 out of 6 of the Clark County
attorneys (for a total of 9/30 or just under 1/3) did not always raise § 10. C. Hart,
supra note 187, at 26; J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 19 & app. F.
278. See J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 19.
279. Id. at app. F(2) (Attorney L).
280. Id. at app. F.
281. Id. at 22. Thirteen attorneys report they would affirmatively state that "there
are no section 10 limitations," although only one attorney believed he was obligated
to refer to the statute; eight report that they would not refer to § 10 if no limitations
exist. Four of six Clark County attorneys say that they include a statement of no
§ 10 limitations, if possible. C. Hart, supra note 187, at 28. We did not verify any
of these reports.
282. J. Sutter, supra note 187, at 31.
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violence claims, attorneys appear to be choosing on their own
to disregard the terms of the statute.2"3 Some suggested
that the parent should choose whether to include a claim.28 4
McKeever and Noda, who characterized their attorneys as
"cautious" or "expansive" with respect to handling section
10,2"5 report that "cautious" attorneys make their own
evaluations of client claims before including them in papers.
They noted that:
Many attorneys have well-developed, yet informal,
systems in place to evaluate the strength of their clients'
claims. An informal system may consist of a mental
rather than a written checklist that an attorney follows
to evaluate a client's claims. Some attorneys intensely
cross-examine clients to obtain the full facts
surrounding claims. One attorney makes his clients
sign an affidavit of truthfulness regarding Section 10
claims. This attorney stated that the affidavit is useful
to put clients on notice to tell the truth, and is an
efficient way to sift out unsubstantiated claims, since
clients reconsider signing this affidavit if they are
exaggerating. . . . Generally, these attorneys who
proceed with caution regard Section 10 as a dangerous
weapon for use in only the most extreme circumstances,
283. Sutter describes interviewing attorneys who noted that "a one-time domestic
quarrel, ending with a call to the police [,] will usually result in a domestic violence
charge." Id. These attorneys decided without regard to the explicit statutory
reference to domestic violence that "[t]his charge might be given far too much weight
in determining parental rights." Id.; see also C. Hart, supra note 187, app. F at 95
(transcript of interview):
I think in discussing it further with my client, the happening of an event.
. Let me just start over here. In my practice, I don't want [§] 10 type claims
to be the deciding factor in a custody award. If it's an isolated event, or if it
doesn't touch and concern the child-maybe husband had too many occasions
to scream at his wife and maybe hit her a couple of times. I don't want child
custody to be determined on that. If all the other evidence is shown that he's
really good with the children, and if my client comes in and talks to me about
these types of things happening, and I get the feeling that she's not really
bothered by them now that the divorce is taking place, I'm not going to put
in a [§] 10 type claim. If my client tells me that "that's what I want", and of
course I tell them what their options are, I think that some of them would
be in bad faith, and if they were in bad faith, I wouldn't do them.
284. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, app. F.
285. Id. at 9-11.
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after much fact-finding and evaluation has been
done.286
As a rule, all attorneys inquire whether there is any specific
corroborating evidence. The attorneys who had an "expansive"
approach to section 10, however "would still ask questions, but
those questions might not be as lengthy or as probing. Much
more reliance and emphasis would be placed on the client's
reasonable belief that a Section 10 violation had occurred."287
Thus, the attorney's trust in the client, or in divorce clients in
general, as well as the attorney's personal values concerning
what behavior should affect a parenting plan seem to be
important variables in determining whether the attorney in-
cludes a section 10 allegation in papers or even informs the
client of the possibility of the protective limits.
288
An attorney's ethical obligation to maintain client confiden-
tiality289 also plays some role in relation to section 10. A
number of interviewed attorneys said that they have had
clients discuss section 10 claims yet request
confidentiality.290 Almost all attorneys who were asked
about how they have handled or would handle such requests
in light of the statute's limitations section stated that they
were bound to maintain the client's confidence.291 In an
extreme case, where they believed a child had been or might
be harmed, a majority of attorneys would urge the client to
make a claim or report the behavior to a public agency.292
They felt obligated ultimately, however, to defer to the client's
decision not to allege the behavior and would withdraw as
counsel rather than reveal the behavior.293 Most attorneys
emphasized, however, that any dilemma presented by the rule
of confidentiality on the one hand and the limitations section
of the Act on the other, although real in theory, was rare in
286. Id. at 10.
287. Id. at 11.
288. This observation on the role of attorney trust (or distrust) of clients accords
with research on divorce attorneys done by other empiricists. See, e.g., Speech by
Professor Austin Sarat at 1990 Annual Meeting of Association of American Law
Schools (Jan. 4, 1990).
289. See WASH. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6, reprinted in note 117.
290. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 14.
291. Id. at 14-15; C. Hart, supra note 187, at 25.
292. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 15-16; C. Hart, supra note 187, at
25-26.
293. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 15; C. Hart, supra note 187, at 25.
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fact because most clients with section 10 claims were anxious
to bring the harmful conduct to light.294
Some King County attorneys and at least one Clark County
attorney, presumably believing that counsel has an affirmative
duty to inquire into section 10 and set limits where section 10
behavior is found, expressed the belief that there was an unre-
solved tension between the mandate of section 10 and the rule
of confidentiality.295 The tension between the attorney's
ethically required allegiance to the adult client and the
possibly conflicting needs of the client's child for protection
from serious harm is nothing new to the practice of custody
law.296 Section 10, however, with its perhaps purposeful
ambiguity, brings that problem unmistakably to the fore.
Concerns about the possibility that section 10 would in-
crease parental conflict at divorce were not borne out in
attorney interviews. Eighty percent of those interviewed
stated that the section either made no difference or helped to
decrease hostility.297 Other limited anecdotal evidence with
respect to section 10's effect on parental hostility does not
indicate that section 10 is increasing or inflaming conflict.298
c. Completed plans-Data from 306 cases showed that
294. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 18; C. Hart, supra note 187, at 26.
295. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, apps. D & E; C. Hart, supra note 187,
at 25.
296. See, e.g., ABA FAMILY LAw SECTION, CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES, supra note 5,
at 85-89.
297. McKeever and Noda reported that of the 20 attorneys who answered this
question, 5 thought § 10 helped, 4 found it "a hindrance," and 11 thought it made no
difference. J. McKeever & D. Noda, supra note 187, at 23. Almost all of these
attorneys had dealt with § 10-type claims before the Parenting Act went into effect.
Id.
The results in Clark County attorneys interviews were similar. All five attorneys
who answered the question had handled pre-Act cases with § 10-type allegations.
One thought § 10 helped with its specificity; one thought it hindered his work
because the vague language means that almost everything can be considered a § 10
behavior, and three saw no change. C. Hart, supra note 187, at 20-21.
Thus, 14 attorneys thought that § 10 made no difference in terms of parental
hostility, 6 thought it helped to decrease hostility, and 5 thought it made the
situation worse.
298. One family law court commissioner did a very small sampling of post-Act cases
(25) and concluded that the percentage of cases with § 10-type allegations in initial
papers was no greater under the new law than under the old. See DuBuque, Practice
on the Family Law Motion Calendar: Some Preliminary Observations Under the
Parenting Act, in FAMILY LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 194, at 86.
The director of King County Family Court Services reports a slight increase in
domestic violence claims in the cases referred to her department since
implementation of the Act. Interview with Marjorie Hellman (Aug. 1, 1989).
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thirty percent of the final plans referred to section 10 and
stated that there were no section 10 limitations. Eighteen
percent referred, explicitly or implicitly, to the existence of
section 10 conduct. In spite of the urging of various
trainers,299 over one half of the plans (54%) did not refer at
all to section 10. As attorney interviews made clear, this could
mean either that attorneys or parties representing themselves
did not believe that they needed to mention section 10 where
no section 10 behaviors existed or that they did not choose to
mention an existing section 10 behavior and therefore could
not honestly include a finding of "no section 10 limita-
tions. 3
Fifty-six cases (18%) of the total sample contained
permanent parenting plans that referred directly or implicitly
(by setting an explicit limit or restriction on the plan) to
section 10. Twenty-five of these cases involved "mandatory
limitation" behaviors;30 1 thirty-one involved "discretionary
limitation" behaviors.
Compliance with the required plan components was mixed.
The statute states that the "court shall not order a dispute
resolution process, except court action, when it finds that any
limiting factor under RCW 26.09.191 applies."3"2 Thirty-nine
percent of the cases (22/56) failed to comply with this
statutory directive and listed mediation, arbitration, or
counseling as the method instead of court.30 3 The statute
299. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. A total of 26 cases contained
§ 10 allegations somewhere in the file, but did not refer to § 10 in the final plan.
301. These included abandonment, sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic
violence.
302. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(1) (1989), reprinted in Appendix (emphasis
added). This language implies that behavior requiring mandatory § 10 limitations
and behavior allowing discretionary § 10 limitations are to be treated the same. A
later section of the statute creates some ambiguity as to this point, however. Section
26.09.191(1) states that the "plan shall not require . . .designation of a dispute
resolution process other than court action if it is found that a parent has engaged in
any [of the § 10 mandatory limitation behaviors]." Id. § 26.09.191(1), reprinted in
Appendix.
303. Thus, 61% did comply. The compliance rate for the 25 "mandatory" limitation
cases was somewhat better (76% or 19/25 cases) than for "discretionary" limitation
cases (48% or 15/31 cases).
Some number of the noncomplying cases specified mediation and listed King
County Family Court Services as the mediation provider. In these cases, the named
provider may reflect a party's or attorney's expectation that in King County a "court"
dispute resolution method may very well result in a stipulation or order for referral
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also states that the plan shall "not require mutual decision-
making" where behavior requiring mandatory limitations is
found." 4  In all but two of the twenty-five mandatory
limitation cases, sole decision making was given in all three
areas (education, health care, and religious upbringing) to only
one of the parents.0 5 Finally, the Act mandates that resi-
dential time shall be limited under some circumstances and
may be limited in other circumstances. °6 "Limits" could
consist of supervised visits or visits with another condition
such as "no drug use." They could also consist of less time
(e.g., fewer overnight visits, less daytime contact, or no contact
at all between the child and the offending parent).3 '
There is, of course, no way to measure whether the amount
of time was, in fact, "limited" when there is no set residential
time for plans without limitations. °8 Therefore, to attempt
to ascertain whether any "limitations" existed, we examined
relationships between amount of residential time and
existence or nonexistence of section 10 conduct.30 9  The
results, set out in Table G, show that the nonprimary
residential parent in a significantly higher percentage of cases
received either no overnight visits or no residential time if the
plan listed section 10 conduct, especially if it listed
"mandatory limitation" conduct.310
to Family Court Services for mediation. See supra notes 109, 204, and accompanying
text.
304. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(1) (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
305. Both of the two exceptions involved representation by an attorney. In one
case, one party was represented; in the other case, both parties had attorneys. See
infra note 329 and accompanying text.
306. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(2) (1989).
307. Wechsler & Appelwick, supra note 276, at 45-23.
308. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.184(5), .187(3) (1989).
309. Fifty-nine percent of the 56 plans did not require any supervision of the
offending parent during residential time with the children. Whether less time or, in
any event, less overnight time (in those instances where some time is allotted to the
offending parent) provides sufficient protection is, of course, a subject of debate and
would depend on the nature of the offending behavior and other factors. Of plans
listing behavior requiring mandatory limitations, 52% did require some sort of
supervision; only 32% of the plans with behavior allowing discretionary limitations
had provisions for supervision.
310. In our study, 34% of the § 10 cases (19/56) allotted no residential time to the
noncustodial parent. These express denials of visitation constituted 6% of the total
sample.
The number of cases in which "visitation" with a noncustodial parent is denied
outright traditionally has been minuscule. The random sampling of 381 divorce files
from 1987 in 11 Washington State counties, for example, found a total of 8 cases (2%)
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TABLE G
SECTION 10 STATUS AND CASES WITH No OVERNIGHTS
OR No RESIDENTIAL TIME
Number No No Residential
of Cases Overnights Time
Section 10-Mandatory
Limitation 25 72% (18) 52% (13)
Section 10-All 56 63% (35) 34% (19)
Non-Section 10 250 14% (35) 11% (28)
In those plans that did grant some residential time to a
parent whose conduct was listed in section 10, the mean
number of overnight visits was significantly smaller than it
was for nonprimary residential parents without such
behaviors. Thus, the mean number of overnight visits for the
nonresidential parent was twenty-one per year in all section
10 cases (fifty-six), as compared to seventy-eight overnight
visits per year for non-section-10 cases (t = -7.42; p < .0005;
d.f. = 304). In mandatory-limitation cases, the mean number
of overnight visits was only eleven compared to the same
seventy-eight in non-section-10 cases (t = -6.08; p < .0005; d.f.
= 273). However, the mean number of days per year did not
differ significantly between all section 10 cases (mean =
twenty-six days) and non-section-10 cases (mean = twenty
days). The same is true when just the mandatory limitation
section 10 cases (mean = twenty days) are compared to non-
section-10 cases.
These findings appear to demonstrate that section 10
limitations in the permanent plan do result in considerably
less overnight residential time for the abusive parent, espe-
cially where a mandatory limitation behavior is found. They
in which visitation was denied outright. WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 134, app. F-355. This figure is strikingly similar to that found
in a study of 485 divorce files in Middlesex County, Massachusetts (selected from the
years 1978 through 1981). There, a total of 9 out of 485 cases (or 1.9%) allowed no
visitation. Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, supra note 213, at 428.
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also demonstrate that section 10's reference to residential time
limitations largely has been interpreted in practice to mean
fewer overnight visits per se. It has not been interpreted to
mean fewer daytime visits. Indeed, cases involving mandatory
limitation behaviors show the same mean daytime visits as
non-section-10 cases. Nor does it appear that parties or
attorneys believe these visits must be supervised.311 There-
fore, section 10 may be providing needed protection to the ex-
tent, and only to the extent, that children are protected by
fewer overnight visits with a parent who has committed
conduct described in section 10.312
Certain other variables should not be disregarded. Not all
final plans containing a section 10 limitation grant the same
degree of "protection." Specifically, appearance (whether one
party defaulted) and representation (especially cases in which
both parties had their own counsel) made a significant
difference in the degree of protection afforded by the plan.
A large percentage-45%-of section 10 cases were "de-
faults," i.e., cases in which one parent failed to make a formal
appearance in the divorce action.313 Conversely, a large
percentage-48%-of default cases included section 10
limitations in the final plan.3 14 Default status in section 10
cases frequently resulted in no overnight or no daytime visits
for the nonprimary residential parent.31' Furthermore, in
those section 10 cases where residential time was granted to
the nonprimary residential parent, default cases resulted in
fewer overnight visits (mean = twelve per year) than cases in
which both parents appeared (mean = twenty-nine per year).
Default judgments also resulted in significantly fewer days per
year to the nonprimary residential parent. The mean days of
residential time to that parent was only six per year in default
311. See supra note 309.
312. In some instances this may be adequate to protect against harms. At the same
time, however, fewer nights but a number of days equal to those in non-§ 10 cases,
suggests that the result may deprive the offending parent but not necessarily protect
the child.
313. This percentage should be compared to the overall sample of 306 cases, which
includes all of those § 10 cases but still had only 17% defaults.
314. Only 12% of cases in which both parents appeared had a § 10 limitation in the
final plan.
315. In fact, 54% (19/35) of the § 10 cases in which the offending parent received no
overnight visitation were cases in which that parent failed to make an appearance.
Similarly, 65% (15/23) of the § 10 cases with no daytime visits for one parent were
defaults.
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cases as compared to forty-two in nondefault cases (t = 4.34;
p < .0005; d.f. =54).
None of these relationships is surprising given that one
parent in each case failed to appear and either challenge
allegations or request more time. We do not know, however,
why these parents defaulted or, more importantly, if defaults
were more prevalent after the effective date of the Act than
before.
Significantly fewer two-attorney cases and one-attorney
nondefault ("one-attorney") cases appeared in the section 10
group than in the non-section-10 sample (X 2 = 41.27; p <
.00005; d.f. = 4). 3 16 We analyzed the one-attorney and two-
attorney section 10 cases after eliminating the default cases
with their unusual patterns.
The number of two-attorney section 10 cases is very small
(only seven cases out of the fifty-six total or thirty-one
nondefault cases). As a result, we will have to see if similar
correlations show up in other samples before we can draw any
definitive conclusions about two-attorney cases. Nevertheless,
the patterns in these cases are so different from those found
in the one-attorney section 10 cases, and-given that these are
all cases in which there is a finding that a section 10 behavior
has occurred-are arguably so contrary to the intent of the
statute that they deserve attention.
I noted earlier that section 10 cases showed a pattern of
fewer overnight visits than non-section-10 cases, but an equal
number of, or in some cases more, daytime visits. 317 When
we eliminated the default cases from the sample, the pattern
of increased days became much more pronounced.
Furthermore, as Table H demonstrates, the distinction
between one-attorney and two-attorney cases is stark. If each
overnight and each daytime visit is assigned one "residential
unit," solely for purposes of comparison,"' then one-attorney
316. Only 13% of the § 10 cases (7/56) were two-attorney cases, as compared to 27%
for the non-§ 10 cases (68/250). One-attorney cases made up 39% of the § 10 group
(22/56) and 48% of non-§ 10 cases (121/250). Conversely, the percentage of two-
attorney cases with § 10 findings-9% (7/75)-was disproportionately small compared
to the overall percentage-18%--of § 10 as opposed to non-§ 10 cases.
317. See supra pp. 158-60.
318. This comparison does not imply that each "day" is equivalent to each
"overnight visit," although in a given instance the amount of actual visiting time may
be the same. Rather, it is a way of emphasizing the result of the sorts of patterns
(decrease in overnight visits, increase in daytime visits) that appear in the § 10
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cases show forty-two fewer "total residential units" in section
10 cases than in non-section-10 cases, but two-attorney cases
show seven more "total residential units" in section 10 cases
than in non-section-10 cases.319
TABLE H
EFFECT OF REPRESENTATION AND SECTION 10 FINDINGS
ON RESIDENTIAL TIME
Representation and
Section 10 Findings Day Visits Night Visits Total Visits
One Attorney
Section 10 Findings
No Section 10 Findings
Difference
Two Attorneys
Section 10 Findings
No Section 10 Findings
Difference
The steep increase in daytime visits in these two-attorney
cases, along with the large number of transitions between
320 taparental homes, suggests that attorneys in these cases
may believe and may be telling clients that trading overnight
visits for more daytime visits with an abusive parent is a
legitimate form of complying with the statute. It is important
nondefault cases.
319. There were only two no-attorney, nondefault cases in the § 10 cases. We did
not include them in these analyses.
320. The mean number of monthly transitions between parental homes for two-
attorney cases was 12.0; for one-attorney cases, it was 5.7 (F = 7.79; p < .0005;
d.f. = 4).
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to remember that these are cases in which the parties have
agreed in the final plan that there is section 10 behavior. It
is impossible not to wonder whether a major dynamic in such
cases is the accused side saying to the accuser: "Okay, I'll
agree to a finding of section 10 in the final plan and save you
the cost of litigation, but in return you had better give me
more time-at least more daytime-with the child." Thus,
daytime visits may be serving as a chit in the bargaining
process when parties and their counsel are confronted with the
need to comply with section 10. Especially in cases of serious
harm where unsupervised daytime visits will not provide
sufficient protection to a child, that speculation is not
reassuring. It suggests that some attorneys, at least while
negotiating with other attorneys, may be more concerned with
working out any agreement than with the limitations decreed
by the statute and the intention behind that law.32'
This speculation is bolstered by the fact that a dispropor-
tionate percentage (50%) of the twenty-six cases in which
section 10 claims were made early on in the case, but in which
there were no limitations in the permanent plan, were cases
in which both parties were represented by attorneys.322 One
321. Representation and appearance also influenced treatment of the other plan
components in § 10 cases. In the seven cases where both parties were represented
by attorneys, 86% of the § 10 cases (6/7) listed a dispute resolution process other than
court. In all other modes of representation and appearance, half or more of the § 10
cases complied with the statutory requirement that court, and not an alternative
dispute resolution process, be listed. Even if the statute is interpreted to require
court for mandatory-limitation behaviors only, the results are no better. Only one
two-attorney case had such a § 10 provision, and it listed "mediation." Two thirds or
more of cases in all other modes of representation or appearance complied by requir-
ing "court."
Similarly, of the seven § 10 cases with two attorneys, five (71%) had mutual
decision making in one or more areas. This can be compared to 18% of the one-
attorney cases (4/22). For mandatory-limitation cases, the only two-attorney case
again failed to comply and assigned mutual decision making. One of the nine one-
attorney cases also failed to comply with the law. All other cases (one-attorney, no-
attorney, and default) provided for the statutorily required sole decision making.
Finally, I should reiterate that only one of the seven two-attorney cases had a
mandatory § 10 limitation in the permanent plan, although we found allegations of
mandatory-limitation § 10 behavior in the files of five of those same seven cases.
In theory, of course, attorneys should know the statute and its purpose better
than nonattorneys. Parents going on their own, however, to pick up forms offered by
the county or public interest groups, in many cases expressly are informed on those
forms about the § 10 limitations. As seen in attorney interviews, a parent with
counsel might never even learn of that part of the new law. See supra notes 277-80
and accompanying text.
322. In the overall sample of 306 cases, both parties had attorneys in 75 cases (25%).
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might hypothesize that the involvement of two attorneys
means a greater likelihood that (intentionally or
unintentionally) false allegations were better aired, examined,
and appropriately eliminated in the negotiation and
settlement process, and in some cases skilled attorneys may
well have facilitated that outcome. We know for at least some
of these cases, however, that clients report having been
ignored or inappropriately discouraged by their counsel.323
Professor Austin Sarat has reported his observation, based on
considerable data, that divorce lawyers often distrust their
clients. 24 Lawyers may simply not believe valid claims, and
may therefore dismiss them as "unreasonable." Two attorneys
discussing a case may reinforce these anticlient attitudes.325
The question of when not to settle in light of alleged or
admitted harms is, however, not an easy one. Not least of the
attorney's problems is the fact that clients themselves may
Of the 26 cases in which § 10 allegations appeared earlier but not in the final plan, 13
cases (50%) involved such dual representation. Of the remaining 13 cases, 2 involved
two pro se parties and 11 had one attorney representing one of the parties. In the latter
group, the second party was pro se in 8 cases and defaulted in the other 3.
There were no significant patterns for these two-attorney cases with respect to
dispute resolution or decision making. Nor did two-attorney cases allot a
significantly different number of daytime visits to the accused parent as compared
to one-attorney cases. The three default cases, however, did allot considerably fewer
days (mean = 2) than one-attorney (mean = 33), two-attorney (mean = 28) and no-
attorney cases (mean = 30).
323. Two students recently completed an in-depth study of five of these two
attorney cases. L. Kalina & F. Porter, Section [10] Restrictions in\the Parenting
Plan: Real or Imaginary? (June 1990) (on file at the Marion Gould Gallagher Law
Library, University of Washington School of Law). In three of these five cases, clients
wanted limits and report that they were discouraged or ignored by their counsel. Id.
at 52-53. In two of those cases, a parent (one mother, one father) strongly and with
reason (in the opinion of interviewers who also studied the court files) desired
limitations on the other parent's time and was discouraged by counsel. Id. at 16, 20-
21, 52-53. One of these parents returned to court without representation to obtain
a protective order and limits on time with the child shortly after her paid counsel
negotiated a plan with no limits and much shared time. Id. at 20-24. In the third
case, a parent asked for, and believed her attorney had negotiated, sole decision
making as a protective limit. Id. at 28. The parenting plan, however, assigned
mutual decision making in all areas. Id. at 28 n.4.
324. Speech by Professor Austin Sarat, supra note 288; see also Robbins, Self-
Defense: Never Assume You're Home Free, FAM. ADVOC. 9-10 (Winter 1990) ("[Y]our
best client can become your worst adversary....").
325. According to several authors, "some attorneys have difficulty asserting
demands they view as unreasonable. Their goal in divorce advocacy may be to
protect the interests of everyone to some degree; they may also see 'unreasonable'
advocacy as damaging to their professional reputation." Erlanger, Chambliss &
Melli, supra note 8, at 601.
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exert strong pressure for settlement. 326 Clients do get upset
and do exaggerate on occasion. 327  Furthermore, some
experienced attorneys may believe that an offending parent
may get worse and harm a child more if a section 10 claim is
litigated, because without making an issue of a claim, that
parent might have drifted off and left the child alone. Finally,
many attorneys may be as ignorant as the general public
concerning the nature of the harmful behaviors listed in
section 10. Lack of education about the verification and
handling of domestic violence cases is among the most obvious
examples.3 2
Whatever the actual origin of the case results or comments
by interviewed attorneys, the data make clear that there is a
great need for more explicit policy and professional education
concerning the nature as well as the amount of "limits" on
parenting arrangements needed to protect children (or
vulnerable spouses) from the various harms articulated in the
statute. In addition, some attorneys may need to learn in no
uncertain terms that some facts, with their concomitant
rights, must not be bargained away, at least not without the
express approval and encouragement of parents. 329  At the
very least, further study of the role of attorney-to-attorney
negotiation in relation to protection for children and
vulnerable spouses at divorce is essential.
d. Court scrutiny-The statute is ambiguous as to the
court's role in reviewing agreed or settled plans with respect
326. Id. at 592-94 (discussing pressures to settle in addition to direct attorney
pressure, including the financial and other disruptions created by divorce and the
desire to get the divorce over with as soon as possible). It would be interesting to
discover if clients are more (or less) apt to push for settlement where there are two
attorneys and thus-or so a client may fear-a greater possibility of expensive and
stressful litigation.
327. Two of the five cases studied by Kalina and Porter contained serious § 10
allegations, but the parents who made the claims deny wanting limits. In one case,
both parents describe the claims as "exaggerated truths." The parents who admitted
to "exaggerated truths" do not report that their attorneys were in any way responsi-
ble for these exaggerations. L. Kalina & F. Porter, supra note 323, at 40.
328. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. One participant in an ABA
conference on child custody stated that "[i]n many domestic violence cases, attorneys
are not familiar with a lot of ways in which to handle them .... Now one of the
things that I encounter is that attorneys are being attacked for representing battered
women. The assumption is that I 'automatically believe the battering.' "ABA FAMILY
LAW SECTION, CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES, supra note 5, at 106-07.
329. If one interprets the statute to require limits where "mandatory limitation"
behaviors exist, then attorneys should not "bargain away" those limits even with the
express approval of parents.
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to section 10.330 There was nothing ambiguous, however,
about how the observed court commissioners behaved as they
reviewed plans. In none of the four observed counties,
including King County, did the court commissioners
inquire-through court checklists or orally-about section 10
conduct. 331 Research from other jurisdictions over the years
makes these findings predictable. 2 In the legal regimes in
those other jurisdictions, however, courts had the legitimate
excuse of unambiguous statutorily granted judicial
discretion. 3  In the Parenting Act, however, the statute
specifically directs the courts to limit parental arrangements
when plans include section 10 findings.334  In addition,
under one much-touted interpretation, the courts also have an
affirmative duty to inquire about section 10 conduct before
approving any plan.335
Interviews with commissioners elicited a number of differ-
ent views concerning the court's role. In one county, the
commissioner, who had practiced family law for years before
going on the bench, said that he considered the Parenting Act
to be another unsuccessful attempt to legislate human
nature.336 While being observed, this commissioner, like the
others, made no inquiries concerning section 10. On being
interviewed, he stated that the volume of cases on his docket
prohibited him from looking too closely at all the "niceties" of
permanent plans. 7  In the other three counties, the eight
commissioners who were interviewed also emphasized the
extraordinary demands of their dockets, demands that had
only been exacerbated by the requirement that all parents file
330. See supra pp. 97-99.
331. See P. Eakes & J. Brown, supra note 189, at 10-11 (observing that each dissolu-
tion took two to three minutes and no questions were asked regarding § 10); C. Hart,
supra note 187, at 34-35. One county commissioner, however, stated that nearly all
plans used a standard form plan, provided by the county, that asked about § 10. She
added that where the form plan was not used she doubted she would notice the lack
of any explicit mention of § 10 because of the demands of her docket. See P. Eakes
& J. Brown, supra note 189, at 25.
332. See, e.g., Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, supra note 8, at 1145 ("[W]e found the
role of the judge as reviewer to be extremely limited. In only one of the 349 court
files examined ... was the stipulation of the parties not approved by the court.");
Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, supra note 8, at 598 ("[A]s Mnookin & Kornhauser
(1979) acknowledge, the existing review process is widely considered to be a 'rubber
stamp,' with harried judges eager to finalize any arrangements made by the
parties.").
333. Wis. STAT. § 267.84 (West 1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West 1983).
334. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191 (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
335. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
336. See C. Hart, supra note 187, app. G at 104.
337. See id. at 35.
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a lengthy parenting plan.338 Of the eight commissioners
observed and interviewed more than one year after the Act's
effective date, two had never read the Parenting Act, and one
of those two had no idea what section 10 was . 3 9 All but one
of the eight commissioners interviewed by Eakes and Brown
and by Hart said that they do not ask about possible section
10 behaviors when an agreed plan does not refer to section
10.340 Two others stated flatly that it is not the province of
courts to question agreed or defaulted plans. Section 10, in
their opinion, only applied in contested cases.34'
Important and valid theoretical arguments support the view
that courts ought not to intervene in cases where parents have
agreed or settled.342  Furthermore, the Act can be
interpreted to require only that the court apply section 10
limitations where parties include findings of section 10
behavior in the plan.343 However, the Act is not ambiguous
with respect to the court's obligation to check, and if necessary
change, the terms of plans that do contain section 10
findings.344 Data show that in King County the courts did
not thoroughly check even the limited number of cases that
included such findings.345
The three researchers who interviewed court commissioners
all reported that the commissioners often said that they varied
their scrutiny of plans depending on whether both parties
were represented by counsel. The operative rule was: If both
parties had attorneys, the plan could be "presumed" to be
within the terms of the Act.3 46 The case study demonstrates
the questionable nature of this assumption.
338. The average estimate for pre-Act dissolution settlements was 6 to 8 pages. The
estimate for papers since the Act is 15 or more pages. P. Eakes & P. Brown, supra
note 189, at 22-23.
There is no reason to disbelieve the commissioners' descriptions of their dockets.
Superior Court Management Information System records indicate that over 6,000
dissolution petitions were filed in King County alone in 1987. Superior Court
Management Information System, Washington State Divorces Granted by County by
Month (1987) (on file with Jane W. Ellis).
339. See P. Eakes & J. Brown, supra note 189, at 33-34.
340. See id. at 25; C. Hart, supra note 187, app. G at 106.
341. See P. Eakes & J. Brown, supra note 189, at 26.
342. See supra note 112.
343. See supra pp. 97-99.
344. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.187, .191 (1989), reprinted in Appendix.
345. Cf supra text accompanying notes 339, 341.
346. See P. Eakes & J. Brown, supra note 189, at 16; see also C. Hart, supra note
187, at 35 n.64. Despite interview reports, Eakes and Brown did not observe any
difference in the practice of commissioners with cases where there was no
representation at all (pro se) as compared to cases with one or two attorneys. See P.
Eakes & J. Brown, supra note 189, at 17.
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IV. CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR RESEARCH AND REFORM
Shortly after the Parenting Act was passed, one family
court commissioner described it as a "noble experiment."
34 7
The phrase is replete with hope and with tentativeness. This
Article has concentrated on the implications of this particular
reform, implications that should concern any state that has
adopted or that is considering adopting a similar statutory ap-
proach. The Article also provides insight into the way in
which some of the essential goals of contemporary custody
reformers play out in practice-raising questions about the
role of the state at divorce, the functions of custody law, and
the role of legal professionals.
Only when we grapple with the dilemmas presented by a
specific regime can we be sure we are on solid ground in
formulating meaningful generalizations about divorce custody
law. What, then, can we say we have learned from this initial
examination of this particular reform? This conclusion begins
with a brief overview of the most important findings detailed
in Part III and then considers the broader implications of
these findings.
A. Summary of Findings
1. The substantive results- a. Shared parenting-Written
agreements in cases completed during the first year of the Act's
implementation showed a substantial amount of shared
decision making and of shared residential time. These
amounts were considerably greater for both forms of "custody"
than those found in a sample of roughly comparable pre-Act
cases in the same jurisdiction when its laws had no plan
requirement and turned on a "best interests" standard. Al-
though the data do not prove causality, they suggest strongly
that the Act and its plan device result in a substantial
increase in both forms of shared parenting, at least in written
agreements.348
347. Remark by Commissioner Joan Allison to Jane W. Ellis at University of
Washington School of Law Alumni Dinner (Oct. 17, 1987).
348. See supra Part III.B.l.b.(2).
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b. Limitations on shared parenting-The effect of the Act's
express limitations on parental sharing where certain harms
have been "found" in settled cases is more difficult to measure
because so many important decisions are made in the informal
and invisible negotiation process. In cases where parents
stipulated to the existence of a section 10 behavior, however,
they complied substantially with the limitations required by
the Act. A large percentage of the "mandatory limitation"
cases complied with the requirement that the dispute
resolution process be through a court and that one parent
have sole decision-making authority.349  Furthermore,
significantly fewer mean overnight visits were granted in
those cases than in non-section-10 cases.35 ' Thus, assuming
that to allow considerably fewer overnight visits per se
comports with the intent of the drafters and is a valid form of
"protection," the plans generally complied with the limitations
on residential time for those section 10 cases. The effect of the
limitations section appears very different, however, when
viewed in terms of the informal processes preceding
completion of the final plan and when studied in relation to
the results in cases where two attorneys were involved. These
findings are discussed below.
c. Other aspirations: facilitative, educative, and preventive
functions-Although some plans included customized terms,
the great majority contained a limited number of formulas for
decision making, residential time, and dispute resolution
methods.351  There was no direct evidence of the plan
device's ability to get parents to focus more on their children's
needs and to be (or at least act) less hostile at the time of
divorce. Attorney interviews, however, provided evidence of
strongly held and differing opinions concerning the Act's
capacity to diffuse parental conflict and to assist parents in
concentrating on the needs of their children.352 Finally, data
on long-term effects of the plan, particularly with regard to
the important question of parental conflict, will be available
only with the passage of time.35 3
2. The role of legal professionals-The most striking results
in this study concerned the role of legal professionals and the
349. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
350. See supra pp. 158-60.
351. See supra Part III.B.l.a.(1)-(3).
352. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part III.B.1.c.(2).
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relationship of certain plan results to representation by coun-
sel.3
54
a. The role of attorneys-Representation by one or two
attorneys in a case-as opposed to no representation-does not
guarantee better compliance with the requirement that all
plans include provisions for dispute resolution, decision
making, and residential schedules. Nor does representation
correspond to more individualized plan terms. Plans written
in cases with two attorneys, however, did have significantly
more "shared parenting" in all its forms: mediation for
dispute resolution, "shared" decision making, and larger
amounts of shared residential time.
Attorneys were confused and they disagreed, at least in
part because of statutory ambiguity, about their
responsibilities under the protective provisions of section 10 of
the Act. Interviews confirmed that attorneys had very
different notions of their roles vis-a-vis section 10 and of the
nature of the parental behavior that would require plan
limitations. Thus, some attorneys made no mention to clients
of the section 10 provisions of the Act, while others not only
mentioned it but felt obliged to ask parents to tell them
whether any section 10 behavior had occurred. Similarly, a
number of attorneys sometimes went out of their way to
explain the availability of protections, while others felt
comfortable dismissing out-of-hand a client's report of harmful
behavior (often domestic violence), seemingly without regard
for (or perhaps without knowledge of) the statute's explicit
characterization of that behavior as requiring protections for
vulnerable spouses and children.355
The case-study data showed that, when two attorneys were
involved in a case, their presence led to a disproportionately
small number of settled cases with section 10 limitations in
the final plan and a disproportionately large number of settled
cases in which a section 10 claim was made early on but failed
354. The study also found that in default cases where one parent did not make an
appearance, there was significantly less shared time and a much greater number of
§ 10 limitations. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text. We do not know
how the number of pre-Act defaults compares to the post-Act number, however, and
that information is essential before any conclusion about this reform and the role of
defaults can be reached.
355. See supra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
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to appear in the final plan." 6 Although the presence of two
attorneys may help decrease inflammatory claims, evidence in
this study suggests that attorneys also may have discouraged
legitimate and desired limitations.357
We did not observe directly how attorneys implemented, or
failed to implement, the educative and preventive goals of the
Act-using the plan to refocus parents and to help decrease
parental conflict at divorce. We do know, however, that attor-
neys as a group are divided in their views concerning the
ability of this (or any) legal device to affect the attitudes or
emotions of divorcing parents. 35 8 The attorneys thus mirror
the sharply divided views of scholars and of empiricists about
what custody law can and cannot do.
b. The role of the court in reviewing uncontested
plans-With two exceptions, the commissioners and judges of
four different counties conveyed an impression that the new
Act made no difference in their scrutiny of agreed or settled
plans except that the added length of settlements made them
more time consuming to review. 3 9  These officials also
labored under the shadow cast by unresolved statutory
ambiguity concerning their responsibilities under the new
law. 360 While being observed, none of them, however, in-
quired about the existence of a section 10 harm, or compliance
with the mandatory limitations required by the Act.36' In
interviews, they indicated that such inquiries were either
economically infeasible given their caseloads or were not called
for by the statute.362 Several commissioners indicated that,
in any event, inquiries concerning section 10 conduct would be
wrong (inappropriately intrusive) in settled cases.36 3
356. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
357. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
358. See supra notes 136-39, 238-40 and accompanying text. We also know that the
presence of one or two attorneys did not result in better compliance with one aspect
of the Act designed to refocus parental consciousness: the attorneys did not replace
the old terms "custody" and "reasonable visitation" with the new terms denominating
parental function. See supra note 252.
359. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
360. See supra pp. 97-99.
361. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. A large percentage of case files in
the King County sample had no provision indicating either the presence or the
absence of a § 10 behavior. See supra p. 157. Those cases could mean either that no
§ 10 behaviors existed or that the behaviors existed, but parties (perhaps under the
influence of counsel) chose not to bring them up.
362. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
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B. Implications for Reform and Research
1. Political consequences-To the extent that the Parenting
Act is accurately characterized as a series of compromises be-
tween two competing political concerns -shared parenting
and limits on shared parenting-shared parenting advocates
appear to have had certain "success" on paper at this early
date while the "success" of those who oppose joint custody is
much more equivocal." 4
There is reason to believe that the Act and its plan device
may contribute to a substantial increase in shared-parenting
agreements.365  We need to know, of course, whether the
paper arrangements hold up in practice. Assuming they do-a
big if-and absent the presence of the serious harms
addressed by section 10's mandatory limitations, this possible
effect may be a great advantage to divorcing families if-and
this is also a big if-the required plans help foster the short-
term or long-term parental cooperation to which the Act's
drafters aspired.366 If instead, plans generate more conflict
than the old "custody to x, reasonable visitation to y" formula,
or if clients report little initial or long-term benefit from the
plan, then the requirement is a disservice, not a help, to the
public.367
Furthermore, we should not forget that the idealized
parenting plan assumes intermediaries who do not subvert the
reform's goals by offering only boilerplate language to their
clients or by using the plan solely to effect a paper compromise
that may not reflect the real plans or desires of the parties
364. The one possible exception to the "success" of shared-parenting advocates
concerns the results in default cases. As noted, the data does not tell us how the
number of defaults before the Act compares to the number after the Act. See supra
text accompanying note 210. Shared-parenting advocates may want to study whether
the Act's plan requirement is leading to an increase in nonparticipation by parents
who would have participated more under the traditional custody/visitation decree.
365. See supra Part III.B.l.b.
366. The California study calls into question the extent to which agreements for
joint physical custody are followed in practice. See supra note 220. We do not know
whether the demanding detail required by a plan results in any higher
correspondence between written provisions and family practice.
367. Even findings ofpostdecree conflict equal to that under nonplan regimes would
call for serious debate of the plan requirement because the expense of creating a plan
could no longer be justified on grounds that it would reduce that long-term conflict.
That central question cannot be answered on the basis of data from the first year or
two after implementation of the act.
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and their children. As one Washington practitioner wrote
(anonymously) to this author after listening to a talk on some
results of this study:
[You] should realize how little lawyers care what the
papers say about parenting. We care about whether the
documents are palatable enough to avoid going to trial
[and] whether the documents will force or avoid diffi-
culties in the future. I'm perfectly willing to agree to
joint decision making [and] big visitation if I know the
parenting plan provisions are meaningless.36
We do not yet know how such attorney attitudes and
behavior influence client attitudes and negotiation postures in
creating plans. Most importantly, the effect of the plan on
parents and children is yet to be studied. A small handful of
interviews indicates that a few parents dismiss the plan idea
as useless, but a number of others, including parents with
section 10 claims or with attorneys they did not like, report
that they have felt reassured by the certainty and specificity
of their plans.369 A reassured parent may be a better parent.
The initial results for advocates of limits on shared
parenting are more uncertain. The primary caretaker
preference, as drafted, is not a "victory" unless and until an
appellate court is willing to rest on grounds other than the
indeterminate "best interests" and, at a minimum, to require
specific findings with respect to the "greatest weight" language
in the statute.37 ' Furthermore, the results of the protective
provisions of the Act are questionable, at least in the less-
contentious cases examined in this study. Evidence from
interviews and court files indicates that the proponents of
section 10 have reason to be concerned about whether
attorneys are mentioning and explaining section 10 to clients,
whether attorneys may be ignoring or dismissing valid section
10 claims, whether unfounded facts are being alleged by
represented parties, whether well-founded allegations are
368. Anonymous Comment on Evaluation Sheet for Fourth Annual Family Law
Institute (May 8, 1990) (a family law CLE seminar presented by the University of
Washington School of Law):
369. See L. Kalina & F. Porter, supra note 323, at 34, 39, 41; K. Timm, Two Years
Have Gone By: Have We Changed The World? 50-51 (May 1990) (on file at the
Marion Gould Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School of Law).
370. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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being inappropriately bargained away in two-attorney
negotiations, and whether the limitations that are included in
plans, at least in two-attorney cases, actually provide the
protection envisioned by the statute. 1 Observed courts do
not appear to have interpreted the Act to require them to
inquire about section 10 conduct when they scrutinize agreed
plans. Nor do courts appear to be fulfilling consistently their
unambiguous duty to ensure that plans conform with section
10 where there are section 10 findings.7 2
Advocates of statutory protections cannot begin to hope for
"success," however, until the Act's ambiguity concerning the
operation of section 10 is cleared up. 373  And unravelling
that ambiguity raises the larger question of what the state's
role should be-or should not be-in attempting to perform
any protective function at divorce.
2. The protective function of custody law-The Parenting
Act demonstrates, at a minimum, that statutory changes
aimed at better protecting divorcing parties and their children
against postdecree harms should be unambiguous as to the
respective duties, if any, of counsel or court in implementing
those protections. Furthermore, even where statutes are clear
about required limitations, professional attitudes, experience,
and, arguably, professional ethics may need to change before
a law's protective goals can be realized.
I believe that the state should create or retain a list of
harmful behaviors requiring limitations on parent-parent or
parent-child arrangements after divorce. The conduct listed
under the mandatory limitation section of section 10, with the
exception of the uninformative "pattern of emotional abuse,"
provides a useful list of such harms. 4  Similarly, there
should be a presumption that such limitations will be applied
where there are findings of these harms. That presumption
can be rebutted as provided in the Parenting Act.375 The
more difficult question, of course, is how-or whether-these
mandatory limitations should be applied to the private-
ordering process.
The state should not, in my opinion, authorize legal profes-
371. See supca Parts III.B.2.a.-.e.
372. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
373. See, e.g., supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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sionals to inquire about, and then judge, the behavior of
divorcing parents in hopes of ensuring such protection in all
cases. Data gathered in this study indicates that at least
some of the drafters of the Act expected attorneys and
reviewing courts to do exactly that.376 Was such intrusion
into the lives of all divorcing parents the goal of the section 10
proponents? The commentary, though not without ambiguity,
indicates that the goal was to protect children and vulnerable
parties rather than to use divorce as an occasion to police
parents. 7 Furthermore, the commentary's repeated concern
with the importance of applying the statutory limitations 37 8
can be interpreted not as a client-policing device, but as a
device to control attorneys or courts who may not have given
sufficient attention to these harms in the past. At the same
time, the commentary refers to the fact that earlier law failed
to "identify" vulnerable parties. 379  Thus, the goals can
reasonably be construed as recognizing and protecting at-risk
parties and children, and ensuring that counsel and court
understand that limitations must be applied in cases where
the mandatory-limitation behavior has occurred.
Is there a less intrusive and more effective means to
achieve these goals than the recommended questioning of each
divorcing parent by counsel or court? The short answer is yes.
A custody statute can and should require in unambiguous
terms that information on the availability of protective
limitations in cases involving serious harms be communicated
to the client. Such a clear legislative directive would both
inform parents and avoid the problem of the attorney who
believes she need not bother to mention section 10. This
requirement would not achieve other goals, however, including
protecting children from egregious harms, "identifying"
vulnerable parties, and controlling ignorant or biased legal
professionals.
a. Child protection-What can be done, if anything, about
the difficult problem of the client who reports that the other
376. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
377. See, e.g., COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 12. The Act's use of the phrase "shall
not require" throughout § 10 also indicates a concern with protection rather than
forcing a certain result against the parent's own wish.
378. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 12-13, 28, 30-32, 36-41.
379. COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 12.
380. A statute could require counsel or, where a party is unrepresented, require the
county court administration to provide written information on the availability of § 10-
type protections before that party completes a plan. Individual jurisdictions might
require attorneys to certify that they have informed clients of the protective sections.
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parent has indeed committed an egregious harm against their
child, but states that she does not want it mentioned in the
parenting plan? Or the client who admits to such a harm, but
requests a zealous denial by his attorney? Although in all
other situations, client autonomy should take priority over any
paternalistic protective function, here the tension between
that autonomy and child protection becomes most pronounced.
These troubling and, fortunately, unusual situations cannot,
however, be resolved by custody reform alone. The problem is
one of professional ethics.3"' Explicit modification of the
rules of confidentiality and client advocacy would be necessary
before an attorney would be permitted to inform the court of
the behavior, unless the extremely narrow "future crime"
exception was implicated by the case.
The decision to make an exception to these rules for the
sake of child protection should not be made without extensive
debate, including consideration of the realistic possibilities of
offering an option that is better than the situation were there
no state intrusion. To pretend that a foster home is an
improvement over residency with a parent who insists he will
do his best to protect the child, but prefers-perhaps with good
reason-that the section 10 claim not be raised, would be
unfortunate at best and unconscionable at worst.
Furthermore, even if the profession did decide that an
exception to the rule of attorney-client confidentiality would be
appropriate in some circumstances, such as those described in
the "mandatory limitations" section of the Act, such an
exception should be triggered only if an attorney has a well-
founded belief that the nonabusive parent is unable to protect
the child from further harm. Finally, any intervention
resulting from such an exception should be the least intrusive
alternative possible. 2
Unless and until there is a modification to the rules, attor-
neys should urge clients to bring the harmful behavior to light,
tell the client that the attorney does not wish to pursue a
harmful course of action on behalf of the client, and withdraw
from any case in which the client insists that the attorney
advocate a position that may result in a serious harm.
b. Identifying vulnerable parties-How can the goal of
"identifying" vulnerable parties be achieved without
381. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
382. The "least intrusive" alternative is a basic principle of Goldstein and
colleagues. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 112, at 24.
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interrogating every divorcing parent? Again, it is important
to ask what the legislature intended. If it intended to ensure
that parties would learn of and take advantage of statutory
protections, then mandatory inquiries by court or attorney will
not succeed. Domestic violence is a useful example. Experts
in domestic violence know that clients may be overcome with
shame or guilt and therefore may not be forthcoming about the
violence in their homes." 3 They may recommend, as a
result, that attorneys ask clients to think about any harms
that may have occurred and to bring a list of those harms to
the attorney during the next visit.384 That is a counseling
technique, however, and good counseling cannot be mandated.
Telling an attorney who is ignorant of the realities of domestic
violence that she must ask about it risks subjecting an already
vulnerable client to humiliation or insensitivity at the hands
of an attorney who lacks information, insight, and empathy.
Expecting such a party to respond to inquiries by an
anonymous court at the moment a divorce arrangement is
being approved is unrealistic. This approach also requires a
party who prefers not to bring up the violence to commit
perjury. Thus, solutions other than coercive questioning must
be found to contend with the need to inform and assist victims
of domestic violence.
c. Controlling professionals-Analogous arguments can be
made in connection with the problem of the ignorant or biased
attorney who injects his personal values into a case and
decides that he can simply dismiss a mandatory-limitation
claim out of hand or actively dissuade a client from seeking
protections that the client desires.385 But requiring the
same attorney or judge to question the client does not solve
that problem either. Again, solutions other than statutory
mandates are necessary to deal with professional ignorance or
bias, and these solutions are discussed below.
3. Professional intervention- a. The role of the attor-
ney-The data suggest strongly that legal professionals need
further education about the protective functions of custody
law, the dynamics of attorney negotiation, and their role in
383. See, e.g., Hawkins, Summary of Section 10 Limitations, in WASHINGTON'S
INNOVATIVE APPROACH, supra note 96, at 104; see also Sun & Thomas, supra note 7,
at 571.
384. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 383, at 104.
385. See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
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assisting or impeding law reform.3 86 Attorneys need more
information on how to communicate with and counsel clients
about legal protection in cases that involve or might involve
serious harms, how to evaluate whether a claim of harm is
well-founded and "worthy" of protection, 387 how to help a
client or the court decide what sort of protections are
appropriate in a given case, and how to make the
tremendously difficult evaluation of when to recommend and
work toward settlement and when not to. They also need
education concerning the risks of joint custody "compromises"
in cases where parents are extremely hostile.
Interviews also revealed the disparate attitudes held by
legal professionals on the ability of a legal reform to change
the attitudes and emotions of clients, at least in the short
term.8 8 It is impossible not to wonder whether the attitude
of attorneys may itself be a potent variable affecting the
proposition that a legal device can have either an immediate
effect on parties' emotions or a long-term effect on societal
norms. Attorneys who, for example, consider a change from
the word "custody" to the word "parenting" nothing other than
a lot of silliness, may not be inclined to use the new word or
may use it only with disdain. Attorneys who consider the plan
to be a useful means of providing structure for important
decisions to emotionally vulnerable clients may communicate
that attitude. Thus, the lawyer's role in facilitating or
impeding change through the use of a legal device like a plan
is another important area for further research and possible
change.
To list these concerns about legal professionals and divorce
custody is only to illustrate, again, their difficulty. And all of
these observations add up to one larger recommendation. The
role of the divorce attorney is one of such complexity, human
delicacy, and human toughness that it may no longer be
justifiable to allow practice in this area without certification
based on specialized education. Without that requirement
there is little likelihood that the profession will be able to
police itself properly. At a bare minimum, educational
386. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
387. This need appears to be particularly great in the area of domestic violence
where the profession evidences a wide range of different values concerning what acts
should "count" as domestic violence that is "worthy" of § 10 limitations at divorce.
See, e.g., supra notes 268-70.
388. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
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programs on the difficult issues discussed above must be made
available and, wherever possible, should be made mandato-
ry."' It may take a generation of such education to effect
change, but to do anything less is to mock any ambition of
caring about the lives of divorcing parents and their children,
let alone the child's "best interests" at divorce.
b. The role of the court-This is not the first empirical
study to expose the fact that court scrutiny of divorce custody
settlements is superficial at best. The number of divorces and
the economic realities of court dockets in many, if not all,
jurisdictions,39 ° suggest that the possibility of change is re-
mote at best. Over ten years ago, Mnookin and Kornhauser
examined possible justifications for judicial scrutiny of
parental agreements, including the possibilities that court
review might improve the quality of out-of-court negotiations
and that it might ensure better child protection. They found
these arguments "questionable" at best:
Given the resources devoted to the task of scrutinizing
agreements, there is little reason to believe that the pro-
cess operates as much of a safeguard when there is no
parental dispute to catch the judge's attention.
Moreover, the process itself often imposes substantial
transaction costs . . . [that] might otherwise inure, at
least in part, to the benefit of the children.391
This study does not indicate that the possibility of court
review improves the quality of negotiations. Ironically, some
judges and commissioners claimed that they have a special
responsibility to scrutinize cases settled by parties without
legal representation. 92 Yet the data in this study showed
that it is the cases involving counsel, and especially two-
attorney cases, that arguably require formal court scrutiny.
This is a dubious use of taxpayers' money.
The rationale for court inquiry about section 10, at least as
389. There are a variety of ways to require such courses. Specialization has already
been mentioned. In addition, law schools could require more courses, requirements
for continuing legal education could include minimum hours for family law, and,
finally, courts could order that certain courses must be taken by counsel before
practice in that area is allowed. There are many arguments to be considered in
relation to each of these proposals, and I defer to experts in the field of professional
education and professional responsibility.
390. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
391. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 995 (footnote omitted).
392. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
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expressed in training sessions concerning the Act, was the
need to ensure that parties knew of the limitations section of
the Act and to ensure compliance with its terms. The
problems of interpreting section 10 to require inquiries by
counsel or court into parental behavior have already been
discussed. Court scrutiny, furthermore, is not the best way to
accomplish the more-circumscribed goal of informing parties
of the availability of section 10 limits.
If the state is loathe to eliminate all review of completed
plans for fear that compliance with its regulations may
diminish without scrutiny (a proposition that can itself be
tested), it might consider limiting court review to those cases
that include section 10 findings.393 It might also do a cost-
benefit analysis on the viability of replacing court scrutiny of
all plans with an audit system that would select a limited
number of random cases to gauge compliance with the law
and, specifically, with section 10.
At a bare minimum, whether the use of state resources for
individual judicial scrutiny of settled plans is a necessary or
even a reasonable expense should be debated. 394 The money
might be spent much more usefully, as Mnookin and
Kornhauser and others suggested many years ago, on
information and counselling services for divorcing parents.395
It could also be used for mandatory education for legal
professionals who wish to qualify to handle parent-child issues
in divorce.
c. The role of the legislature-To the extent a new law
precludes investigation without inordinate expense, it is trans-
formed from experiment to unexamined edict overnight. This
is nothing new, of course. We pass laws based on unexamined
assumptions all the time and don't return to examine the
result. Where the laws affect economically sound adults, this
393. There are dangers here, however. The specter of special treatment, as opposed
to the routine inspection now given to all plans, might create an incentive for some
parties or attorneys to eliminate valid § 10 findings to avoid that scrutiny. Some
members of the bench and bar might find the idea of no regular court scrutiny
threatening because it eliminates the need for legal services in cases where people
retain attorneys simply because they are intimidated by the idea of going to court.
That is no justification, however, for maintaining an expensive and ineffective system
of "review."
394. Such a debate is now going on among family law practitioners in the State of
Washington, and the issue continues to be a controversial one. See Family Law
Newsletter, 12 FAM. ADvoc., Jan. 1989, at 71.
395. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 995; see also Cavanagh & Rhode,
supra note 8.
Divorce Custody Reform
is less of a problem. The system is self-correcting to the
extent the adults can afford to appear in court to litigate the
interpretation or application of the new statute. When the law
affects parties and nonparties who have little or no resources
(i.e., children and many divorcing parents of both genders), the
state has more responsibility for tracking the result of what it
has imposed and correcting problems as they come to light.
Thus, legislatures should be sensitive to the need for
investigation and must be willing to allocate time and money
to follow up on reforms that so extensively regulate the
intimate lives of its citizens and that cannot be tested with
ease or frequency in a public forum. Politicians, like legal
professionals, must recognize the extent to which and ways in
which human lives are touched by their handiwork.
In addition, the legislature also has a responsibility to
acknowledge and act on the fact that no legal change, includ-
ing a statutory attempt to provide better protection to
vulnerable spouses and children at divorce, will come to pass
without sufficient training to ensure proper implementation of
a law. To leave education of professionals to the marketplace,
or to only one session that skims the surface of a new law, is
to guarantee that a given reform will amount to no more than
rhetoric.
We still do not know whether these rigorous regulations are
helpful to family members during or after divorce.
Longitudinal research about the experiences of families who
divorce under the new Act is imperative before a reasoned
judgment of this law can be made. Other jurisdictions should
therefore hesitate to impose the demanding plan requirement
on divorcing parents and should, at most, recommend that
parents may wish to use that structure in their decrees.
Should future studies indicate a strong positive consensus
from parents or a decrease in postdecree conflict, a statutory
plan requirement might then be in order. States should add
a statutory list of harmful behaviors requiring limitations so
that informed clients may avail themselves of necessary
protections should they so choose without fear that certain
serious harms will be ignored. Whether or not a state decides
to proceed with formal legal reform, however, work can and
must be done to improve the practices of family law
professionals and to solve problems that have likely existed for
many years under cover of less-regulated custody regimes.
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APPENDIX
(excerpted from Washington Revised Code (1989))
§ 26.09.004 Definitions. The definitions in this section
apply throughout this chapter.
(1) "Temporary parenting plan" means a plan for parenting
of the child pending final resolution of any action for
dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity, or legal
separation which is incorporated in a temporary order.
(2) "Permanent parenting plan" means a plan for
parenting the child, including allocation of parenting
functions, which plan is incorporated in any final decree or
decree of modification in an action for dissolution of marriage,
declaration of invalidity, or legal separation.
(3) "Parenting functions" means those aspects of the
parent-child relationship in which the parent makes decisions
and performs functions necessary for the care and growth of
the child. Parenting functions include:
(a) Maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing
relationship with the child;
(b) Attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feed-
ing, clothing, physical care and grooming, supervision, health
care, and day care, and engaging in other activities which are
appropriate to the developmental level of the child and that
are within the social and economic circumstances of the
particular family;
(c) Attending to adequate education for the child, including
remedial or other education essential to the best interests of
the child;
(d) Assisting the child in developing and maintaining appro-
priate interpersonal relationships;
(e) Exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's
welfare, consistent with the child's developmental level and
the family's social and economic circumstances; and
(f) Providing for the financial support of the child.
§ 26.09.184 Permanent parenting plan. (1)
OBJECTIVES. The objectives of the permanent parenting
plan are to:
(a) Provide for the child's physical care;
182
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(b) Maintain the child's emotional stability;
(c) Provide for the child's changing needs as the child
grows and matures, in a way that minimizes the need for
future modifications to the permanent parenting plan;
(d) Set forth the authority and responsibilities of each
parent with respect to the child, consistent with the criteria in
RCW 26.09.187 and 26.09.191;
(e) Minimize the child's exposure to harmful parental
conflict;
(f) Encourage the parents, where appropriate under RCW
26.09.187 and 26.09.191, to meet their responsibilities to their
minor children through agreements in the permanent
parenting plan, rather than by relying on judicial intervention;
and
(g) To otherwise protect the best interests of the child
consistent with RCW 26.09.002.
(2) CONTENTS OF THE PERMANENT PARENTING
PLAN. The permanent parenting plan shall contain
provisions for resolution of future disputes between the
parents, allocation of decision-making authority, and
residential provisions for the child.
(3) DISPUTE RESOLUTION. A process for resolving
disputes, other than court action, shall be provided unless
precluded or limited by RCW 26.09.187 or 26.09.191. A
dispute resolution process may include counseling, mediation,
or arbitration by a specified individual or agency, or court
action. In the dispute resolution process:
(a) Preference shall be given to carrying out the parenting
plan;
(b) The parents shall use the designated process to resolve
disputes relating to implementation of the plan, except those
related to financial support, unless an emergency exists;
(c) A written record shall be prepared of any agreement
reached in counseling or mediation and of each arbitration
award and shall be provided to each party;
(d) If the court finds that a parent has used or frustrated
the dispute resolution process without good reason, the court
shall award attorneys' fees and financial sanctions to the
prevailing parent;
(e) The parties have the right of review from the dispute
resolution process to the superior court; and
(f) The provisions of (a) through (e) of this subsection
shall be set forth in the decree.
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(4) ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY.
(a) The plan shall allocate decision-making authority to one
or both parties regarding the children's education, health care,
and religious upbringing. The parties may incorporate an
agreement related to the care and growth of the child in these
specified areas, or in other areas, into their plan, consistent
with the criteria in RCW 26.09.187 and 26.09.191. Regardless
of the allocation of decision-making in the parenting plan,
either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the
health or safety of the child.
(b) ' Each parent may make decisions regarding the day-to-
day care and control of the child while the child is residing
with that parent.
(c) When mutual decision making is designated but cannot
be achieved, the parties shall make a good-faith effort to
resolve the issue through the dispute resolution process.
(5) RESIDENTIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE CHILD. The
plan shall include a residential schedule which designates in
which parent's home each minor child shall reside on given
days of the year, including provision for holidays, birthdays of
family members, vacations, and other special occasions,
consistent with the criteria in RCW 26.09.187 and 26.09.191.
(6) PARENTS' OBLIGATION UNAFFECTED. If a parent
fails to comply with a provision of a parenting plan, the other
parent's obligations under the parenting plan are not affected.
(7) PROVISIONS TO BE SET FORTH IN PERMANENT
PARENTING PLAN. The permanent parenting plan shall set
forth the provisions of subsections (3) (a) through (c), (4) (b)
and (c), and (6) of this section.
§ 26.09.187 Criteria for establishing permanent
parenting plan. (1) DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS.
The court shall not order a dispute resolution process, except
court action, when it finds that any limiting factor under RCW
26.09.191 applies, or when it finds that either parent is unable
to afford the cost of the proposed dispute resolution process.
If a dispute resolution process is not precluded or limited, then
in designating such a process the court shall consider all
relevant factors, including:
(a) Differences between the parents that would substantial-
ly inhibit their effective participation in any designated
process;
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(b) The parents' wishes or agreements and, if the parents
have entered into agreements, whether the agreements were
made knowingly and voluntarily; and
(c) Differences in the parents' financial circumstances that
may affect their ability to participate fully in a given dispute
resolution process.
(2) ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
(a) AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. The court
shall approve agreements of the parties allocating decision-
making authority, or specifying rules in the areas listed in
RCW 26.09.18(4)(a), when it finds that:
(i) The agreement is consistent with any limitations on a
parent's decision-making authority mandated by RCW
26.09.191; and
(ii) The agreement is knowing and voluntary.
(b) SOLE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY. The court
shall order sole decision-making to one parent when it finds
that:
(i) A limitation on the other parent's decision-making
authority is mandated by RCW 26.09.191;
(ii) Both parents are opposed to mutual decision making;
(iii) One parent is opposed to mutual decision making, and
such opposition is reasonable based on the criteria in (c) of
this subsection;
(c) MUTUAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY. Except
as provided in (a) and (b) of this subsection, the court shall
consider the following criteria in allocating decision-making
authority:
(i) The existence of a limitation under RCW 26.09.191;
(ii) The history of participation of each parent in decision
making in each of the areas in RCW 26.09.184(4)(a);
(iii) Whether the parents have a demonstrated ability and
desire to cooperate with one another in decision making in
each of the areas in RCW 26.09.184(4)(a); and
(iv) The parents' geographic proximity to one another, to
the extent that it affects their ability to make timely mutual
decisions.
(3) RESIDENTIAL PROVISIONS.
(a) The court shall make residential provisions for each
child which encourage each parent to maintain a loving,
stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent
with the child's developmental level and the family's social
and economic circumstances. The child's residential schedule
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shall be consistent with RCW 26.09.191. Where the
limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive of the child's
residential schedule, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(i) The relative strength, nature, and stability of the child's
relationship with each parent, including whether a parent has
taken greater responsibility for performing parenting functions
relating to the daily needs of the child;
(ii) The agreements of the parties, provided they were
entered into knowingly and voluntarily;
(iii) Each parent's past and potential for future performance
of parenting functions;
(iv) The emotional needs and developmental level of the
child;
(v) The child's relationship with siblings and with other
significant adults, as well as the child's involvement with his
or her physical surroundings, school, or other significant
activities;
(vi) The wishes of the parents and the wishes of a child who
is sufficiently mature to express reasoned and independent
preferences as to his or her residential schedule; and
(vii) Each parent's employment schedule, and shall make
accommodations consistent with those schedules.
Factor (i) shall be given the greatest weight.
(b) The court may order that a child frequently alternate
his or her residence between the households of the parents for
brief and substantially equal intervals of time only if the court
finds the following:
(i) No limitation exists under RCW 26.09.191;
(ii) (A) The parties have agreed to such provisions and the
agreement was knowingly and voluntarily entered into; or
(B) The parties have a satisfactory history of cooperation
and shared performance of parenting functions; the parties are
available to each other, especially in geographic proximity, to
the extent necessary to ensure their ability to share perfor-
mance of the parenting functions; and
(iii) The provisions are in the best interests of the child.
§ 26.09.191 Restrictions in temporary or permanent
parenting plans. (1) The permanent parenting plan shall not
require mutual decision-making or designation of a dispute
resolution process other than court action if it is found that a
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parent has engaged in any of the following conduct: (a) Willful
abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or
substantial refusal to perform parenting functions; (b)
physical, sexual, or a pattern of emotional abuse of a child; or
(c) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW
26.50.010(1) or an assault or sexual assault which causes
grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm.
(2)(a) The parent's residential time with the child shall be
limited if it is found that the parent has engaged in any of the
following conduct: (i) Willful abandonment that continues for
an extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform
parenting functions; (ii) physical, sexual, or a pattern of
emotional abuse of a child; or (iii) a history of acts of domestic
violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(1) or an assault or
sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear
of such harm.
(b) The limitations imposed by the court shall be reasonably
calculated to protect the child from physical, sexual, or emo-
tional abuse or harm that could result if the child has contact
with the parent requesting residential time. If the court
expressly finds limitation on the residential time with the
child will not adequately protect the child from the harm or
abuse that could result if the child has contact with the parent
requesting residential time, the court shall restrain the parent
requesting residential time from all contact with the child.
(c) If the court expressly finds that contact between the
parent and the child will not cause physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse or harm to the child and that the probability
that the parent's harmful or abusive conduct will recur is so
remote that it would not be in the child's best interests to
apply the limitations of (a) and (b) of this subsection, or if the
court expressly finds the parent's conduct did not have an
impact on the child, then the court need not apply the
limitations of (a) and (b) of this subsection. The weight given
to the existence of a protection order issued under chapter
26.50 RCW as to domestic violence is within the discretion of
the court.
(3) A parent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse
effect on the child's best interests, and the court may preclude
or limit any provisions of the parenting plan, if any of the
following factors exist:
(a) A parent's neglect or substantial nonperformance of
parenting functions;
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(b) A long-term emotional or physical impairment which
interferes with the parent's performance of parenting
functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004;
(c) A long-term impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or
other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of
parenting functions;
(d) The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties
between the parent and the child;
(e) The abusive use of conflict by the parent which creates
the danger of serious damage to the child's psychological
development;
(f) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to
the child for a protracted period without good cause; or
(g) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly
finds adverse to the best interests of the child.
(4) In entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall
not draw any presumptions from the provisions of the
temporary parenting plan.
(5) In determining whether any of the conduct described in
this section has occurred, the court shall apply the civil rules
of evidence, proof, and procedure.
